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Introduction 

Since the late 1980s, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) has viewed voluntary repatriation as the most desirable solution to a refugee 
situation. In conjunction with the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
governments, various development organizations, and aid donors, UNHCR has pro­
moted international action to create conditions favourable for mass return movements 
and long-term development efforts. The ideal was that repatriated refugees (returnees) 
would receive immediate relief and assistance upon arrival in their country of origin to 
aid short-term resettlement. Returnees would then participate in longer-term social 
and economic development programs to ensure that viable livelihoods could be 
attained to facilitate their successful reintegration (Allen and Morsink 1994). Through 
this multifaceted cooperation it was assumed that the dangers of returnees becoming 
"internally displaced persons" or aggravating problems such as excessive urbaniza­
tion, job competition, or land scarcity could be reduced. In reality, however, as Stein 
(1994,50) notes, "there is a tremendous gap between principle (the desirable) and 
practice (the actual) with regard to aid to returnees." Refugees are frequently repatri­
ated to politically volatile locations where security violations continue to destabilize 
the country and aid assistance is more in the form of rehabilitation than development. 
In Cambodia, for example, the economic, social, and political conditions under which 
the Cambodian repatriation took place in 1993 meant that the level and type of aid given 
to returnees was of short-term priority. Long-term assistance focused on rebuilding the 
physical infrastructure, supporting local populations, and aiding internally displaced 
peoples (IDPs). 
As early as 1991, when the United Nations initiated plans for the voluntary 
repatriation of over 370,000 Cambodian refugees, Cambodia was recognized as one of 
the poorest countries in the world, the result of more than two decades of war and 
international isolation. General living conditions throughout the country were seri­
ously deteriorated and showed little improvement over the next two years, as indicated 
in a 1993 report: 
Life expectancy is only 49.7 years. Just 12 per cent of rural Cambodians and 
20 per cent of urban dwellers have access to safe drinking water. A relatively 
large proportion of the population consists of extremely vulnerable groups 
comprising widows with families, single elderly people, orphans and the 
disabled. Four of every 1000persons are disabled. Women in particular must 
shoulder heavy burdens and responsibilities. They account for nearly two 
thirds of the population and head one third of all households. (UNRISD 
1993,1) I 
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Charney (1992) identifies three distinct phases in Cambodia's recent history. The 
first is referred to as the "Emergency Period" from 1979 to 1982. This was a period of 
urgent rehabilitation via international intervention into all sectors of Cambodian 
economy and society. After four years of Communist Khmer Rouge destruction (from 
1975 to 1979), the recovery of health and agriculture were priorities, specifically food 
production. The second period, which Charney (1992) identifies as "Isolation," was 
from 1982 to 1987. During this time the international community imposed an embargo 
an Cambodia, supposedly to force anend to the Vietnamese occupation ofthe country. 
Security violations magnified. Only scant humanitarian assistance such as basic food 
was available. Mysliwiec (1988) details this international isolation in her book Punish­
ing the Poor. The third phase of "Transition and Liberalization" began immediately 
following the December 1987 meeting between various Cambodian political leaders. 
Lasting unti11991, this period enabled international organizations and NGOs to place 
expatriate staff in all provinces and lay the foundations for reconstruction and commu­
nity development projects. The period from 1992 to the present has involved the 
holding of Cambodia's first democratic elections, the repatriation of all Cambodian 
refugees, and the intensification of civil warbetweentheKhmer Rouge and Cambodian 
government forces. 
In April 1992, the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) 
was established in Phnom Penh, Cambodia's capital, to organize the implementation 
of multiparty elections and to facilitate the repatriation of Cambodians from refugee 
camps throughout Southeast Asia. UNTAC's presence in Cambodia lasted 18 months 
and involved more than 22,000 soldiers and civilians. The overall cost exceeded $2.8 
billion, making it the mostexpensive peacekeeping mission inUnited Nations' history. 
In addition to holding democratic elections in May 1993, UNTAC was to resolve 
security concerns and disarm military factions, implement de-mining activities, and 
expedite long-term development plans. Except for the last-minute Khmer Rouge 
withdrawal from the multiparty elections, the electoral organization and the final 
results were declared a success in democratic procedure. 
When the repatriation process began inearly 1993, four out of five preconditions for 
repatriation had not been met. Peace and security in Cambodia were not guaranteed 
and, despite the presence of 20,000 United Nations security forces, UNTAC failed to 
resolve conflicts between the Khmer Rouge and the Cambodian government. During 
the protracted negotiations for repatriation, continued fighting between the Khmer 
Rouge and Cambodian forces resulted in over 180,000 internally displaced persons 
(Ruiz and Robinson 1993). In addition, Khmer Rouge forces reclaimed extensive 
territory throughout northwestern Cambodia and continued terror tactics against 
civilians. De-mining efforts had been minimal and over forty percent of farmland 
remained littered with mines, with estimates ranging as high as eight million being 
scattered throughout the country's fields, roads, and hillsides (Donovan 1993). Land 
mines continued to claim the lives of local people and their livestock, and restrict access 
to agricultural lands. As a result, agricultural land that could be potentially available 
for returnees was scarce and equitable alloca tion procEPures could notbe developed or 
implemented. Further, adequate funding for long-term rehabilitation and develop-
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ment assistance, either for returnees or the country itself, was not forthcoming. As Stein 
(1994,52) notes, when refugees are returned to their homelands under circumstances 
of conflict and continued risk, the implementation of development assistance may be 
nearly, if not totally, impossible. 
During 1992 and 1993, the efficiently planned and orderly process of Cambodian 
repatriation was set in motion. Cambodians were registered, bused or flown across the 
border, processed in reception centres, and given a 400-day food ration card along with 
packages of material aid. They were transported to transit centres from where they 
were to reURite with their families. Various degrees of integration assistance were 
provided by a number of international agencies and NGOs. By June 1, 1993, an 
estimated 362,209 Cambodians had repatriated from Thai camps via UNHCR convoys. 
In addition, approximately 2,000 Cambodians were repatriated from camps in Viet­
nam, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and an estimated 22,000 returned spontaneously, 
although only 5,306 registered with UNHCR for assistance (Robinson 1994). 
Due to the scarcity of available agricultural land, ninety percent of the returnees 
were "encouraged" by UNHCR officials to choose "Option C," an aid package which 
offered a house/agricultural kit, 400 days of food assistance (200 days for those settling 
inPhnomPenh), and $50 peradult and $25 per child under twelve. The destinations for 
the majority of returnees were Banteay Meanchey and Battembang provinces, areas 
littered with mines and surrounded by Khmer Rouge forces and factional fighting. In 
general, Cambodians were returned to areas ill-prepared or incapable of receiving and 
resettling them, and to local governments who had little interest in or commitment to 
facilitating their reintegration (Rogge 1994). Indeed, the UNHCR promotion of Cambo­
dian repatriation was done in the face of vigorous criticism from development agencies 
bothwithin Cambodia and in the refugee camps. Concerns were raised about the return 
and reintegration of "vulnerable" refugees into severely devastated areas (Ledgerwood 
1992, Mollica et al. 1992, Thorn 1991). 
Geiger (1993) notes several criticisms concerning the UNHCR information cam­
paign, especially the push for "Option C," which concentrated on the repatriation plan 
and excluded the updated conditions inCambodia with regard to social, economic, and 
security concerns. As a result, returnees were not prepared for the social and economic 
circumstances they were expected to reintegrate into, nor were they made aware of the 
extensive mine presence, the numerous areas of security risks, the lack of water in 
villages, and the high incidence of malaria and other health risks. The 1990 UNHCR 
pre-repatriation assessments of areas into which the returnees had indicated they 
would return to, provided information that led most returnees to believe that good 
agricultural land would be available to them upon return. By 1992,when thatinforma­
tion proved to be grossly misleading and false, returnees were influenced to accept the 
landless aid package. At this time, many retained the mistaken impression that land 
would still be available to them. Other than the emotional desire to "return home," 
questions remain regarding the information onwhich refugees based their decisions to 
return. Certainly the upcoming elections and the removal of the Vietnamese-backed 
government were influential, but when contrasted witl]. the scarcity of available land 
or employment opportunities, debilitated infrastructure, ongoing fighting, extensive 
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mines, and the lack of health and social services, what benefits were there in repatriat­
ing? As Rogge (1994, 32) notes, "refugees agreeing to repatriate 'voluntarily' on the 
basis of misinformation fed them are anything but voluntary returnees." 
The urgency and scale of the return of Cambodian refugees conformed more to the 
tight electoral schedule set for May 1993 than to any set of objective criteria concerning 
the conditions returnees would face in Cambodia (UNRISD 1993, 4). As early as 1990, 
the UNHCR Inter-Agency Mission on Repatriation of Cambodian Refugees deter­
mined that reintegration, as part of overall development and reconstruction plans, was 
not a UNHCR concern. Once the logistics of return and provision of immediate 
assistance were complete, reintegration activities would be undertaken by other UN 
agencies, such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), NGOs, and 
bilateral aid programs (Robinson 1994, 13). As a result of this rationale, the initial 
reintegration-phase expenditures associated with repatriation led to an excessive 
emphasis on short-term humanitarian relief aid though UNDP Quick Impact Projects 
(QIPs), provided within the first six months of return, while returnees were still 
benefiting from the 400 days of food aid. Essential forms of long-term UNDP develop­
ment assistance were to be implemented through the creation of Cambodia Resettle­
mentandReintegration (CARERE). CARERE's mandate was to expand into longer-term 
regional and rural projects to promote sustainable community development and self­
sufficiency, which ideally would benefit returnees as well as locals (ibid. 1994,49). 
In providing assistance to refugees whohave returned to areas seriously affected by 
war, NGOs and UNDP (including CARERE) generally adopt a "zonal approach" in 
which little distinction is made between returnees and others, since all are regarded as 
being in need of help (Rogge 1994). In a country such as Cambodia, where the basic 
infrastructure has been destroyed and needs to be rehabilitated, it is difficult for NGOs 
and the UNDP to prioritize reintegration needs of returnees against the overwhelming 
rehabilitation needs of the local population, oragainst the provision of emergency relief 
assistance to the hundreds of thousands of internally-displaced people uprooted 
before, during, and after repatriation. Numerous villages, especially in the northwest­
ern provinces, remain abandoned due to mines, and huge tracts of agricultural land 
have reverted to bush. Schools, clinics, water supplies, and roads have been destroyed. 
Community health and veterinary services are still rare, and malaria, malnutrition, and 
other nutritional deficiencies are widespread. Food production has not yet returned to 
pre-1975 levels and is hampered by increasing drought, floods, and lack of technology. 
Cambodian villages need to be rebuilt, land recleared, roads upgraded, wells and 
ponds dug, all of which will take years of effort, dedication, and committed financing 
on the part of UNDP, CARERE and NGOs. 
Against these overwhelming obstacles, Rogge (1994, 39) notes that all too often 
problems of social reintegration among returnees are discounted or repudiated. Within 
the context of major reconstruction, reintegration becomes part of long-term develop­
mental programs. For many aid agencies providing rehabilitation and development 
activities, the presence of repatriated refugees is just one more factor that needs to be 
evaluated to make decisions on organization and a1l9cation of funds (Stein 1994,67). 
Rogge (1994, 31) questions how zonal assistance programs can be implemented that 
benefit both returnees and local people, yet retain the capacity to specifically target the 
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most vulnerable returnees. Zonal assistance may be the most equitable approach from 
the position of the donor agency, but for those returnees most in need (female-headed 
households, handicapped, landless, and unemployed), the benefits may be minimal 
due to the barriers preventing their access to services and assistance geared towards 
community development. It is an open question whether the longer-term reintegration 
of returnees will be significantly assisted by the current and future reconstruction 
programs in Cambodia. 
Due to the lack of material on the reintegration of Cambodian returnees, it is also 
uncertain if returnees have even participated in generalized assistance programs, what 
their status or position is in the highly stratified community networks, or what type, 
extent, and complexity of reintegration problems they may be experiencing. As Allen 
and Morsink (1994) note, very little information is available on the social and economic 
dimensions of repatriation in general, or on the reintegration experiences of the 
returnees themselves. Most literature on voluntary repatriation focuses on three main 
themes-international law, political motivations and parameters, and the logistics of 
the return. The various publications and reports on the large-scale repatriation of 
Cambodians have essentially concentrated on these themes, especially the logistics of 
how the operation was funded, organized, and carried out. Cambodian repatriation is 
usually extolled as a UNHCR "success story" focusing on the organizational process 
and highlighting the social and emotional appeal of long-term refugees 1/coming 
home." 
An exception to this hyperbole is Robinson's (1994) report, in which he provides an 
excellent presentation of the strengths and failures of the process of repatriation and the 
immediate resettlement patterns of returnees. He notes that by the spring of 1994, the 
majority of returnees hadyetto find or develop a source of sustainable income and were 
deeply worried about how they would survive once the 400-day food assistance ended 
in May 1994. At the conclusion of his report, Robinson suggests that "What comes 
next?" would be the key issue for UNHCR monitoring in the months ahead. Geiger 
(1993) also emphasizes the socioeconomic andpsychological implica tions for returnees 
once the 400-day food support program ends but, like Robinson (1994), provides few 
details on the coping mechanisms or survival strategies of families once their food aid 
is gone. According to a World Food Program (WFP) survey conducted from May to 
November 1993, nearly 74 percent of all returnee families interviewed fell under the 
classification of "needy" or"at risk" due to lack of resources; 39 percent were identified 
as vulnerable, being headed by women, handicapped, or elderly; and 29 percent were 
still living in temporary shelters (Robinson 1994,60). Only 12 percent had access to 
agricultural land and fewer still held any title to land, including housing plots (ibid.). 
During the one month of field work undertaken in Cambodia in August 1994 (upon 
which this report is based), I continually raised questions on reintegration, specifically 
on the situation of returnees who must now manage without food aid assistance. Little 
information was available, however, and the common response was a lack of knowl­
edge on returnee coping strategies. The degree and extent to which returnees have 
reintegrated was no longer even addressed as a significynt concern. Further, less than 
two months after the end of the 400-day food assistance program, WFP, UNOP, and all 
other NGOs no longer identified returnees as a vulnerable category or as distinct from 
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local people. The overwhelming assumption was that, after one year, returnees have 
resettled with family members (although this has not been demonstrated in any way) 
. and have integrated to the extent that special consideration or attention is not required. 
At present, the UNDP and NGO emphasis is on bolstering community services and 
infrastructure, particularly in the area of agriculture and farm aid, and not identifying 
returnees or other "vulnerable" categories (orphans, abandoned children, elderly, 
handicapped, widows) for particular support or as principal beneficiaries of develop­
ment assistance. It is precisely these groups, however, whohave the least access to land, 
a fact whim diminishes their eligibility for development assistance and their ability to 
repay credit schemes or other income-generating programs. Few UNDP or NGO 
personnel acknowledge that returnees may have long-term social and economic 
readjustment problems with little sustainable employment and uncertain status positions, 
or that the aid package merely postponed the issue of reintegration rather than abetting it. 
Issues Addressed in the Report 
This report addresses two basic issues. The first concerns reintegration, specifically 
what has happ€ned to returnees who no longer receive food aid and, for the most part, 
do not have employment, adequate housing, and access to agricultural land. The 
second issue involves the type and extent of assistance that has been available to help 
reintegrate returnees, the perceptions from NGOs, locals, and returnees concerning 
this assistance, and the extent to which returnees have participated in zonal-based 
community development. The scope of this report is narrow. Time constraints of less 
than five weeks for data collection, and field-access barriers, precluded a broad 
country-wide analysiS. Data collection was restricted to two provinces: Kandal (which 
includes the capital city, Phnom Penh) and Pursat. Although the majority of returnees 
initially returned to four provinces (Banteay Meanchey, Battambang, Siem Reap, and 
Pursat), only Pursat was considered safe to conduct survey research. Within Pursat, 
most rural areas were inaccessible, either due to impassable roads during the rainy 
season, or because security was not guaranteed, especially for independent research. 
Methodology 
Returnees are living in a diversity of situations throughout Cambodia and the question 
of reintegration is complex, obscured as much by the scarcity of agricultural land as by 
the extensive and unmet needs of local people everywhere. I explored the numerous 
issues related to repatriation and reintegration in two sets of interviews with personnel 
from various international organizations and NGOs. The following is a list of the 
international organizations and NGOs with whom I was able to procure interviews: 
American Refugee Committee (ARC) 

Cambodia Canada Development Program (CCDP) 

Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) 

Care International (CARE) 

Catholic Relief Services (CRS) 
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Church World Service (CWS) 
CONCERN 
Cooperation Committee for Cambodia (Ccq 
Halo Trust International (HT) 
Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS) 
Medecins Sans Frontieres Holland/Belgium (MSF H/B) 
Pursat Women's Association 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP including CARERE) 
World Food Program (WFP) 
The initial setof interviews took place inPhnomPenhduring the first two-and-a-half 
weeks of August 1994. In some organizations, several personnel were interviewed, 
ranging from executive directors to field workers to returnees. During this time, one 
day was spent in Sre Ampil village, a new returnee settlement in Kien Svay District, 
Kandal Province (approximately one hour south of Phnom Penh). There I spoke with 
several returnees through a CWS translator. The next phase of the research (approxi­
mately two weeks) occurred in Pursat province. In Pursat town, interviews were held 
with representatives of the same international organizations and NGOs previously 
interviewed in Phnom Penh, as well as with government officials at the district levels. 
Visits were made to established villages in Pursat Ville and Kravanh Districts. One day 
was spent in a new settlement for returnees at Keo Moni village in Banteay Deay 
commune, Kandieng district, in the company of a Khmer field worker from WFP, 
Pursat. During visits to villages, interviews were held first with commune-level 
leaders, then village leaders, and then with returnees, all of which had to be conducted 
through translators. 
In addition, a survey questionnaire of almost 100 returnee households in several 
villages throughout Pursat Ville District in Pursat Province was conducted. Ten 
Cambodian survey assistants were hired (all of whomhad previous survey experience 
with NGOs in Pursat), as well as one translator and a driver. Three communes were 
involved in the survey, Phteas Prey, Roleap, and Prey Nhi, which include some 18 
villages. The number is approximate because villages exist side by side with little 
visible boundary, causing one or two returnee households from an adjacent village 
(same commune) to be included in the survey of a particular village. Communes and 
districts also exist side by side so that some surveys include returnees from other 
communes in Pursat Ville district and even other districts, such as Keo Moni village in 
Banteay Deay commune in Kandieng district. 
Structure of Report 
This report consists of two parts. Part One includes five chapters, the first providing 
discussion of the general repatriation process. Chapter Two details the extent and type 
of aid assistance provided for returnees, and a review of }he aid organizations active in 
Pursat province who have worked with returnees. Chapter Three provides an over­
view of Pursat Province highlighting demographic characteristics, environmental 
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conditions, and the general social and economic context into which the refugees 

returned. Chapter Four details the issues of land, including its importance and absence 

. in the lives of most returnees. Two new returnee settlements are contrasted: Sre Ampil 

village in Kandal Province and Keo Moni village in Pursat Province. Chapter Five is an 

analysis of returnee reintegration, focusing on resettlement choices, employment 

opportunities, local responses to returnee resettlement, and a typology of returnees, 

differentiating those with access to land or working for local NGOs with those who 

remain in extreme poverty. 
Part Two presents the survey data that was collected during the month of August 
1994 in several villages in Pursat Ville District, Pursat Province. Construction of the 
data base, analysis and the presentation of results was done by Dr. R. Dion. 
The report concludes with a general assessment and analysis of Cambodian 
reintegration. 
Difficulties Involved in Studying Returnees 
Two inter-related difficulties were involved in studying Cambodian returnees. The 
foremost concern during the entire fieldwork was that of personal safety. Security 
conditions have rapidly deteriorated since the UNT AC withdrawal in December 1993, 
making independent research generally dangerous throughout Cambodia. Conduct­
ing fieldwork without the support and assistance of an international organization or 
NGO was impossible in several areas, especially innorthwestern Cambodia. In August 
1994, the entire country was beset by endemic security violations. Robberies, violence, 
assaults, kidnapping, extortion, and political intimidation by bandits, government 
troops, and the Khmer Rouge occurred daily incities and towns, on highways, and near 
Khmer Rouge encroachments. Even though certain areas (such as Krakor District in 
Pursat Province) were considered "safe" by NGO workers in Phnom Penh, local 
government officials would not grant me authorization to do research, citing the 
ongoing security problems. Travelling along any highway was not recommended 
without the presence of at least two NGO- or UNHCR-related convoys, so transporta­
tion to and from Pursat Province had to be requested. The hiring of local people to assist 
in surveyresearchwas also problematic in that no one was willing to venture more than 
a few kilometres from the town of Pursat and people insisted on being returned well 
before three P.M. every day. 
The second difficulty in conducting fieldwork was that after the 400-day food 
assistance ended in May 1994, there was no longer any monitoring of returnees by 
UNHCR officials, other UN agencies (UNDP /CARERE), international organizations, 
NGOs, or Cambodian administrators and leaders at the local, commune, district, and 
provincial levels. By August 1994, the previously up-to-date lists of the number of 
returnees in each area (at the provincial, district, commune, and village levels) were 
inaccurate. Returnee families had quietly disappeared from villages and no informa­
tion was available on their whereabouts. Large numbers of returnees are said to be in 
flux, moving across the country in search of work, ac;cessible land, and family. It was 
also difficult to identify some returnees in the newly-created settlements, especially 
when they no longer referred to themselves as former refugees. In particularly devas­
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I.a~ AreIlS, luch IlS the northwestern provinces, there are no dear distinctions between 
retu~, in~a1Jy-<fupl.a~ people, or thOR Clltegorized as "vulnerable." Since 
e;lrly 1m. Il\IIny UJ\'OP/ CARERE Iml NCO workers no longer ask if there ;Ire 
retumeo!$ in tho! vilb.ges. 1'hen-f ..... , little up-to-date infomation is available on the 
retu.mee~, and on whether ~ hal'i' adapted or hove re-fltabJi!hed kin 
and community networks. 
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Cambodian Repatriation 
Seeking Asylum 
Cambodians sought asylum in two distinct phases. The first group of more than 200,000 
who fled the Communist Khmer Rouge takeover in 1975 went to Thailand (34,000), 
Laos (20,000), and Vietnam (150,000). One-hundred-and-seventy thousand ethnic 
Vietnamese also left Cambodia for Vietnam during this initial flow (Rogge 1992, 179). 
In Thailand, Cambodian refugees were placed in three UNHCR-assisted camps, 
Aranyaprathet, Lumpuk, and Kamput, from which more than one-half resettled 
overseas by 1978 (ibid.). In Vietnam, Cambodian refugees were accommodated in 
UNHCR-funded camps but were free to engage in small trade, to associate with 
Kampuchea Krom relatives, or live with family members outside the camps. Many of 
the Cambodians who fled to Vietnam were ethnic Chinese and Vietnamese from urban 
backgrounds (Robinson 1994, 64). 
The second Cambodian refugee flow began in early 1979, immediately following the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. InApril 1979, as restrictions were lifted on internal 
movement (due to the breakup of country-wide Khmer Rouge labour camps), and 
Vietnamese attacks on retreating Khmer Rouge forces intensified, thousands of Cam­
bodians began to mass on the Thai border seeking asylum. During this time, Thai 
military forces subjected numerous Cambodian refugees to a IIforced repatriation" in 
which over 45,000 recently arrived Cambodians in Thailand were pushed back across 
the border into heavily mined territory (Rogge 1994). Itwas not until October 1979 that 
Thailand agreed to an lIopen-door" policy, enabling Cambodian asylum seekers to 
enter the country unimpeded by government soldiers and without the threat of forced 
return. The UNHCR created two "holding centres," called Sa Kaeo and Khao I Dang, 
which quickly filled with 30,000 and 110,000 persons respectively, and Thailand 
officially closed its borders to new arrivals (Robinson 1994, 5). Unofficially, however, 
thousands of unregistered Cambodians continued to, arrive in Khao I Dang and, 
although safe from military conflict, their unauthorized status left them vulnerable to 
threats of extortion, physical abuse, or expulsion by Thai security forces (ibid. 10). 
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By early 1980, almost one million Cambodians were gathered in various encamp­
ments along the contested Thai/Cambodian border. Border relief (food, water, shelter, 
and the provision of basic supplies) was first organized by the United Nations 
Children's Fund, then transferred to the World Food Program in 1981 and, byJuly 1982, 
fell under the newly-established UNBorder Relief Operation (UNBRO) (ibid.) InMarch 
1980, Thailand was still advocating a mass repatriation of Cambodian from the two 
UNHCR holding centres (ibid.). With UNHCR approval, 7,000 people from Sa Kaeo 
chose to return to Khmer Rouge areas, and 1,700 left Khao I Dang for non-Communist 
resistance sites along the border during the week of June 16-23 (ibid.). Immediate 
repercussions followed, however, with Vietnamese soldiers intruding into Thai terri­
tory and Thai military retaliating with shelling along the border, causing numerous 
civilian deaths and over 50,000 new refugees fleeing into Thailand. StilL UNHCR 
continued negotiating repatriation agreements between Bangkok and Phnom Penh 
(ibid.). 
Initial Repatriation Process 
To further the repatriation process, UNHCR opened an office in Phnom Penh in 
September 1980 to distribute "resettlement kits" and provide some food aid (50 
kilograms of rice per family) to an estimated 310,000 returnees, of which 115,000 were 
from Vietnam (Robinson 1994, 6). This cross-border movement, occurring during the 
second half of 1980 and throughout 198twas identified by Rogge (1992) as the second 
Cambodian repatriation. Rogge (1992) considered this repatriation as "spontaneous," 
because most refugees returned to Cambodia with virtually no assistance. Rogge (1994, 
23-24) notes that had the over 95 international relief agencies and NGOs servicing 
refugees at the border phased themselves out during this time, many of the remaining 
refugees would also have returned to Cambodia. 
For Cambodians living along the borderlands between Thailand and Cambodia, the 
period from 1980 to 1984 was marked by constant relocations of unsettled people 
continually on the move, and several more attempts at "spontaneous" repatriation. 
Robinson (1994, 5) notes that from 1979 to 1984, most Cambodian displaced persons 
living in this "volatile no man's land" spent some part of every year evading military 
action. Fighting was between the PRK Vietnamese-backed government in Cambodia 
and the U.S.- and Thai-backed Coalition Government of Democratic Kampuchea 
(CGDK) comprised of the Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLFt the 
National United Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful and Cooperative Cambo­
dia (FUNCINPEC), and the Khmer Rouge. Although statistics on repatriation to 
Cambodia during the years 1979 to 1985 suggest movements of large numbers (up to 
520,000), Robinson (1994, 6) questions their validity as the figures do not distinguish 
between forced and voluntary repatriation or between spontaneous and organized 
return. The UNHCR maintained lists of Cambodians who received food aid (90,000 in 
1981; 60,500 in 1982;49,000 in 1983, and 10,000 in 1984), but officials did not distinguish 
between returnees and the internally displaced, or iqtplementmonitoring and accurate 
documentation (ibid.). 
5 Cambodian Repatriation 
In 1985, UNBRO, in conjunction with the International Red Cross and the Thai 
government, attempted to separate Cambodian civilian populations from the military 
and consolidate the numerous border sites into eight camps within Thailand. Two 
distinct types of refugee camps were established: UNHCR holding camps, where 
residents were eligible for resettlement (for example, Khao I Dang), and border camps 
affiliated with political factions and operated under the military authority of these 
factions. Site K, O'Trao, and Site 8 were controlled by the Khmer Rouge. Sok Sann and 
Site2,with over 200,000refugees, were controlled byKPNLF, and Site Bby FUNCINPEC. 
During the time the population of almost 300,000 Cambodians remained relatively 
stable within the border camps as movement between Thailand and Cambodia was 
deemed traitorous by either side (Robinson 1994). Spontaneous return also became 
increasingly unsafe, due to constant fighting and millions of land mines, laid in part by 
all military groups. Forced relocations continued to occur, however, primarily out of 
the UN-assisted Khmer Rouge camps in Thailand to military Khmer Rouge resistance 
camps. The estimates of between 60,000 to 100,000 civilians living in these resistance 
camps along the "hidden border" gave rise to the Vietnamese-backed PRK government 
perspective that people from the camps were traitors (ibid.). From 1985 to 1988, the 
growth of resistance groups and the intensification of conflict impeded any attempt for 
organized repatriation. 
Repatriation plans recommenced on January 26, 1989, with the signing of the Aide 
Memoire on voluntary repatriation between Phnom Penh and UNHCR. This break­
through was soon followed by the Paris Peace Conference, held from July 31 to August 
20, in which repatriation plans and provisions for returnees began again to be formu­
lated. On November 21, Thailand, Cambodia, and the UNHCR signed a Memorandum 
of Understanding detailing the conditions under which repatriation would take place. 
Subsequently, cross-border movements grew significantly, despite the menace of land 
mines, continued fighting, and KPNLF prohibitions. 
Final Repatriation 
The third repatriation process of Cambodian refugees has been well documented. 
Robinson (1994), for example, has admirably summarized the array of legal and 
political parameters surrounding this repatriation, as well as the elaborate system that 
channelled Cambodian returnees through the various centres (processing, transit, 
reception, and dispersal). In his detailed account of the repatriation process, Robinson 
(1994, 11-22) has also written an excellent synopSis of the extensive inter-agency 
consultations, the numerous surveys conducted, the overall costs, and the continual 
revisions to resettlement plans. Of particular importance in this report are the numer­
ous revisions to the extent and type of resettlement support, the manner in which 
refugees were "encouraged" to accept these changes. There is little, however, on the 
subsequent impacts of returnee reintegration. 
Early concepts of repatriation were premised on several assumptions, the primary 
ones being that reintegration would occur within one yepr after return, that returnees 
would return to families or locales they were familiar with, and that, in addition to the 
allocation of housing plots, returnee farmers would receive agricultural land. Chal­
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lenges to these assumptions, however, were immediately forthcoming. The Ford 
Foundation Border Survey, conducted by James Lynch in November 1989, identified 
difficulties of returning to family or villages of origin. Forty-seven percent of those 
surveyed were from Battambang province, 59 percent chose it as their preferred 
destination, and the vast majority of respondents in each camp (Site 8, Site B, and Site 
2) had no contact with relatives in Cambodia since before their arrival on the border, 
meaning that theyhad no way of knowing if family members wouldbe therewhenthey 
arrived (ibid. 12). 
Assumption Concerning Available Land 
The assumptions concerning land remained a central part of the early planning 
procedure. The UNHCR 1989 1/Absorption Capacity Survey/' although highlighting 
numerous problems returnees would face, such as lack of drinking water, limited 
medical services, and the ability of returnees to regain farming skills, remained 
generally optimistic that farmland was available, even though the land was second 
choice (not the best or the most accessible land), and left over from the recent (1979) land 
reforms (ibid., 13). The 1990 UN Inter-Agency Mission on Repatriation in Cambodia, 
which detailed immediate assistance, was primarily concerned with integration into 
existing villages and the resumption of farming as a subsistence base, neatly coinciding 
with Lynch's (1989) study, which indicated that 88 percent of those surveyed were 
farmers and most expected to farm upon their return. Based on this information, the 
UNHCR proposed an assistance package which would provide food rations for one 
year, household kits, farming tools, a homestead plot, and one to two hectares per 
family. In late 1991, UNHCR officials were showing videos and distributing flyers 
highlighting the promise of two hectares of land (Robinson 1994, 22). Returnee 
movement into towns and cities was considered undesirable because of the already 
large numbers of vendors, beggars, and other marginal people in Phnom Penh and 
Battambang (ibid. 15). 
The increasing numbers of internally displaced Cambodians from Banteay Meanchey 
and Battambang provinces (186,000 in 1991), combined with new information from 
later surveys, challenged the idea that return to villages of origin or access to land was 
feasible (ibid., 16). The 1992 Halo Trust survey of the mine problem in potential areas 
of returnee settlement, for example, destroyed any lingering assumption that culti­
vated and fallow lands were available for returnees. As Robinson states: 
Out of 70,000 hectares surveyed, Halo Trust found that 30,200 hectares were 
"probably clear of mines," 28,200 hectares were "probably mined," and 
11,200 hectares were "heavily mined." The cost of mine clearance, Halo Trust 
estimated, would be $6 million for each of the first two years and $3 million 
per year for three years follOWing. (ibid. 19) 
Non-Land Options 
I 
A March 1992 survey of the four northwestern provinces, conducted by the Cambodian 
Red Cross, identified suitable land for only 8 percent of the returnee population (ibid. 
22). ~alizing thaI . relurn 10 agricul lural activities could no longer ~ supported.. 
UNHCR begin 10emphasizeotheroptioN and theneassityof lempor.u:y resettlemenl 
in urb.n o r peri-urban areas whe .... retume<'$ rould pursue nCJn-;ogricultural activities 
(Robinson 1994, 21). Cash granl$ or "rein tegration money,. rather than lanel, would 
.uppo5('dly assisl returnHf In this choice and, for the relNinder of 1992. UNHCR de­
emphuiz.ed .ccess 10 farming land .nd focuwd iru;lead on returnlnfj to the plaa of 
origin (ibid., 23). AJ no land wu avaiLable, ITIOf"e than 8S pe.centof .11....rumeescholle 
Option C, the resettlemenl packagi! whidl included cash (550 per adult and S25 per 
child under U), • household/ agrkultural kit. and food for 4OOd.lys (but only 2OOd.lys 
in Phnom Penh). The leu tIwl 10 pe lCe"t of retumees who opted. for Option A 
(.gricultuntl land of up 10 two hectares per family, hous"" plot. wood for house 
constnlction. household kil, and WFP for 400 days). recei\-ed tither only one-half 
Mo:t.1re of land on IOU\. or _ gh 'en no WId al all (ibid. 25). 
Although 95 pe.ce••t o/Cambodian ....fusees registef"ed for ~trution in lale 1991 
and appe • ....d "gel" to ....tum home, there was In fact littJto choke other tIwl to ~t.1y on 
Thailand and be treated as illtgal immisnnlS 5Ut;ect toanest anddeporl3tion (ibid. (4). 
Five hund....d.nd seventy-th....e .~. from Khao Io.ng.who "-ere still hoping 
for M5elt lemmt opportunilie$ OVef$HS. "-ere dq>orted to Cambodia in 1993. 
Return to Cambodia 
Immedi.tely upon crouing the border, mUmeell Wef\t 10 one of six UNHCR reception 
centres (lJ\OIIt of which we.... in the north~tem~, and one in Phnom Penh), 
whe.... they .I.a)"ed up to one week before trl\'elling 10 their finli destiruo tion. Al lhe 
Phnom Penh rKeption centre. Martin Fishn-, Executive Dire:1or of WFP in Pursat 
(per$OIIIl communication. Augusl l994) dHCribed wdiffermce between returnees, 
mlKhns whe.... they Nod IOUghll5ylum: 
~ whoMayed In Viettwn an very doifo.rmt f""" IhOR who were in 
ThaUand. Thty looIo:{edj d.1ff~1, w ..... dllferftlt clothes, brought back 
.w:f<'lft"It matm&! soo<b (lum"" ot charroaI,. broken b;cyt:1es), . nd Iud • 
.w:f<'lft"It ."'tude. Tbty we.. in tIw RCtptiort oentIe at the NlIU! time. Abo, 
pIano:....... ot Cambodians cane in frocn Irw:tor.em iIJ"Id. Singaport and a 
handful froon MaI;oyaiL MOIl ot!hom ......... )'OW\jj mm who fled 10 avoId 
toNCtiption from the VIttnimeM. Apin.. they wne vflY diffBftll,havingan 
ellll!. upper-mid~ml!ntlLty and. bein.g very dtmanding. Thai .... tun>­
,.... Up! apu1from aU !heN DIhor grlHJpt. upKlally theoneo from Vietnam. 
The" was I""I.UJpldofI !owardJ tIw:m !o,having gone 10 Vietnam. Mosl 
of the non·Thai retumetf Wtnt to urban oenll"1!f, npKWIy PI\nom Ponh. 
Over one-h,)f of all finll destinations, as of/un", I, 1993, were conc:enlril ted in 
Battambang and &nleay Meanchey provinces, and almost 40 percen t in 5iem Reap, 
Kanda!. and Pul"Sll t provinctt, with Ihe rest ka tl~ throughout Ihe JOUlheaslrm and 
central parts ofCarnbodi. (Robinson 1994,31). 11 is po85ible thlt the popularity of the 
Ba ttambang and Banteay Meanchey ..... 15 ....f1ected antippootion of a speedy rftum to 
Thailand. Rogge (1994, 31) COiN the ~ .periodic repatriation" 10 des<:ribe tlw 
movementof peoplewhoo<:o5S lhe border in ti~ ofconflict, bu t then return when the.... 
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is a lull in fighting that allows a crop to be cultivated, crossing over again when 
hostilities resume. Stein (1994, 66) refers to this practice as IIebb and flow repatriation/' 
'reflecting cycles of peace and turmoil. Both accurately describe the current behaviour 
of thousands of returnees who are periodically caught up in the incessant fighting 
between the Khmer Rouge and government forces, such as in March 1994, then briefly 
became refugees again as they flee into Thailand. According to Anne O'Mahoney, Field 
Director of CONCERl\J: 
After the election and the repatriation process, returnees had tremendous 
hope. But, as the Khmer Rouge insecurity continues, compounded by the 
increasing banditry, returnees feel the corruption throughout the country is 
as bad as it was in 1972. This worries returnees and many stay in the Western 
provinces with easy access to Thailand and the continued hope that they can 
resettle in Western countries. This is a bad indication that what the returnees 
have been dreaming about, the idea of returning home and reintegrating, has 
not worked out and people are not developing the commitment to stay. 
(Personal communication, August 1994) 
In early 1994, it was evident that numerous returnees had chosen to settle in places 
that differed from their final destination, areas where most had never lived before or 
in which previous relations with local people had notbeen developed (Robinson 1994, 
57). Martin Fisher, Executive Director of WFP in Pursat, noted that 88,000 returnees 
from Thailand, who came through the Phnom Penh transit centre, resettled in the 
southern areas, Takeo, Kandal, and the surrounding provinces (personal communica­
tion, August 1994). He comments: 
In retrospect, the repatriation was a huge task that somehow was accom­
plished successfully. I'm glad it's over. But, the entire planning process could 
have done with an extra year. The number of poor people and street people 
are increasing rapidly in Phnom Penh. Every family has extended relatives 
staying with them. In the last two years there has been massive, rapid change 
... Even the town of Pursat has gone through extensive change. 
After living for years in well-organized refugee camps with basic services and 
chlorinated water provided by NGOs, returnees have come back to areas in Cambodia 
where primary health care and deanwater are lacking. Those refugees who lived in the 
best-serviced camps wouldnot be prepared for conditions in Cambodia, and may well 
have reduced natural immunity to endemic disease. Diarrhoea, malnutrition, malaria, 
and tuberculosis remain common ailments, and health care treatment in Cambodia is 
chronically impaired by shortages of drugs, medical supplies, inadequate health care 
buildings, and questionable medical treatments (Anderson 1992). This impacts espe­
cially on the highly vulnerable individuals who have been most dependent on institu­
tional support structures. These include individuals with physical or mental handicaps, 
the elderly, orphans, and women who are the sole support for their households. As 
Rogge (1994,40) notes, absence of serious deficiencies in services in areas of repatriation 
can become a major catalyst for secondary migration of returnees to the city. To date, 
there is no clear idea of where some of the returnees have resettled, nor how many have 
migrated to Phnom Penh or other towns and cities throughout Cambodia. 
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Provision of Assistance (or Returnees 
As56stance for Retu rnee; 
Stein (1994,57) notes th&t inorOer to faciliUlte~tumee reintegration in t:hearea to which 
they return. the intunational community. as well as most Nco., .. ethere to the 
prindpk!t of d~",I~I-<Hi<!nI«l usis~ Dfospite the desirability of develop­
ment-orimted rq»tri.ation Ull'lstance, ho>o,'e\'er, the concept of refugee aid and devel­
opment mNinsill-ddined and subj«t lociwlgingdefinitiOl'l5conarning aid purposel 
"nd. reponsibility (ibid.) Further, theTe ill often gnat d issimilarity bl.'tween short- and 
long-11enn refugff aid and de\'el~l 
In gewnl, &hort-Iftm relief usiMance is gured towards mHting the basic need5 of 
retumeft, JUCh as food, transport, shelter, UId water. Once back in Cambodia, return­
ees immediately recei\~ temporary in-tr"",illlS5ista~ (provision of clothes, food. 
blanlt:eb. and ~alth Cll~ if ~ry) and orient.l tion to the 400-day food support 
program. Longn-Ierm assistance was determined ~Ofding to the particular .id 
option choem. 'I1w lNIjolity of retu.mees chaR Option C- food for 400 days (rice, fl$h.. 
oil, and",]!; 2OOdaY'if ~ming tOAn urban are,,), .. household kit••md reintegration 
II'\OIW)' (SSO/adult and S25 / child). Lessernumbers took Option S-food for400daYI , 
a l mall housins plot, .. wIler package valuM at 11O.!XXl riels, and " household! 
Igricultural kit that included I wlter container, or Option D-food for 400 d.J.ys, and 
a household kit Very few chooee Option A- food for 400 days, agricultural land, a 
shelter ~wge, ;md • household and agricultural kit. Option E was;m aid ~ckage 
gea~ for ~ml'l'5 who we..... offend . job in Cambodia, in which thty receh"ed 
transporution expenses. food for 120 days. and similar reintegration money as Option 
C Several individuals and f.mili.., who .....turned spontaneously_..... able to ~ ttu. 
4O(kIay food lid progr&m. 
~iger (1993) suggests that theOption ClS5ist.a~pacugeofcash and J'cI'rticipation 
in the 400-day food program es.sentially rep.....sented !il!lf-settlement, meaning trun 
retumeeshad toeither rely on ties tovillages. if they settled in rural ;ll'ea5, or go to urban 
, 
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areas. Although Option C did give returnees the option to resettle in areas of their 
choice, it did nothing to lessen the expectation or need for land of their own to develop 
some sense of self-sufficiency, either through a housing plot or larger areas for 
agricultural use. 
An additional type of assistance funded by the UNHCR was the development of 
"Quick Impact Projects" (QIPs) to benefit communities in areas where returnees might 
resettle. The idea of QIPs is to rapidly implement projects that would provide benefit 
and assistance to local needs, thus setting up the conditions in which further develop­
ment could be co-ordinated with NGOs (Allen and Morsink 1994). Areas in Cambodia 
thatwere heavily settled by returnees (as well as internally displaced and demobilized 
soldiers) received most of this short-term development assistance. Through UNDP 
organization, QIPs were geared primarily towards infrastructural improvements 
(roads, bridges, buildings), but also included the building of wells and ponds, some 
health clinics, and a few schools. 
Longer-term development needs of both returnees and the areas they returned to 
were addressed by the UNDP Cambodia Reconstruction and Rehabilitation (CARERE) 
program, international organizations, and several NGOs. Longer-term reintegration 
assistance is oriented towards zonal development approaches, in which local popula­
tions are included inassistance programs and projects are devised to generate workand 
income opportunities andenhance self-sufficiency. Such development-oriented projects 
would include seed banks, credit schemes, well and pond digging, the provision and 
clearing of land in new settlement sites, vocational training, and rebuilding of infra­
structure such as schools and clinics. Other priority assistance activities focus on the 
rehabilitation of community infrastructure such as road, bridge, and water channel 
repairs. These developmental investments aimed to benefit locals as well as returnees 
are based on access to land, primarily that associated with rice agriculture, which has 
the most marketing potential for income generation. The problem with this kind of 
development-oriented reintegration assistance in Cambodia, however, is that most 
returnees have no access to land, and those that do are restricted to vegetable and fruit 
growing. Further, unless assistance was provided directly to returnees, such as those 
living in a new settlement site, it is not clear whether returnees participated in 
generalized zonal assistance programs to villages or if they gained any long- or short­
term benefits. 
International Organizations, NGO, and UNDP/CARERE Activity in Pursat 
Many of the following international organizations and NGOs have either actively 
assisted returnees during the repatriation process during their initial period of resettle­
mentwhile receiving the 400-day food aid, or are involved in longer-term reintegration 
through zonal approach community development programs in two ormore provinces. 
Several NGOs active in Pursat, such as American Friends Service Committee (AFSC), 
Handicapped International (HI), Medecins Sans Frontieres Holland/Belgium (MSF 
H/B), or Stiftung Kinderdorf Pestalozzi (SKIP), which do not provide direct assistance 
to returnees, are not included. f 
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American Refugee Committee (ARC) 
ARC has been working with Cambodian refugees since 1979 in Thai camps. In 1990, 
ARC began work in Cambodia with a mission statement to focus on the health care 
infrastructure. They provide a program of Maternal and Child Health Activities at the 
Kon Dien District Hospital in Pursat. In Pursat, ARC has expanded to include water 
sanitation through construction of wells, water storage systems and latrines, and 
technical sanitation training. The project of Literacy Education for Local Women and 
Day Care Centre is targeted for women to help them access health care programs. This 
approach rests on educational outreach to encourage women to access literacy pro­
grams. Without literacy, it is problematic to disseminate information and to keep 
women aware of health concerns. 
Care International (CARE) 
In Pursat, CARE was involved in the early stage of repatriation, delivering people from 
reception centres to particular locations and distributing WFP-provided food to areas 
every 40 days. CARE bought all the trucks and set up the system, which was subse­
quently turned over to CRe CARE is now mainly active in the Bakan District, 
especially with the Bakan Integrated Rehabilitation and Child Health programs. The 
overall community development focus is on: 
1. 	 Water Sanitation (hand-dug wells, water use education, a latrine pilot 
program); 
2. 	 Community Based Rehabilitation for the Disabled (CBRD). 
This is broad-based program aimed at community education, awareness, disabled 
children's access to school, working with the physically handicapped, skills training for 
amputees, small loans, working with the blind, and eye referrals. CARE works with 
individuals, families, and communities recommended through the Department of 
Social Action on the provincial and district levels; 
3. 	 Women in Development (WID). 
a. 	 Animal-health sector (because women are in charge of the animals). 
CARE sponsors village livestock agents (most of whom are men) for 
preventative and curative treatment of the animals. 
b. 	 Village bank and credit on a five-family basis, on the GRET model. 
c. 	 Adult literacy, aimed at women. 
d. Maternal and Child Health. 
Canada Cambodia Development Project (CCDP) 
CCDP lists several ongoing projects: Agriculture/Agronomy, Vaccination Program, 
Funding of Local Initiatives, Institutional Health Strfngthening, Hydrology, and 
Women In Development Study Tours. 
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CCDP has been in Pursat for over two years. Most of their activities have been 
focused on research and surveys on agriculture and irrigation. At present, they are 
beginning a new phase of projects geared towards community development, such as 
providing agricultural support to extend gardening for families in groups of ten, or the 
implementation of a credit system for cows in three villages of Prey Nhy Commune, 
Pursat Ville District (Sala Komrou, Krang Tasen, Sras Srang). 
CONCERN (Concern InternationallEC) 
CONCERN began activities in Pursat in May 1992 to do area rehabilitation and 
development. Up to twelve villages were targeted in three districts: Bakan, Kravanh 
and Krakor, all of which were selected on the basis of being impoverished. The focus 
was on agricultural extension and credit (such as schemes to purchase oxen/buffalo 
and fertilizer, organize training in agriculture and animal husbandry), repair and 
rebuilding of schools, bridges and road construction, district nursery establishment, 
and digging wells and ponds. 
Bakan District: 10 villages in 7 communes; Kravanh District: 3 villages, 2 communes; 
Krakor District: 2 villages, 2 communes. 
Initially the villages CONCERN works with were selected on the basis of a high 
number of returnees in the area. The criteria were based on the overall level of poverty. 
CONCERN aid now targets particular problems in the village, such as scarcity of 
animals. CONCERN does community development through focusing on community 
organization committees so that people can move into positions of authority. Particular 
attention is given to older established local women (the younger women tend to be 
hesitant and not so vocal), who are more willing to organize themselves and suggest 
ideas for development. Most of them are over 40 and are widows who have experience 
in doing things themselves. Many of the projects suggested by older women are either 
not supported by the village men, or their ideas get taken over by the men. 
Cambodian Red Cross (CRC) 
The Cambodian Red Cross is the major conduit for the distribution of food and other 
items donated by NGOs and international organizations. In 1993, over 75,000 tons of 
World Food Program rice was distributed to about 800,000 beneficiaries at 150 distri­
bution points throughout Cambodia's 19 provinces. Most of this food went to return­
ees, internally displaced people, and vulnerable persons who normally have access to 
land but who are in temporary emergency or disaster situations (drought or flood). In 
addition, the Cambodian Red Cross distributes clothing, shelter kits, sanitation, water, 
emergency kits, educational materials, and medication, and engages in public health 
outreach programs and hospital construction/ development. Because of its national 
network and capacity for reaching into rural areas, the Cambodian Red Cross has 
played a central role in assisting the repatriation and reintegration of returnees. The 
CRC managed reception centres, provided shelters, ard coordinated resettlement food 
distribution with UNHCR. 
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01 increasing i mporl~nce ill ~ e RC's rol~ U I. liaison between returnees and local 
IUthorititt in &«'eSSing land for r1'tumees and sil~ prep;o.ration, especially now that the 
food distributions have mded. AI first. land access was only d iscussed concerning 
Option A r1'lumees who "'ere few in number. The money Option C rehtmees recei,'ed 
was to be u~ to help them intesrale in the towns. Now, howe ....er, access to land issem 
as the ~I means to further integration for most of the ~.ln addition to land 
aCCe5s. the eRe helps to org<>nile committees at the villa~, commune, and district 
levels with NGOs. to identify vulnerable returnee families;md to help support them 
through the·WFP ~food for w()I'kM progralJ\f-l"Olld ronstruction, pond cnoalion. 
digging land and canal5-whidl retrulln the bAsis of most community-development 
programs. 
HALO Trusl lntemallonal (HT) 
HALO Trust tw been adi~ in Cambodia 5~ 1987. II .ptciali1:es in cleanng mine­
fields &J\d disposing of WWlCpLoded bombs and shells, and in fiUSWrung prqects in 
hazardous aru. of conflict for v;tmded pmods. HALO Trust is al50 involved in 
PfO'iding .WlIrmeM tnl1nin8 _MOd ,I;", the preence of mines. esp«WIy toduldren. 
In Pur$oot ~, HALO Trull has de-mining projtds in aU five di$trictS, d<earing 
mines from ~ fieldJ, vi.Uap <:entres, khooI buildinp , road sides, bridges. and 
footpaths. TMre'nI! two de-1l'IininJ tHIN in Punal, eKh WIth 20 de-D\U'IeI'S loally 
.ained Ilnder!he direction of two British specialisls. Several previously mined ueas 
thaI No~ been de.rtd ani! now av.ulable for mumees. lOPs. and dispbced locals. 
HALO pn;nides ~mea with aw~ Inirung .bou. mines and tNoir pg6Sibt.. 
presmce in areas th.i.anl! dec:lartd -de-mined.-
Pt..,..,Womm'l A..ssodatlon 
The Pul'SlOt Womm'. Asaod.tion. sponKII1!d by the Cambodian government, has 
dt-oeloped usisWv:\" proj«b with I1!Iurnees in !he new viUage5- It is epeci.o.Uy 
concerned with planting via teed banks (both ..w:.&rId vegeublM).1n othervillages, the 
Women'. AModation I\Q III!lped \(I estlblUh cow banks. pond digging. and credit 
~ when! five familin mU5t join.o qu.o.lify. 1n ru.....t Province, UNDP use the 
Women', AlIOdation to imple-menl its projects sud> as cndit schemes. h-i4ny of the 
H rlycredi.5dIemH wrredim:ted I I retumft wornm, but Ihftr .bility10 pay bKk was 
probkmatic. RetUmeft WIeR said 10 Nove. tendency 10 move and this CTe4lted credit 
problems. Now the system is to establish five f.milies to aupport urn other in the 
bU5inns &rid in ~ynwnt. l.ocal ~Ie I1!rN.ln hesitant to trwt returnees bK.~ of 
their ~ved tendency to move and lack of kmg..renn oommitment. 
Since the negative evlluation of returnee women's nI!~ymmt (which w., oon5id­
el1!d not 10 be ~liable), the Women', Association no longer includes them in the credit 
system, B«.Iuse of this, IIII! ~I vWn.e-rable and needy ni!turnH wOffil'n do not get 
."istara. It is a Ca tch-22 situation. Returnee wommjUMol get loans until their 
c:apacity for busineu and rep.yment is first improved, but they cannot improve Iheir 
capacity forbU$lrw$$ until they get a loan.This iscompounded by their lackol networks 
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to be able to join with other families. Most of the loans go to established local people, 
who represent between 30 and 60 percent of the population. Overall, the Women's 
Association loans are only available in 10 target villages. If they are successful, they can 
be expanded to other targeted zones. This is needed in order to monitor the loan and 
to assess for example, who gets the benefit of the money. 
Through UNDP funding, the Pursat Women's Association is also implementing 
adult literacy programs geared towards women by providing child care. They want 
women to raise their awareness of capital and interest and to increase their capability 
to benefit from credit. Literacy classes also include issues of health care, and the 
Women's Association staff are sent to UNICEF for relevant training. The Women's 
Association wanted to make literacy training mandatory for women who received 
credit, but UNDP thought this was too great an imposition. 
United Nations Development Program (UNDP)lReintegration and Resettlement 
Operation (CARERE) 
UNDP's original mandate was the rehabilitation of infrastructure such as roads, 
bridges, and public buildings. The purpose of CARERE was to meet the needs of 
returnees in their integration into villages. Both kinds of assistance were implemented 
through government funding to the province, district, and commune authorities who 
also selected projects. Returnees were never themselves consulted as to their needs; 
they had to request assistance through the local authorities. After the expiry of the 400­
day food aid, Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) that involved activities at the commune and 
village levels, (such as sanitation/water, schools, and other public facilities) have been 
replaced by a development priority geared towards income generation, employment 
training, and agricultural production (such as the provision of seeds, cattle, and land 
for housing). Most of these programs are directed towards the rural poor and commu­
nity development. 
The selection criteria are the poverty of the area, accessibility, security, the number 
of vulnerable groups, and local receptiveness to programs. Priority groups are female­
headed households, internally-displaced people, returnees, and disabled and demobi­
lized soldiers. Returnees are still recognized as a vulnerable group but are no longer 
designated as having"special needs." Some small villages, such as Kambeng village in 
Kravanh District, have up to 30 vulnerable families who are targeted for assistance 
throughQIPs and seed programs. UNDP emphasis is on the improvement of life for the 
rural poor and on the development of official standards to sustain this activity in the 
future. In creating a strong community organization, the hope is to build the capacity 
for direct negotiations between the community and the government. UNDP works 
through community district people. They are responsible to UNDP and are the liaison 
between people in villages and local leaders. A new role of UNDP is to facilitate 
community dialogue and decision making. 
In1993, UNDP /CARERE implemented development projects in 17 villages through­
out the five Pursat districts. In 1994, 13 more villjlges were included, primarily in 
Kandieng, Pursat Ville, and Krakor Districts. The 1994-96 Workplan projections are to 
expand programs to one commune in Kandieng, three communes in Pursat Ville, and 
15 Provision of Assistance for Returnees 
two in Krakor and Kravanh. UNDP initiates development of model areas in specific 
communes to set an example. In model areas, there may be intensive activity in the 
villages, such as the construction of a new road in a particular village or the building 
of a commune district school. CARERE projects also give loans for starting small 
businesses (if individuals can organize ingroups of five). In 1994, UNDP targeted three 
villages (Sala Komrou, Sras Srang, and Spean Thmar) in Prey Nhy commune, Pursat 
Ville District for community development. Previously, the only community develop­
ment in Pursat Ville District was in Toul Makak and Prey Ormal villages in Roleap 
Commune.. 
World Food Program (WFP) 
The WFP and UNICEF are the only two agencies that have been in Cambodia since 1979 
because their assistance was considered humanitarian rather than developmental. 
During repatriation, WFP was actively involved in the procurement, delivery, distribu­
tion, and monitoring of food supplies to returnees. WFP distributed more than 85,000 
metric tons of rice, fish, vegetable oil, and salt to 372,000 returnees. The food aid was 
crucial in facilitating early resettlement negotiations between returnees and their 
relatives or other people with whomtheywere able to find accommodation. During the 
food distribution, the WFP worked in conjunction with CRe. In Pursat province, the 
WFP has their own offices, but in other provinces they share offices with CRe. 
Now that the 400-day food ration has ended, the only remaining support and safety 
net against hunger is through the WFP-sponsored Food For Work programs operating 
throughout the country. Atpresent, the WFP Food For Work programremains the most 
important assistance organization for returnees in Pursat. The Food For Work program 
is village-based inCambodia, which makes itunique. In other countries, Food For Work 
tends to be government-implemented for major public works. In addition, the food 
does not come from the UN but directly from bilateral support countries, and is 
guaranteed for the next three years. 
Since the beginning of 1994, WFP expanded their staff to 15 provinces, beyond the 
four main repatriation provinces of Battambang, Siem Reap, Pursat, and Bantheay 
Meanchy. The spreading out through Cambodia reflects the change in WFP emphasis, 
from that of giving food to that of community development. Food For Work is now 
involved in development schemes through infrastructure building. The actual word 
WFP uses is "rehabilitation." In Pursat, Food For Work is geared towards road 
construction and land clearance. WFP has looked for high concentrations of returnees 
in villages and has invited comments on priorities. Some have requested roads, some 
canals, some ponds, and some clearance of land. When returnees have beengiven land, 
construction of an access road has often been necessary. 
Before January 1994, the rare Food For Work projects were usually offered in 
conjunction with NGOs. Later in the year, the mandate of and demand for WFP 
activities expanded greatly. The program is not as practical as cash, butits very success 
means that people in Pursat will not starve. In road cOIJ.5truction, for example, if an 
individual can clear one square metre of land this will equal 4 kilograms of rice, an 
amountwhich will basically feed a family for one day. If the demand for Food For Work 
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dies down, then it is obvious the need for food is not there. The Food For Work will 
continue as planned until 1996, an extension of the original projection of 1994-95 to 
keep in sync with the Cambodian government and NGO three-year plans. Before 
implementing a food-for-work program, an assessment is done in the targeted area to 
identify individuals in need and to decide what type of assistance they could receive 
and for what work. 
In some of the better-established villages, villagers will volunteer to do work for 
certain vulnerable individuals or families, such as female-headed households, where 
the women cannot work on road construction or engage in the heavy labour involved 
in clearing land. In one Pursat village, 80 square metres of road construction were 
donated for 8 vulnerable families, 10 square metres each. This equalled about 40 
kilograms of rice. WFP personnel note that in the older, well-established villages, there 
is a greater tendency to help others. WFP personnel also note that in the new villages, 
such as those in which most returnees reside, there is less evidence of this willingness. 
In this case, WFP field staff will consult with village leaders to help identify and locate 
vulnerable families. When vulnerable individuals are identified, the field officer can 
exercise flexibility in attempts to give work, usually something simple for the family to 
do around their house, such as composting. A new idea, yet to be tried, is to provide 
Food for Work for women to look after other people's children while they work. The 
women would receive 2-3 kilograms of rice per day. The handicapped, those with one 
leg, are also kept busy and given light road work. One man in Keo Moni village, 
Kandieng District, Pursat province, has a double handicap (both legs amputated). His 
wife works on road construction but since the man can repair bicycles, the WFP field 
officer has requested headquarters in Phnom Penh to find money in the budget to get 
him some tools so he could earn an income. 
In 1993, WFP conducted a survey to identify IIvulnerable" individuals (VGAs). In 
Pursat, about 25,000 were listed as VGAs. Returnees who finished the 400-day food aid 
were identified as VGA and automatically included in Food For Work programs. The 
"vulnerable" classification proved problematic, however, because it was difficult to 
draw the line between those who qualify and those who do not. A very poor family 
could be characterized as being in need, but not fit into the IIvulnerable" criteria. Also, 
village head people tended to show favouritism so WFP questioned their assessment 
of IIvulnerable." As a result, in 1994, groups who may fall into vulnerable categories 
(returnees, female-headed households, lOPs) are no longer designated for special 
consideration, but instead are lumped together in Target Areas. WFP targets geo­
graphical areas marked by high concentrations of returnees, vulnerable populations, or 
lOPs, low rice production, or environmentally fragile regions affected by drought or 
flooding, to provide both emergency aid and longer-term labour-intensive community 
work. 
Examples of WFP specific target areas can include: 
1. 	 Food Deficit Areas, where the amount of rice produced is inadequate. The 
Food For Work is then targeted at the commune level. The basis for selection 
of the commune is a survey analysis of tlte rice harvest. New returnee 
settlements in Pursat are always included as a target area because their land 
is for vegetable production rather than rice. The question of land and 
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sustainability is the bottom line. Returnees as well as locals are eager to 
participate in the food-for-work projects to prepare them for the future 
months without rice. 
2. 	 The northwestern area of Cambodia, especially where IDPs are numerous. 
They can get Food for Work in the more settled areas where they are placed. 
3. 	 Banteay Meanchey province, where two areas get free food assistance: Kong 
Va Reception Site (where returnees first came through Cambodia) is now a 
temporary IDP shelter, and Krakon (also a temporary !DP site). These two 
placesare the closest to a refugee camp. Most of the inhabitants are displaced 
returnees. But WFP is not so generous as to keep people in the camps beyond 
necessary need. For example, when the area is safe to return to, the last food 
distribution will be in the local village to encourage people to go back. If they 
want the food, they have to return. 
Because WFP is so decentralized, the administrators are acutely aware of what is 
going on in each province and can make decisions accordingly. If a security situation 
deteriorates, or during environmental stress such as drought or flooding, WFP is 
prepared with an emergency component that can be mobilized quickly. At the provin­
ciallevels, NGOs work together with WFP to determine village needs. Food for Work 
depends on NGOs like CRC to go out to the villages and communes to do analysis of 
need. NGOs are present in greater numbers in some provinces than in others and this 
determines the amount of WFP input. Programs arise very much on an ad hoc basis. 
Approval for Food for Work assistance is from WFP provincial level of consultation. 
Once a month, WFP provincial personnel meet with the central administration in 
Phnom Penh to discuss emergencies, such as the August 1994 flooding in Kompong 
Speu, and these then become priorities. 
Attitudes to Returnees 
Most NGOs interviewed asserted that returnees in general have a dependent state of 
mind and an inability to make decisions. Since repatriation, returnees remained 
dependent on the supply of food provided by UNHCR, CRC and, since May 1994, on 
the Food For Work programs run byWFP. The following statements are included in this 
section on assistance to returnees to illustrate a certain degree of animosity that is felt 
towards returnees by the aid organizations' personnel that are currently helping them. 
In context, these attitudes may be a reflection of the enormous needs facing all 
Cambodians and the difficulties of international organizations and NGOs in address­
ing or resolving them. 
WFP Official in Phnom Penh: 

There is no problem with "acceptance" per se,but returnees do have a certain 

"mentality." Long-tenn dependency in the camps has impacted on their 

attitudes; for example, it was hard for returnees to really accept that they 

would be $Icut-off" after 400 days. They didn't think jt would really happen. 

WFP constantly had to face returnees who were askiilg for more food once it 

had been cut off. Other aid agencies also experience this sense of expectation. 
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WFP Official in Pursat: 
There are two main groups of returnees: the returnee elites who work for the 
NGOs and the returnees with a dependency mentality. Those with the 
dependency mentality are the ones who always have expectations of food 
and aid on a constant basis. Most returnees have not accepted that they will 
not get dependency assistance any longer and that they must operate on their 
own. After twelve years, this attitude had permeated people's psyches. 
Pursat NGO Official: 
In one area where people are all returnees, anew village, materials were made 
available for road construction, but during the night all the sand and stones 
were taken and spread across the individual housing plots. The next day, the 
NGO was stuck in the mud because all the top layer of the road had been 
removed. But the returnee people would not help the NGO get out. This 
attitude is unheard off in the established villages where there is a strong sense 
of community still. 
UNDP jCARERE Official in Pursat: 
There have also been occurrences of manipulations. For example, returnees 
say they need fertilizer from the UNDP for their land. This is given on a credit 
basis. But instead of putting it to agricultural use, they sold it for profit. They 
keep the money and then they say their vegetable gardens or their rice 
harvests are no good and they don't make payback for the fertilizer. They 
make a good profit because fertilizer costs $40 a load and UNDP loans it out 
at a $20 subsidized rate. This year UNDP must first verify that in every 
household which requests fertilizer there is cultivated land to put it on. 
Returnees have great awareness of the aid packages available. If one 
community gets one package, then the other groups are quick to have a "me 
too" mentality. 
Returnees are more ready and more equipped to request assistance from 
UNDP or NGOs than local people. 
NGO District Nurse in Pursat: 
Being provided for on the border has made returnees'too used to being in a 
state of dependency, not being independent enough. Returnees express great 
dissatisfactionand they complain muchmore about everything. ManyNGOs 
note that returnees are full of complaints and that locals are much more 
content with what they have. This attitude of always complaining impacts on 
their resettlement. Only returnees ask the foreigners for jobs. Locals donotdo 
this. Also, many of their complaints are exaggerated. For example, many 
returnees will say "wehave no family here," but on investigation, they really 
do. Returnees are also not interested inapplying for govemmentjobs because 
the wage is considered too low. There is a dangerous attitude among 
returnees that everything should be free here, like it was on the border. But 
even on the border when things were free, they were always sold again and 
again ... In Krakor, only CCDP is here and this could be why there are so few 
returnees in this district. In Pursat Town, there life a lot of returnees because 
there are a lot of NGOs. 
NGO Official in Phnom Penh, 
Relumtft have a "'1.U"·lvOl" m... tality." lhi. keeps them lf~ppM in only 
~ about nv:t WHIe and not about their chiId/Ul's future. Tltil; tnenQJ­
ily 5e\'_Jy limits who.t they a~ obit 10 do, 10 ifna&1ne, to pi..... or to work 
tow....ds • Ion.~ rune frAme. Jt abo O"Ntu • lot 01 mistrust ""Itun vi.J..Lagfl 
in tNt people take who.I they need to s1.U"i,'e,. it is no! J mird5e1lh.ot sha..-. 
.•. AnoN' common mindoet with returnees is tho! they ItXpect tIung> to be 
dON for th<o'm. for example. \0 ho~ I&nd cl......!, or to have had their Mu5" 
kilt b;uUI. In Batwnbans, ~turMc. would not ....ist in helping to build 
hornell lor tlw!agod. or widow. unl... theywere paid. Uke mOSt oth<:r Kiuru>r, 
relurnHS ha~ on 1.UlwUling:nes to ..,gage in altruis tic btluoviour or any 
HnH 0 1 ..,U-s.critkt. 
In the Chun:h World Service 1993 annual "'"PO". it ,,'U ~ thai mumen Nt\'~ 
problnns with thrir attitude tQward.s~If~ufficiency ~d 5upport: 
lhey are focu...cl on thftr ownsitu.ltionand ",.,.taU USLftlU"lCe to be dLreCtod. 
to Uwm. This IwnpttJ reintes....tion and oom_ ctWItu confusion No. 
UuH . uist.J.na! is ~uest«l by 1M returnee. from many .~. who uo: 
oft... uninformod. about theexisting involvement ofothe, group', It wW lab 
timebefOt"e th<o' retumca fully ,nUu that &g""c~ are notJUII! therein·work 
(o.them" and thattheywill ha" e to be raponoibJe fo, themHI,·" oul$i~ tho 
llrIillci.alrefugH amp commU/\lIy. (p. 17) 
, 
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Pursat Province-General Overview 
Demographic Characteristics 
As of May 1993, the total population of Pursat Province was 254,587 (UNT AC Election 
Component). Pursat is divided into five districts: Bakan, Kandieng, Pursat Ville, 
Kravanh, and Krakor. The districts are further subdivided into 44 communes with a 
total of 440 villages (Shams 1994). Pursa t Ville District is where most ofthis study's field 
work was carried out. Ithas seven communes and 60 villages. UNTAC figures from the 
May 1993 list indicate 8,028 households and 42,866 people in Pursat Ville District. In the 
Shams (1994) report, Pursat Province is noted as having the largest number of widows 
and women-headed households in Cambodia. In some villages, female-headed house­
holds account for up to 70 percent of all families. On average, 50 percent of the total 
population is less than 17 years old (ibid.). 
According to figures from Pursat Women's Association, the numbers of returnee 
families are slowly decreasing in most Pursat districts: 
Arrival May 1993 As of April 22, 1994 

District Number of Families District Number of Families 

Bakan 3,407 Bakan 2,339 
Kandieng 389 Kandieng 345 
Pursat Ville 876 Pursat Ville 621 
Krakor 312 Krakor 371 
Kravanh 302 Kravanh 276 
Figures from CRC lists indicate that, by January 1994, a total of 23,433 returnees 
(5,286 families) and 3,293 internally displaced people (IDPs) (824 families) had resettled 
in Pursat, representing over 10 percent of the provincial population. Figures from 1994 
World Food Program lists show even higher numbers of }DPs in Pursat, totalling 5,823 
persons (1,022 families). Of the 23,433 returnees in Pursat, the vast majority (20,464 
individuals in4,341 families) resettled withOptionC; a smaller number (2,622 individuals 
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in 856 families) took Option B; 28 families (135 persons) returned with Option D; 21 
families (65 persons) chose Option A; and three families returned through Option E. 
Thirty-eight families (131 persons) returned spontaneously, although they were able to 
access the 400-day food program (World Food Program). 
Lack of Accurate Statistics on Returnees after May 1994 
During May 1993 and May 1994, district authorities kept an accurate registration of 
returnees in specific villages so they could inform CRC about any changes in food 
distribution. After the end of the 400-day food aid package, however, the monitoring 
of returnee families ended. By August 1994, there were no longer up-to-date figures of 
how many returnees were in each district. In Roleap and Prey Nhi communes, Pursat 
Ville District, there were many empty houses in the villages. Neighbours stated that 
these were the houses of returnees who have moved far away. Mr. Samrith Bo, Krakor 
District Authority, noted: 
The number of returnees on my present list is different from [those of] 
UNHCR and WFP. Major changes have occurred after the expiry of food 
[aid]. Many returnees have moved out of the district. People just leave within 
a day, they just disappear. We have no idea where they have gone. Eighty­
nine families are left in the district and these are just the temporary statistics. 
Returnees move because they find other relatives in other provinces. 
Commune leaders in Pursat also stated that they no longer knew anything more 
about the returnees, what they are doing, where they are living, or even if they had any 
rice to eat. Mr. Say Mang, Chief Officer of Phtas Prey Commune, stated: 
There are about 126 returnee families, but this is according to the 1993 list and 
I'm not sure how many are left. After the 400-day support has ended some 
returnees go to another province. 
Mr. Mil Ben, Chief Commune Officer of Prey Nhy Commune, stated: 
These numbers are from the 1993 list. Now the exact numbers are not known 
because many returnees havemoved without saying anything. I do not know 
where they go or why. The first time the returnees came to stay here with 
relatives, but when they hear that other relatives are in another province they 
think the land is better or is available so they move. 
Mr. Martin Fisher, WFP Director in Pursat, noted that returnees are moving in (e.g., 
from Kompong Thorn) as much as they move out. Some of the returnees I spoke with 
indicated that they had come to Pursat province after their 400-day food aid ended. One 
man, his wife, and theirfour children (one son and three daughters), for example, came 
from Siem Reap Province three months earlier to settle in Tonsay Kol village, Anlong 
Thnot Commune, Krakor District, Pursat province. They came because the wife was 
born in this commune. She had one family member left here, her brother-in-law. At first 
the family was sent to Siem Reap because that was the husband's birthplace, even 
though they had no relatives there. The man said: I 
We stayed as long as the food ration card was good, but once it finished we 
came here. Also, Siem Reap has not got good security. The house we live in 
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now is not our own, we share it with another returnee family, two adults and 
their children. The house is less than 12 by 12' and is very crowded for over 
nine people. No one has any rice land. The women prepare food to sell on the 
road to the passengers in the bus. This only provides enough money for the 
morning and evening rice so we do not eat during the day. 
Another returnee woman in the same village also spoke of just coming to Pursatfrom 
Battambang because of increasing security concerns. She came with her husband, five 
children, and her parents. She also helps to prepare and sell the food along with another 
returnee widow whom she met here. 
Internal Secondary Migration 
Between May 1993 and May 1994, the primary internal movement was the search for 
family reunification. The cash/food aid provided a buffer for an initial atternpt at 
resettlement with family members. Ms. Linda Hartke, Executive Director of CWS, 
commented on this secondary migration among returnees: 
The pattemis that returnees first move in with relatives for a short term, three 
months, six months, or nine months. But problems arise with the shortage of 
space within a house and the small size of the land. Most Cambodians have 
less than one-half hectare of land, which is too small to support one family, 
let alone an extended one. Chances are that the returnee family will move out 
to another place in the village or another commune. 
The search for fertile land has been the motivating factor in much secondary 
migration among returnees. In their search for land, returnees are usually the first to 
settle on housing land wherever a new access road has been created. Returnees have 
also gone to "no-go" areas (mined, malarial, difficult to access, or lacking water) as well 
as areas of growing insecurity and military conflict. Robinson (1994, 32-44), for 
example, describes the more than 25,000 returnees who chose the rich agricultural lands 
of Rattanak Mondol in Battambang province as their final destination, despite the fact 
that it is also the most heavily mined area inCambodiaand subject to cont inualfighting. 
Other push factors can include the hostility of neighbours and kin; mistrust from local 
levels of government, and employment discrimination; not finding family; the lack of 
health, education, or social services; and no tenacity to struggle in the development of 
new settlements. Pull factors in secondary migration may be to find other family 
members, to gravitate towards urban environments, or to engage in military activity. 
Pursat Environment 
With a land area of over one million hectares, Pursat is the fourth largest province in 
Cambodia. Three distinct agro-ecosystems are predominant in Pursat-forests and 
mountains covering 67 percent of the land area, upper terraces, and the great lake Tonie 
Sap and its plains (Shams 1994). There are distinct dry and wet seasons. During the wet 
season (April to December), rice is grown in all three lanfl areas-upland rice cultiva­
tion in the mountains, rain-fed lowland varieties in the upper terraces, and floating rice 
in the Tonie Sap system. The upper terrace ecosystem is the most predominant used 
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land in Pursat province. It consists of poor rain-fed fields that are characterized by 
sandy and acidic soil, resulting in low rice yields. The variety of rice grown depends on 
the water regime of particular fields, canals, or ditches. 
The average family in Pursat Province is 5.59 persons, indicating high pressure on 
small plots of land (ibid.). In the late 1980s, when land began to be de-collectivized, 
initial land distribution was made on the basis of family size. Through marriage, 
inheritance, and migration, however, land holdings got smaller. In Pursat Ville, for 
example, Shams (1994) found the average yield of paddy is 1,483 kilograms of rice per 
hectare, indicating that 1.15 hectare of rice land is needed to fulfil the basic requirements 
of an average family of 5.91 people. In surveyed villages, however, the average female­
headed household holds just 0.93 hectare, significantly lower than that of the average 
male-headed household which holds 1.46 hectare. 
Shams (1994) lists numerous types of rice cultivation: 13 varieties of early rice, 9 
varieties of medium rice, and 15 varieties of late rice. The one variety cultivated by 
everyone is Dom Neup (used for making cake), whereas all other varieties are grown 
for subsistence. In Pursat Ville District, where rain-fed lowland rice is predominant, 
almost 50 percent of the farmers grow the early variety of subsistence rice due to its 
short growing duration, good volume expansion, suitability for high fields, and 
drought tolerance (ibid.). Although the late-variety rice yields the highest production, 
its cultivation requires a long maturity in deep-standing water, and few farmers have 
these "pond fields." All rice cultivation begins with seeds sown in highly fertilized seed 
beds. After 40-45 days, the seedlings are bundled together in stacks and transplanted 
into the main field. 
Rice is the staple food. Corn, sweet potato, cassava, beans, and backyard cultivation 
of fruits and vegetables supplement the diet. In addition, a significant amount of 
protein comes from foraging small animals such as frogs, shrimp, eels, turtles, birds, 
snakes, and crickets. Domestic animals represent the family savings, particularly draft 
animals. A wealthy family will have cows, water buffaloes, one or two pigs, and at least 
five chickens orducks. Pigs and chickens are fed recycled agricultural branorunhusked 
rice, kitchen waste, and whatever they can forage. Pigs are raised for up to nine months 
and then sold on the market. Chickens are eaten when they die naturally or when they 
become too numerous. Cows and buffaloes forage and are also fed hay, which the 
owner must buy. Draft animals are eaten only after they have died naturally. Cow's 
milk is not used. 
In well-established villages, numerous palm and banana trees provide shady areas 
as well as food. Without NGO community development assistance, water sources in 
most villages consist of hand-dug family ponds, hand-dug wells, possibly one drilled 
well at the local temple site, and numerous cement jars to store rainwater. 
Traditional Labour Patterns 
Cambodian women traditionally engage in pig fattening, planting rice seedlings, 
weeding and planting gardens, harvesting rice, and Cf11 domestic chores including child 
and animal care. Many also operate small businesses selling cooked food [vegetables, 
fermented fish (pra hoc), meat, salted egg, noodles, fish sauce (tuk tray)], fresh 
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vegetables and fruit, general supplies (salt, herbal medicine, MSG, cigarettes), and 
dried coconut shells or rice husks along the main roads or in the market town. Some 
women also produce handicrafts such as weaving, basketry, or jars that are also sold in 
the market. Local vegetables that women can grow in gardens around their house 
include the sponge gourd, wax gourd, pumpkin, cucumber, taro, onions, long beans, 
chilli, basil, slec ngob (local leafy vegetable), as well as numerous spices. 
Men are active in construction, ploughing, fencing, climbing sugar palm, coconut, 
and banana trees, hunting, fishing, cutting wood for sale, producing charcoal, and 
administering village and religious activities, including village militia and defense 
groups. Only a small number of men are engaged in small businesses as repairmen 
(bicycle, motorcycle), carpenters, blacksmiths (for ornaments and tools), tinsmiths 
(watering cans), motor taxi drivers, or barbers. Many men work for the government (as 
soldiers or attached to specific departments), but the pay is so low that most have 
additional jobs. Most farmers have secondary occupations as well, needed to supple­
ment their food budgets that are at best classified as marginal (Shams 1994). 
Children are generally engaged in looking after cows, water buffaloes, and smaller 
children, collecting firewood for household use, carrying water, and foraging for extra 
food (frogs, fishing, catching snakes). 
Since 1979, however, many women, who are now heads of their households, engage 
in traditional male labour involving intensive agricultural activities. A few women 
have assumed managerial and administrative work at the province, district, andvillage 
levels, in addition to ongoing domestic and child care responsibilities. Among returnee 
men, gender responsibilities have also shifted. Several unemployed returnee men 
spoke of how they have had to assume domestic labour activities in their families 
because their wives often travel long distances to sell vegetables or other products at the 
markets, or are employed in other people's houses. As one returnee said: "When the 
men have no jobs, they are left at home to do everything." 
Pursat History since 1975 
During the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-79), the population of the provincial and 
district towns of Pursat was moved into rural villages to work on the newly-created 
collective farms. All the province's cattle and buffalo were herded together to be used 
for transportation purposes, and humans became the supply draft power (Shams 1994). 
The absence of disease control and proper care severely depleted the draft animal 
population, which today remains low in all villages. Throughout Pursat, large areas of 
forest were cleared for extensive rice cultivation. After 1979, however, most of these 
areas have lain dormant and regrown with scrub brush. 
The families who returned to their land immediately following the Khmer Rouge 
withdrawal in 1979were allowed to occupy their former lands, up to 1,500-2,000 square 
meters in size (ibid.). Individual agriculture was still not allowed, however, and people 
were forced to farm through solidarity groups known as Kram Samaki (ibid.). The 
involvement of the UN and some NGOs in early 1?80 helped to transform the 
agricultural system from the rigid Khmer Rouge collective farming and labour bri­
gades into a resource-sharing structure. Under Vietnamese Communist control, land 
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Pursat Province-General Overview 
Demographic Characteristics 
As of May 1993, the total population of Pursat Province was 254,587 (UNTAC Election 
Component). Pursat is divided into five districts: Bakan, Kandieng, Pursat Ville, 
Kravanh, and Krakor. The districts are further subdivided into 44 communes with a 
total of 440 villages (Shams 1994). Pursat Ville District is where most of this study's field 
work was carried out. Ithas seven communes and 60 villages. UNT AC figures from the 
May 1993 list indicate 8,028 households and 42,866 people in Pursat Ville Dis trict. In the 
Shams (1994) report, Pursat Province is noted as having the largest number of widows 
and women-headed households in Cambodia. In some villages, female-headed house­
holds account for up to 70 percent of all families. On average, 50 percent of the total 
population is less than 17 years old (ibid.). 
According to figures from Pursat Women's Association, the numbers of returnee 
families are slowly decreasing in most Pursat districts: 
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Arrival May 1993 As of April 22, 1994 

District Number of Families District Number of Families 

Bakan 3,407 Bakan 2,339 
Kandieng 389 Kandieng 345 
Pursat Ville 876 Pursat Ville 621 
Krakor 312 Krakor 371 
Kravanh 302 Kravanh 276 
Figures from eRC lists indicate that, by January 1994, a total of 23,433 returnees 
(5,286 families) and 3,293 internally displaced people (!DPs) (824 families) had resettled 
in Pursat, representing over 10 percent of the provincial population. Figures from 1994 
World Food Program lis ts show even higher numbers of IDPs in Pursat, totalling 5,823 
persons (1,022 families). Of the 23,433 returnees in Pursat, the vast majority (20,464 
individuals in 4,341 families) resettled withOptionC; a smaller number (2,622individuals 
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in 856 families) took Option B; 28 families (135 persons) returned with Option D; 21 
families (65 persons) chose Option A; and three families returned through Option E. 
Thirty-eight families (131 persons) returned spontaneously, although they were able to 
access the 400-day food program (World Food Program). 
Lack of Accurate Statistics on Returnees after May 1994 
During May 1993 and May 1994, district authorities kept an accurate registration of 
returnees in specific villages so they could inform CRC about any changes in food 
distribution. After the end of the 400-day food aid package, however, the monitoring 
of returnee families ended. By August 1994, there were no longer up-to-date figures of 
how many returnees were in each district. InRoleap and Prey Nhi communes, Pursat 
Ville District, there were many empty houses in the villages. Neighbours stated that 
these were the houses of returnees who have moved far away. Mr. Samrith Bo, Krakor 
District Authority, noted: 
The number of returnees on my present list is different from [those of] 
UNHCR and WFP. Major changes have occurred after the expiry of food 
[aid]. Many returnees have moved out of the district. People just leave within 
a day, they just disappear. We have no idea where they have gone. Eighty­
nine families are left in the district and these are just the temporary statistics. 
Returnees move because they find other relatives in other provinces. 
Commune leaders in Pursat also stated that they no longer knew anything more 
about the returnees, what they are doing, where they are living, or even if they had any 
rice to eat. Mr. Say Mang, Chief Officer of Phtas Prey Commune, stated: 
There are about 126 returnee families, but this is according to the 1993 list and 
I'm not sure how many are left. After the 400-day support has ended some 
returnees go to another province. 
Mr. Mil Ben, Chief Commune Officer of Prey Nhy Commune, stated: 
These numbers are from the 1993 list. Now the exact numbers are not known 
because many returnees have moved without saying anything. I donot know 
where they go or why. The first time the returnees came to stay here with 
relatives, but when they hear that other relatives are in another province they 
think the landis better or is available so they move. 
Mr. Martin Fisher, WFP Director in Pursat, noted that returnees are moving in (e.g., 
from Kompong Thom) as much as they move out. Some of the returnees I spoke with 
indicated that theyhad come to Pursat province after their 400-day food aid ended. One 
man, his wife, and their four children (one son and three daughters), for example, came 
from Siem Reap Province three months earlier to settle in T onsay Kol village, Anlong 
Thnot Commune, Krakor District, Pursat province. They came because the wife was 
born in this commune. She had one family member left here, her brother-in-law. At first 
the family was sent to Siem Reap because that was the husband's birthplace, even 
though they had no relatives there. The man said: 
We stayed as long as the food ration card was good, but once it finished we 
came here. Also, Siem Reap has not got good security. The house we live in 
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now is not our own, we share it with another returnee family, two adults and 
their children. The house is less than 12 by 12' and is very crowded for over 
nine peopIe. No one has any rice land. The women prepare food to sell on the 
road to the passengers in the bus. This only provides enough money for the 
morning and evening rice so we do not eat during the day. 
Another returnee woman in the same village also spoke of just coming to Pursat from 
Battambang because of increasing security concerns. She came with her husband, five 
children, and her parents. She also helps to prepare and sell the food along with another 
returnee widow whom she met here. 
Internal Secondary Migration 
Between May 1993 and May 1994, the primary internal movement was the search for 
family reunification. The cash/food aid provided a buffer for an initial attempt at 
resettlement with family members. Ms. Linda Hartke, Executive Director of CWS, 
commented on this secondary migration among returnees: 
The patternis that returnees first move in with relatives for a short term, three 
months, six months, or nine months. But problems arise with the shortage of 
space within a house and the small size of the land. Most Cambodians have 
less than one-half hectare of land, which is too small to support one family, 
let alone an extended one. Chances are that the returnee fami! y will move out 
to another place in the village or another commune. 
The search for fertile land has been the motivating factor in much secondary 
migration among returnees. In their search for land, returnees are usually the first to 
settle on housing land wherever a new access road has been created. Returnees have 
also gone to "no-go" areas (mined, malarial, difficult to access, or lacking water) as well 
as areas of growing insecurity and military conflict. Robinson (1994, 32-44), for 
example, describes the more than25,000 returnees whochose the rich agricultural lands 
of Rattanak Mondol in Battambang province as their final destination, despite the fact 
that it is also the most heavily mined area in Cambodia and subject to continual fighting. 
Other push factors can include the hostility of neighbours and kin; mistrust from local 
levels of government, and employment discrimination; not finding family; the lack of 
health, education, or social services; and no tenacity to struggle in the development of 
new settlements. Pull factors in secondary migration may be to find other family 
members, to gravitate towards urban environments, or to engage in military activity. 
Pursat Environment 
With a land area of over one million hectares, Pursat is the fourth largest province in 
Cambodia. Three distinct agro-ecosystems are predominant in Pursat-forests and 
mountains covering 67percent of the land area, upper terraces, and the great lake TonIe 
Sap and its plains (Shams 1994). There are distinct dry andwet seasons. During the wet 
season (April to December), rice is grown in all three land areas-upland rice cultiva­
tion in the mountains, rain-fed lowland varieties in the upper terraces, and £loating rice 
in the TonIe Sap system. The upper terrace ecosystem is the most predominant used 
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land in Pursat province. It consists of poor rain-fed fields that are characterized by 
sandy and acidic soil, resulting in low rice yields. The variety of rice grown depends on 
the water regime of particular fields, canals, or ditches. 
The average family in Pur sat Province is 5.59 persons, indicating high pressure on 
small plots of land (ibid.). In the late 1980s, when land began to be de-collectivized, 
initial land distribution was made on the basis of family size. Through marriage, 
inheritance, and migration, however, land holdings got smaller. In Pursat Ville, for 
example, Shams (1994) found the average yield of paddy is 1,483 kilograms of rice per 
hectare, indicating that 1.15 hectare ofrice land is needed to fulfil the basic requirements 
of an average family of5.91 people. In surveyed villages, however, the average female­
headed household holds just 0.93 hectare, significantly lower than that of the average 
male-headed household which holds 1.46 hectare. 
Shams (1994) lists numerous types of rice cultivation: 13 varieties of early rice, 9 
varieties of medium rice, and 15 varieties of late rice. The one variety cultivated by 
everyone is Dom Neup (used for making cake), whereas all other varieties are grown 
for subsistence. In Pursat Ville District, where rain-fed lowland rice is predOminant, 
almost 50 percent of the farmers grow the early variety of subsistence rice due to its 
short growing duration, good volume expansion, suitability for high fields, and 
drought tolerance (ibid.). Although the late-variety rice yields the highest production, 
its cultivation requires a long maturity in deep-standing water, and few farmers have 
these "pond fields." All rice cuI tivation begins with seeds sown in highly fertilized seed 
beds. After 40-45 days, the seedlings are bundled together in stacks and transplanted 
into the main field. 
Rice is the staple food. Corn, sweet potato, cassava, beans, and backyard cultivation 
of fruits and vegetables supplement the diet. In addition, a significant amount of 
protein comes from foraging small animals such as frogs, shrimp, eels, turtles, birds, 
snakes, and crickets. Domestic animals represent the family savings, particularly draft 
animals. A wealthy family will have cows, water buffaloes, one or two pigs, and at least 
five chickens or ducks. Pigs and chickens are fed recycled agricultural branorunhusked 
rice, kitchen waste, and whatever they can forage. Pigs are raised for up to nine months 
and then sold on the market. Chickens are eaten when they die naturally or when they 
become too numerous. Cows and buffaloes forage and are also fed hay, which the 
owner must buy. Draft animals are eaten only after they have died naturally. Cow's 
milk is not used. . 
In well-established villages, numerous palm and banana trees provide shady areas 
as well as food. Without NGO community development assistance, water sources in 
most villages consist of hand-dug family ponds, hand-dug wells, possibly one drilled 
well at the local temple site, and numerous cement jars to store rainwater. 
Traditional Labour Patterns 
Cambodian women traditionally engage in pig fattening, planting rice seedlings, 
weeding and planting gardens, harvesting rice, and all domestic chores including child 
and animal care. Many also operate small businesses selling cooked food [vegetables, 
fermented fish (pra hoc), meat, salted egg, noodles, fish sauce (tuk tray)], fresh 
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vegetables and fruit, general supplies (salt, herbal medicine, MSG, cigarettes), and 
dried coconut shells or rice husks along the main roads or in the market town. Some 
women also produce handicrafts such as weaving, basketry, or jars that are also sold in 
the market. Local vegetables that women can grow in gardens around their house 
include the sponge gourd, wax gourd, pumpkin, cucumber, taro, onions, long beans, 
chilli, basil, slec ngob (local leafy vegetable), as well as numerous spices. 
Men are active in construction, ploughing, fencing, climbing sugar palm, coconut, 
and banana trees, hunting, fishing, cutting wood for sale, producing charcoal, and 
administering village and religious activities, including village militia and defense 
groups. Only a small number of men are engaged in small businesses as repairmen 
(bicycle, motorcycle), carpenters, blacksmiths (for ornaments and tools), tinsmiths 
(watering cans), motor taxi drivers, or barbers. Many men work for the government (as 
soldiers or attached to specific departments), but the pay is so low that most have 
additional jobs. Most farmers have secondary occupations as well, needed to supple­
ment their food budgets that are at best classified as marginal (Shams 1994). 
Children are generally engaged in looking after cows, water buffaloes, and smaller 
children, collecting firewood for household use, carrying water, and foraging for extra 
food (frogs, fishing, catching snakes). 
Since 1979, however, many women, who are now heads of their households, engage 
in traditional male labour involving intensive agricultural activities. A few women 
have assumed managerial and administrativeworkat the province, district, andvillage 
levels, in addition to ongoing domestic and child care responsibilities. Among returnee 
men, gender responsibilities have also shifted. Several unemployed returnee men 
spoke of how they have had to assume domestic labour activities in their families 
because their wives often travel long distances to sell vegetables or other products at the 
markets, or are employed in other people's houses. As one returnee said: "When the 
men have no jobs, they are left at home to do everything." 
Pursat History since 1975 
During the Khmer Rouge regime (1975-79), the population of the provincial and 
district towns of Pursat was moved into rural villages to work on the newly-created 
collective farms. All the province's cattle and buffalo were herded together to be used 
for transportation purPoses, andhumansbecame the supply draft power (Shams 1994). 
The absence of disease control and proper care severely depleted the draft animal 
population, which today remains low in all villages. Throughout Pursat, large areas of 
forest were cleared for extensive rice cultivation. After 1979, however, most of these 
areas have lain dormant and regrown with scrub brush. 
The families who returned to their land immediately following the Khmer Rouge 
withdrawal in 1979were allowed to occupy their former lands, up to 1,500-2,000square 
meters in size (ibid.). Individual agriculture was still not allowed, however, and people 
were forced to farm through solidarity groups known as Kram Samaki (ibid.). The 
involvement of the UN and some NGOs in early 1980 helped to transform the 
agricultural system from the rigid Khmer Rouge collective farming and labour bri­
gades into a resource-sharing structure. Under Vietnamese Communist control, land 
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tenure belonged to the solidarity groups. Lands attributed to villages and districts, 
however, could be loaned to individual families or government employees (ibid.). Kram 
Samaki were obliged to sell part of their harvest to the government at a fixed price, less 
than market price or inflation. To some extent, the Kram Samaki system provided a 
form of security to vulnerable families and individuals, ensuring that they could 
participate in and receive at least their communal share of land production, as well as 
sharing in any draft power or agricultural equipment available to the group. The law 
on land tenure was changed in February 1989, granting hereditary tenure to individual 
families (ibid.). 
Pursat Province,like all of Cambodia, is characterized by an inadequate physical and 
administrative infrastructure. The lack of trained personnel and their low management 
capacity results in an underdeveloped local capacity for self-reliance, sustainability, 
and reconstruction efforts. During the Khmer Rouge regime, most provincial roads, 
bridges, and water distribution systems were damaged, as were houses and agricul­
tural equipment. In August 1994, all roads (including the main highway) remained 
seriously dilapidated and filled with potholes. In one section, between the town of 
Pursat and Kravanh District, it takes over one-half hour to cross two kilometres of road. 
Bridges are also rundownand frequently have huge gaping holes in them, covered only 
with loose boards. Roads branching from the main highway #5 are mostly inaccessible 
during the rainy season except for oxcarts, four-wheel-drive vehicles, motorcycles, and 
bicycles. The small truck used during this study to transport the survey team into 
villages in Pursat Ville District frequently got stuck in deep, muddy ruts and the entire 
team (twelve, including myself) would have to get out the back and push. At bridges 
where there were foot-wide spaces between the road and the bridge. The intrepid 
driver would assess the situation for a few minutes and very slowly proceed. 
Vulnerable Families 
Female-headed households, families with a handicapped male head, and those with 
large numbers of children, especially among families who are recent arrivals, charac­
terize the poorest families in Pursat. With little access to land and in the absence of an 
adult male's labour, these households remain disadvantaged. Even when given land, 
the expense of hiring labour and draft animals to prepare the fields, the lack of tools and 
the labour force to work the field, compounded by a general lack of water and access 
to irrigation, result in less rice production and chronic rice deficits throughout the year. 
Shams (1994,27) notes that the average land holding for female-headed households is 
often less thanhalf of other households (0.56 compared to 1.2 hectares). Female-headed 
households though tend to have a slightly smaller family size. 
Since the 400-day food program ended in May 1994, large numbers of returnees 
could be classified as extremely vulnerable individuals (EVI). Other categories of EVI 
include female-headed households where the mother is illiterate, unskilled, and the 
children are under ten years old; elderly people, alone orwith small children; unaccom­
panied minors; and those with handicaps (blind, disabled) or medical disabilities 
(epilepsy, heart problems, tuberculosis, asthma, mental illness). 
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The three districts in Pursat which have the highest numbers of female/widow­
headed households, as well as high returnee and internally displaced populations, are 
Bakan, Kravanh, and Krakor. Area districts with the highest population density are 
Pursat Ville, Kandieng, Bakan, and Krakor. Most of the communes and villages in 
Pursat districts are situated along the main highway and railway line, and to a lesser 
extent along secondary roads connecting the districts, or rivers (ibid.). 
Minority Groups 
Several minority groups live in some areas of Pursat. A small number of Poa (less than 
500 individuals) live in the forest and mountainous regions of Kravanh. Over 6,500 
Muslim Cham live in the five districts, but with the majority in Krakor and Kandieng 
(Shams 1994). Some 6,000 Vietnamese, 500 Chinese, and 30 Laotians live in the floating 
villages in the Tonie Sap engaging in industrial fishing (ibid.). 
Security Concerns 
Apart from the occasional shelling of outlying government military posts, small 
skirmishes in contested Khmer Rouge territory, and a few bridges being blown up, the 
stability of Pursat province is relatively secure, especially when compared to the 
neighbouring provinces of Siem Reap and Battambang. Khmer Rouge territory is 
generally confined to the mountains and forested areas near the railway tracks, and 
provincial and local authorities retain control over much of the province. Khmer Rouge 
attacks are increasing, however, in the Krakor District, with intensified highway 
robberies, assaults, and killings of Vietnamese. General banditry is also becoming 
problematic, most likely due to an overall impoverishment of the province caused by 
the poor agricultural yield and inadequate water supply. Banditry impacts on return­
ees who have been given isolated land, far from established villages with no militia 
defense systems. Returnees are afraid of the isolation and lack of protection. As Ms. 
O'Mahoney, Executive Director of CONCERN, noted: 
In rural areas throughout Cambodia, many villages are constantly raided by 
bandits, some as frequently as once a month, as in Bantay Meanchy. These 
attacks are not by Khmer Rouge. Local people are forming their own quasi­
militia to provide some sort of earlywarning system. If the Khmer Rouge can 
step into villages and offer protection, there is not much resistance from 
locals. InWestern Pursat Province, for example, several areas are recognized 
as Khmer Rouge villages, but NGOs such as CONCERN can still send 
personnel in for community development, such as digging wells. The desig­
nation of a Khmer Rouge village is a loose term. Other than in the specific 
areas identified as Khmer Rouge, the term usually indicates that this is 
territory through which Khmer Rouge can move easily and which is under 
Khmer Rouge protection from bandits. 
Ms. Carol Strickle, an official with CARE in Pursat, noted that the Bakan District in 
Pursat is having problems with forced conscription into the Cambodian military: 
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People are paying large amounts in bribery to get away from having to go 
with the government troops. This is a good source of income to the govern­
ment soldiers who usually don't get paid. The large presence of government 
soldiers mean that people are more afraid. CARE programs are affected. Men 
hide in the fields or run away, there is a lot of cash loss, people are not planting 
the rice and the men don't come to program training or gather in labour 
groups where they may be targeted by the government soldiers. This was 
especially problematic in July. 
Literacy 
According to NGO personnel working in Pursat province, the level of illiteracy among 
villagers continues to be high. Early figures indicate that over 65 percent of the illiterate 
population are women between the ages of 14 and 40 (Shams 1994,31). As a result, 
women remain dependent upon more educated individuals, and their ability to 
participate as village leaders or in community development schemes, such as credit and 
rice banks, is impaired. Shams (1994) notes that World Bank studies indicate that four 
years of primary education increases farm productivity an average of ten percent or 
more, as does the provision of child care facilities. The government of Cambodia, 
however, has no resources to transfer to communes or villages to provide literacy skills, 
and most assistance comes from international organizations and NGOs. CONCERN, 
for example, has rehabilitated 20 percent of the primary schools in Pursat province 
alone, but this is geared towards children. American Refugee Committee (ARC) has 
developed literacy programs for women, but this is specifically for raising health 
awareness. 
Health 
The survey carried out by Main and Pennells (1994) in Pursat province identified 
several main health problems. These include the consumption of unclean drinking 
water leading to numerous diarrhoeal diseases, insufficient care of pregnant women 
and babies, malaria, TB, and extensive malnutrition among children under five (over 
51 percent). Cambodia has one of the highest infant and maternal mortality rates in the 
world (Main and Pennells 1994). Endemic diarrhoea, malnutrition, and vector-borne 
diseases, such as malaria and dengue fever, are leading causes of childhood death, 
while untreated maternal hypertension, infection, malaria, haemorrhage, and malnu­
trition contribute to high maternal mortality (ibid.). The majority of women give birth 
at home with the assistance of untrained midwives, and do not receive pre- or post­
natal care. David Ashton, director of Cambodian Mines Action Committee (CIMAC), 
estimates that 15 percent of the population in Pursat is disabled, primarily from land 
mines (personal communication). Health care for returnees is also minimal. According 
to Martin Fisher, former official in the International Red Cross and now executive 
director of WFP in Pursat: 
[t]hose with illness, for example TB, who were on treatment were repatriated 
with the "hope" that they would receive further treatment. But it was never 
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clear where they would they go for treatment and how they would pay. This 
also happened with other medical cases. In certain cases the International 
Red Cross (IRC) was informed that EVIs were coming to specific areas and we 
could prepare something but otherwise the UNHCR would take no respon­
sibility for people whoneeded a lot of medical care. Health care is insufficient 
throughout the entire country. IRC had extended discussions about UNH­
CR's lack of concern for returnee access to health care once they were back in 
the country. The only compromise was that UNHCR would pay for medical 
services while people were in the reception centre, but there was nothing 
after. (Personal communication 1994) 
During the Khmer Rouge years (1975-79), all existing health structures were de­
stroyed and 90 percent of the health workers died or fled the country (Main and 
Pennells 1994). In 1992, the estimated number of health care workers in Cambodia was 
700 physicians, 1,300 medical assistants, and 4,000 trained nurses (ibid.). Currently, 
5,000 students are registered at the Faculty of Medicine (4,500 of whom will become 
doctors, 200 dentists, and 200 pharmacists), and 2,000 students are in nursing, physi­
otherapy, and laboratory technician training. However much of this training is inap­
propriate for present-day needs (ibid., 9). The recent adoption of Western medical 
training methods still follows the French medical system, first in place during the 1960s, 
and remains focused on curative health care rather than primary health and preventa­
tive care. Further, instruction and texts are in French, a language unfamiliar to many 
younger Cambodians. During the 1980s, medical training for Cambodians was ob­
tained overseas, in Russian, German, or Vietnamese languages (ibid.). In addition, 
Western medical personnel pay little attention to traditional medicine, especially 
Khmer beliefs about disease and death. NGO health care models are frequently taken 
from"developing" Africa which are expected to fit "rehabilitating" Cambodia (ibid., 10). 
Expense of Medical Care 
Medication and consultation with accredited medical staff is expensive and, in rural 
areas, the most common cause of debt is medical expense. Main and Pennells (1994, 10) 
note that any illness or treatment can be catastrophic to fragile family finances, 
especially when major assets such as a buffalo or pig must be sold to pay for treatment. 
Inaddition, less than50 percent of rural people have access to local health care andmust 
incur transportation expenses and loss of time in travelling. As a result, people first 
consult Kru Khmer (traditional healers) first during illness in preference to recognized 
government medical services, which are generally sought only as a last resort. Al­
though folk medicine continues to play a vital role in Cambodian health care, its 
potential in preventative and promotional health care remains underutilized by 
doctors. 
To treat respiratory illnesses and diarrhoea, two endemic ailments, the majority of 
parents seek remedies at local markets rather than from medical clinics or the district 
hospital. Children, however, accounted for 34 percent of all requests for medical 
attention at the Krakor district hospital in 1993 (ibid.). At present, only one-third of 
Krakor children are vaccinated against polio, tuberculosis, diphtheria, tetanus, and 
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pertussis, and over 40 percent of all children's deaths (0-15 years) in Pursat was the 
result of acute respiratory infection (ibid.). 
Hospitals 
District Hospitals in Pursat often do not have a physician or surgeon, and resident 
medical staff mayconsist only of senior nurses, midwives, andmedical assistants (Main 
and Pennells 1994). Complicated medical emergencies must be transferred to the 
provincial hospital in Pursat town, but only during the day, due to security concerns 
at night (ibid.). Although hospitals ostensibly provide 24-hour health services, few 
nurses stay overnight and most are engaged in supplemental work outside. The 
combination of daily English classes and World Food Program supplies of rice and oil 
to hospital staff are incentives to keep them longer each day and to make them take 
more interest in their work (ibid.). Throughout Pursat province, hospitals and clinics 
provide medical services with inadequate and insufficient equipment and supplies. 
Pharmacies tend to be run by entrepreneurs rather than medical staff so that the cost of 
medication is high with no quality or handling and storage control (ibid.). 
Water 
According to Main and Pennells (1994), 93percent of all water sources inKrakor district 
is contaminated, a figure which can be applied to the four other districts in Pursat. The 
majority of people in Pursat use either river water or rainwater as their primary source 
of drinking water. In Kandieng District, for example, less than 15 percent of the 
population have access to wells and/or village pond water, and 0.2 percent must rely 
onbuying drinkingwater (Lloyd 1992). The provision of clean drinkingwater is a major 
component in all community development programs. 
Throughout Pursat province, there is not onlywidespread lack of water for drinking 
but also for agricultural use. Water shortages are compounded by the lack of crop 
diversification and excessive reliance on rice. When weather difficulties occur, such as 
insufficient rainfall, there is a massive deficit in rice and a negative effect on the overall 
economic situation. As one NGO worker noted: 
If the rains dOI).'t come this year it will create a natural disaster, thus slowing 
long-term community development, and being replaced by a focus on 
rehabilitation with aid becoming seed distribution or food distribution. And 
that's going back to "relief." Long-term development can't work with 
starvation. (Personal communication, August 1994) 
Lack of irrigation is one of the biggest problems in Pursat. Irrigation systems are a 
desirable long-term goal but the expense is beyond the scope of NGOs. UNDP is 
looking at the possibility of irrigation on a national scale as well as small-scale irrigation 
plans, such as submersible water pumps run on diesel fuel to connect villages with 
rivers. The ambivalent characteristics of village organization and difficulties in 
prioritizing needs, however, have postponed implementation of these projects. At 
present, there is no clear management structure to authorize decisions on how much to 
31 Pursat Province-General Overview 
borrow, to clarify benefits, to plan for spare parts and maintenance, or to develop an 
equitable program of who gets use of the irrigation first and for how much. 
Village Organization 
Most Cambodian villages are comprised of a concentration of houses around a 
marketplace or temple, along a road or highway, or alongside a body of water (river, 
irrigation channel, or lake), and surrounded by rice fields. Individual households or a 
cluster of houses can also be found scattered over more isolated areas that are still 
within village boundaries. For administrative purposes, villages or "Phums" (in 
Khmer) are organized into sub-districts (called communes in English and "Khums" in 
Khmer), which in tum are organized into districts within a particular province. 
Although van de Put (1993) feels that the village itself cannot be considered a"commu­
nity," particular villages often have amenities and services that are shared within the 
commune. One village may have a fuel supply and several rice mills, another village 
may be the site of the commune market, or has a primary school (with one or two 
buildings, five rooms each), or local pagoda (Buddhist temple), or be the location for the 
commune headquarters. Within the village, smaller organizational units tend to 
function as core social and economic networks. These smaller units are called "Kroms/' 
and comprise groups of eight to twelve houses (or relatively separate nuclear house­
holds), usually consisting ofclose family members (along matrilineal lines) and friends 
(van de Put 1993). 
Villages Included in This Project's Survey 
Three communes inPursa t Ville district were targeted for this report's survey. They are 
Phteas Prey commune, situated very close to the town of Pursat, with boundaries 
overlapping Pursat's main marketplace; Roleap commune, situated from two to five 
kilometres northwest from Pursat town along Highway#5, with the main road into the 
commune running parallel to Pursat River; and Prey Nhi commune, 18.5 kilometres 
west of Pursat town along Highway #5. 
There are eight villages inPreyNhyCommune. Mr.MH Ben, Chief CommuneOff icer 
of Prey Nhy Commune, supplied the following numbers of returnee families (as ofMay 
1994): 
Village Number of Returnee Families 
Bak Rotesh (C Hq) 9 
DoungChrom 13 
PraLayTom 20 
Speanthmar 3 
ManCher 9 
SalaKomrou 14 
KrangTasen 5 
Sras Srang 17 
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Approximately 30 returnee families were surveyed in the villages of Speanthmar, 
Sala Komrou, Krang Tasen, and Sras Srang. 
In Roleap commune, there are twelve villages. Mr. Sor Sarim, first chief of Roleap 
Commune, supplied the following data: 
Village Number of Returnee Families 
Prekthnot 5 
Soriya Leu 11 
TImalChopon 14 
Steugn Touch 16 
Cha Long Kat 8 
PoanDau 6 
Tunal Bam Bek 6 
PreyOmal 4 
ToulMakak 11 
Spean TIunar 13 
Roleap 11 
Mr. Sarimcautioned against the accuracy of these figures, stating that lithe numbers 
are not stable andwhen peoplemove they don't say anything. I thinkmost go to Phnom 
Penh. Many houses are empty." Five villages were surveyed: Soriya Leu, Soriya Krom, 
Thnal Chopon, Toul Makak, and Spen Thmar, for a total of 28 questionnaires. 
The following is a list of villages in Phtas Prey commune: Peal Bhek 1, Peal Beck 2, 
Khal Hong, Dang Kea, Chamba Chek Cheung (Chamkachek), Chamba Chek Thoung 
(Chamkachek), Opra Sdav (Osdao), Thnot Tret, Kork, Ra. 
Mr. SayMang, Chief Officer of Phtas PreyCommune, stated that there are some 126 
returnee families living in Phtas Prey, but cautioned that this numberwas according to 
the 1993 list. He was not sure how many were left because, after the 400-day support 
ended, somereturneeswent to another province. Over 30questionnaireswerecollected 
from the villages of Peal Bhek 2, Khal Hong, Chamba Chek (north and south), Osdao, 
and Thnot Tret. 
Two Village Profiles 
Two ofthevillages incl uded in this report's survey, SalaKamrou and Sras SronginPrey 
Nhi commune, have been profiled by UNDP/ CARERE. The following provides an 
indication ofvillage characteristics and changing demographics, based in part on these 
profiles. 
Sras Srang Village 
Before the elections, UNTAC listed 91 people in Sras Srang (49 adults of whom26 were 
women). As of June 1994, Sras Srong had a population of 237 (44 households, of which 
10were female-headed, including widows and those with amputee husbands). Thirty­
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two of the households are returnee families who were provided with house land of 
approximately one-half hectare. The village is situated 7.5 kilometers east of the 
commune headquarters off the main road #5, and 6.5 kilometers west of the Roleap 
Spean Thmar market. The roads are very bad and considered inaccessible to the more 
established part of the village. 
There is no clear history of Sras Srang village, only that in 1979 it was referred to as 
Takoy village. At present, there are two dams in the village to conserve water during 
the dry season and to irrigate rice crops, so the village is considered better off than most 
surrounding ones. In addition, a natural stream runs through the village. The village 
also has 10hand-dugwells (which go dry), one canal, and one pond in the pagoda used 
for community drinking water. Rice planting is by cultivated seed, which is trans­
planted in "Tung" (little bunches). Each hectare has between40-50 Tungs. The average 
household is 5.5 persons, which means that 1,450 kilograms of rice are needed per 
family per year. Other crops planted include those in field gardens, vegetables around 
the house, and in orchards (mangoes, coconut, and palm trees). Market products are 
obtained from sugar palmproduction and firewood cutting in the nearby forest. There 
is a small school in the pagoda but most students go to the nearby Krang Tasen village 
school, which serves five villages in PreyNhi commune. Eighty percent of the children 
in Sras Srang village go to school. Few of the returnee families have rice land, 
agricultural tools, or draft animals. Land is available for rice cultivationbut itmust first 
be cleared, and Mr. OuEm, chief of Development ofPrey Nhycommune, stated that the 
land is far away and is not considered good. The surrounding cultivated rice land is 
already owned and in use by local villagers. 
Sras Srang village now consists of three different segments: an established central 
core, the new returnee houses at the beginning of the new road that extends approxi­
mately 1 kilometre, and the newer returnee houses along the extended road that goes 
into Keo Moni village in Kandieng District. Keo Moni is a new village for returnees, 
developed from a section of forest and scrubland. Mr. Ou Em, Chief of Development, 
Prey Nhy commune, noted that there is room for more families in Sras Srang if WFP 
helps to enlarge and prepare additional land for vegetable gardens, and clear the forest 
for rice fields. 
Sala Komrou Village, 
Sala Kamrou village was founded in 1919 with five or six households. In June 1994, 
UNDP/CARERE estimated the population of Sala Komrou at 437 people (98 house­
holdswith 39 being female-headed). Ten ofthe total number ofhouseholds are returnee 
families. Returnees were provided with house land, approximately 30metres wide and 
100 metres long. 
The village has several rice mills and two local markets. It is situated on road #5, 5.5 
kilometers east of commune headquarters. Most people use hand-dug wells for 
drinking, washing, and growing vegetables. During the dry season, people need to 
collect water at the Pagoda in Sras Srang village or at Ta Brachao village. A primary 
school had been built in 1960, and in 1993 UNDP built a new one with five classrooms. 
The main occupation is rice farming, with secondary income derived from palm tree 
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products, wood cutting, rice mills, video movie showing, and raising animals. Eighty­
three households have a total of 60 hectares of rice land, an average of less than one 
hectare per household. Only eight households have more than one hectare. Twenty­
three households have their own draft animals, and 75 have none. Only eighteen 
households own oxcarts. Most of the rice land consists of sandy soil, which is less 
productive. In order to make it viable, intensive farming practices must be used 
through fertilization and mixed crop rotation. But most village farmers are not familiar 
withnewcropping systems so the land does not produce enough to sustain the families. 
At present, one hectare will yield 700 kilograms of rice. The average household consists 
of 4.5 persons, and one person needs 260 kilograms of rice from the paddy (unmilled 
and called "paddy rice") in order to survive the year. UNDP estimates that one family 
of 4.5 persons needs a minimum of 1,200 kilograms per year, so that families remain 
about 500 kilograms short of what they can grow. 
Both Sala Komrou and Sras Srang have received development aid. UNDP, CARE, 
and UNICEF provided a cow bank, credit schemes, irrigation systems, and wells. 
CCDP has plans to implement a credit system for cows and will provide agricultural 
support and an extension of gardening for families who can get together in groups of 
ten families each. According to Mr. Mil Ben, Chief Commune Officer, Prey Nhy 
Commune, most adult returnees are employed on road construction and WFP pays 
them with rice through the Food For Work program. 
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Land Issue 
The May to November 1993 World Food Program (WFP) country-wide survey of 
returnees showed that only 12.2 percent had access to land (Robinson 1994). By August 
1994, this figure had improved only slightly (personal communication with NGOs, 
UNDP). Throughout Cambodia, the lack of land for returnees is a critical impediment 
to successful rural reintegration. In Pursat province, few returnee families have 
received land, as indicated in the following chart from the Pursat Province Women's 
Association, dated April 1994. 
District Commune 
Kandieng SreSdok 
BanteyDey 
Bakan Tiapeang Chormg 
Bet;tgBat 
Kandol 
Chorng 
Talo 
BengKhmar 
SnamPreah 
Kravanh Prognil 
Pursat Ville Prey l\.1}ri 
Krakor AnlongThnot 
Kbal Trach 
Total 
Village 

TulKou 

KeoMoni 

Bakan 

SvayChium 

TramSel 

KohSvay 

Talo 

Roung 

Sambour 

Kampeng 

SalaKamrou 

Ampil Tret 

Teal Kposh 

35 
Number of 

Families 

31 

72 

65 
31 
7 
23 
11 
10 
86 
43 
35 
23 
11 
450 
Size of 
Land 
40" X 50" 
50" X 40" 
25" X 40" 
25" X 40" 
Other 
Garden 
50" X 40" 
100" X 100" 
15 acres 
20" X 50" 
Farmland 
50" X 70" 
20" X 100" 
20" X 30" 
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Only five of these villages were listed as selected areas for UNDP /CARERE pro­
grams in 1993 and 1994: Keo Moni, Sambour, Kam Peng, and Sala Kamrou. Mr. Say 
Mang, Chief Officer of Phtas Prey Commune, notes that only 50 percent of the people 
in this commune have access to the nearby rice land and none of these are returnees. 
Bernie O'Neill, Field Director of CONCERN in Pursat, commented that without access 
to land of their own, returnees easily fall into a "very poor" category. Laurie Pennells, 
CCDP District Nurse in Krakor Province, felt that returnee patients are significantly 
worse off than local people because they had no land. 
The Cambodian land tenure system is still unregulated and is administered ad hoc 
by local and provincial officials. Returnees may be granted short-term tenancies to 
develop more fertile land, but they rarely hold secure title. Between 1975 and 1989, the 
system of land tenure in Cambodia was restructured several times. Before 1975, 
traditional land tenure was in the form of large freehold plots in which extended 
families could participate in extensive rice cultivation. During the Khmer Rouge 
regime, the control of all agricultural land and production was under the Khmer Rouge 
Communists. Throughout the country, families were divided, local populations were 
uprooted and sent to different locations, and urban populations were forced to 
participate as slave labour. After 1979, while millions of Cambodians were still finding 
their way back to areas of origin, the Vietnamese Communists restricted internal 
movements and imposed their own version of state-run co-operatives. Gradually, the 
state-run co-operatives moved towards semi-communal land tenure. By 1989, internal 
movements were not as restricted and families were allowed to farm very small-scale 
freehold plots (see earlier chapter on Pursat). The small size of the available fields 
greatly reduced or eliminated the need for agricultural labour beyond the immediate 
family. Throughout Cambodia, the lands and properties formerly owned by families 
are now frequently owned by others. Muanpong Juntopas, Community Development 
Officer, UNDP/CARERE, Pursat notes: 
Land titles were only given in 1989. Local people have only recently got title 
to their land and they don'twantto give itup or have to share it. In any village 
the biggest population is the agriculturists. The majority land holding is one 
to one-and-a-halihectare. Also some of the land, such as inKravanh District, 
is still heavily mined. In Pursat Province much of the land is in mountainous 
areas and there is a big security issue with the Khmer Rouge claiming this as 
their territory. Therefore, the majority of the population is crowded about the 
vicinity of towns, especially Pursat Town. This means that accessible land is 
limited and land holdings are small. 
Many returnees inPursat live in crowded villages, staying on the small housing plots 
already owned by family or friends. Most returnee families have been able to build 
temporary housing on these plots, but some are still living under the blue tarps 
prOVided by UNHCR, sharing space with animals under existing houses. Other 
returnees have built houses on the edges of villages or on the irrigation canals. They 
want housing land of their own but, in the overcrowded villages, good sites (Le., not 
subject to flooding) that would allow the growing of field crops like vegetables are 
difficult to find. Within villages, most of the places where returnees live are on land 
already claimed by local families, so that their presence is regarded as temporary. In 
37 
... 

Returnees and Land-Access, Availability, and Use 
general, there has been little division of land, especially of rice land being provided for 
returnees. The assumption is that returnees are participating in extended-family 
agricultural activities, yet even when this occurs, resources are so limited in the villages 
that land sharing means increased pressure on the family land. Ms. O'Mahoney, 
Executive Director of CONCERN, noted the burden returnees place on the local 
families they stay with: 
A lot of returnee families were reduced to poverty through the loss of their 
400-day food ration at the end of December 1993. Significant numbers were 
asked to leave the homes of those whom they have shared accommodation 
with because with the loss of their food contribution, their presence became 
a burden. Returnees tended to stay with families or friends either sharing the 
home or living in a shack out back. Returnees were considered a source of 
extra labour within the household, rather than family members sharing in a 
percentage of the produce from the land. 
Access to land remains problematic in all areas, but especially near Khmer Rouge 
territory where security and land mines make agricultural production difficult. The 
land that is available for returnees in Pursat is often marginal or very remote as Lam 
Vong, CCDP field worker in Pursat, explained: 
The land issue is a big problem. Some land is more available and cheap but 
this is always in high risk security areas or very isolated. The distance limits 
access to the new land. Both Kravanh and Pursat Ville have villages devel­
oped just for returnees, and they are very rural and very isolated. 
Popit village in Anlong Thnot Commune, Krakor District, is a section of land given 
to returnees. Mr. Samrith Bo, Krakor District Authority, noted that although fifteen 
families are listed (down from last year), he is not certain who is using the land as 
returnee families move back and forth to the nearby village of Tonsay Kol village. He 
felt that returnees did not stay because the landwas not good for rice production. One 
returnee woman in Tonsay Kol village, Anlong Thnot Commune, Krakor District, 
however, commented on her fear to access the land given to her: 
Ourmain problem in coming back to Cambodia is the lack of rice land and no 
land for a house to cultivate vegetables. We want to live on our own land but 
we are afraid to live in the areas available to us. We are afraid for the security 
and not having ,any other people live there. The land is so far away we are 
afraid to go to it. This is whywe have come to the village to stay with relatives 
and friends. We have been able to build a small house on the same house plot 
but it is only for a short while and it is not our land. We want to go to our land 
but are afraid and it is easier to earn money here in the village for our families. 
Buteven here there are difficulties getting enough water. The only water here 
is what we can collect in the rain containers. 
Another returnee womanfrom Tonsay Kol village, Anlong ThnotCommune, Krakor 
District, commented: 
No one here has land for a house. Three of the families were given land and 
the other three have their names on a list. Almost two years ago the govern­
ment provided me with land for rice but it was not good land and there was 
no oxen or any help to clear the land. Also, one family only gets one part of 
38 Fading Hopes 
a hectare. This land was given to those returnees who came then. Even after 
all this time we still have not been able to dear the land. If we could get 
support to clear the land we would want to farm it but not live there. We are 
afraid to stay at night because of the Khmer Rouge. The land is over half an 
hour walk away and for some it takes an hour, The main point is that it is not 
good land. Some families there can grow vegetables around the house but 
others can't because of not enoughwater in the dry season. Here in the village, 
the women can sell the food the whole year round. 
Returnees end up on land already owned because they can not access the land to 
which they have title. Security issues are compounded by the difficulties in cultivating 
forested or fallow land. Available land for returnees is often covered with scrub and 
returnees are expected to clear, bund (digging small dikes to retain water), and plough 
before any planting can occur. Very few returnees have sufficient resources to prepare 
the land themselves. Mr. Mil Ben, Chief Commune Officer, Prey NhyCommune, noted: 
Some families must plough with their hands if they want to plant fruit and 
vegetables. In Sras Srang village the returnee families are provided with the 
house land/3D metres wide and lODmetres long. None of them have rice land, 
no tools, no plough animals or transportation. 
Some land has never been cultivated, so that it must first be deep-ploughed and 
rotovatored by tractors before rice or vegetable seeds can be broadcast and harrowed 
in. Unless they are given assistance by NGOs, returnee families must pay back 
ploughing expenses through their own labour, through a percentage of their rice 
harvest, or with chickens and ducks. If returnees have no land of their own, they can 
rent cultivated land from someone else. Land is available from other villagers, such as 
older people who no longer have labour to do their own cultivation, or from govern­
ment officials who have no time. The payback procedure, however, makes it difficult 
for returnees to profit from the rental. "Boah" is a Khmer word that explains the 
traditional way of payback for the loan of land or equipment. The traditional renting 
system of animals is called "Provas." Both Boah and Provas involve giving some of the 
rice harvest as a means of rent payment, orsomething of equal value suchas exchanging 
labour for working someone's land. Boah especially places returnees at a disadvantage 
to local farmers because most returnees do not have any animals or extra labour for 
payback if their rice yield is insufficient, and therefore must pledge more of their yield 
from the next planting. 
Access to De-mined Land 
The land problem is exacerbated when good quality agricultural land is made available 
through de-mining, and returnees, locals, and internally displaced people (lOP), all of 
whom mayhave worked the land at different times, vie for access. At present, the acute 
scarcity of good agricultural land forces many Cambodians, returnees, lOPs, and locals 
to cultivate land that contains unexploded mines. Areas known to be mined are ignored 
by local people and although returnees are warned to stay away from these areas, they 
are usually the first to access them when they have been de-mined. The people who 
moved away from the areas when the fighting started ten years ago (al though they were 
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never classified as IDPs) also move back when it appears safe. Mr. Dan Middlemas, an 
expatriate de-miner with HALO in Pursat, commented on the friction involved in 
securing de-mined land: 
Prohoac Kval in Kravanh District used to be a huge village in the 1960s with 
a hospital, school, pagoda, and market. All of it was burnt when the Khmer 
Rouge left. In 1979, truckloads of mines were planted by the Khmer Rouge so 
in one small area there would be hundreds. In February 1994 there were 
approximately 20 returnee families living under blue tents in the middle of 
the minefield or on the very edge of the village. 
In a govemmentminefield the mined areas are relatively well defined and 
localized. InKhmer Rouge minefields, they can cover a square kilometre with 
up to 200 mines scattered through in a "nuisance mining" pattern. This is a 
military term meaning to cause problems to local people. The base knowl­
edge onmines being in an area is according to the accident rate of animals and 
people. Every day cattle would be blown up, and cattle represent one year's 
worth of wealth. In Prohoac Kval village, twelve people had been killed and 
numerous injuries sustained. But the village is twelve hours from a hospital 
so the likelihood of survival was low, especially with children. This rate 
caused the mass abandonment of the village. This area has two mined areas. 
The first is the huge minefield in the village centre, now abandoned, which 
is 800 metres by 300 metres. The second is a huge dam-8 feet high, 30 feet 
across and 800 metres in length-which had 20 mines in it. This was also a 
"nuisance mining" area or an "area denial" field, meaning its purpose is to 
cause general fear. 
There is no guarantee that all the mines are out from this village because 
Khmer Rouge mines are plastic and deeply mined. They come to the surface 
in heavy rains and are detonated especially by cattle. When two more cattle 
got blown up, HALO declared it a "no-go" area in May 1994. Yet, between 
February and May 1994,109 families had moved in, camped around the edge 
of the mined village centre. A lot of themhad registered their names with the 
village chief and although they were from the surrounding villages, origi­
nally they were from the mined village previous to 1983. But a lot of them 
were also returnees. The area has excellent agricultural land and is attractive 
with mature trees. From May 1994 onwards, two or three families would 
arrive per day., Some were "hidden" IDPs (never classified) and previous 
residents, but most others were from the refugee camps. 
There is great pressure that if previous villagers don't return to stake their 
claim they are afraid "returnees" will come and claim the land. In July 1994, 
returnees and locals were fighting amongst themselves over the land. People 
got a plot of land inside the village and there were fights over where people 
were putting their stakes. Also in July a villager trod on a mine in a de-mined 
area. Most likely the mine was newly planted to get at the villager, a returnee, 
who was the husband of a woman involved in a land dispute with another 
local woman. It's common to settle land disputes with mines. My impression 
is that revenge seems very apparent among people here. 
When HALO begins clearing mines (both government and Khmer Rouge mines) in 
a specific area, people assume that this land is available, even though the de-mining 
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process can take up to a year or more. During the de-mining process, when HALO 
declares a village a "no-go area" and does not allow anyone to move onto the mined 
land, returnees are found waiting on the outside perimeters. Many returnee families 
arrive by oxcart (usually a two-day trip) and build a hut to establish their claim to the 
land. Those who have residences elsewhere can then leave the hut and return to their 
previous area to wait for the land to become available. 
Land Negotiations for Returnees 
In Pursat province, very few returnees have received land from the government. 
Option C was regarded as a contractual issue so that, by accepting it, returnees were 
deemed to lose their right to demand land. Land was not considered as part of the 
package deal, and local governments did not feel obliged to provide it. In order to get 
land for the returnees, UNDP /CARERE has had to negotiate with provincial authori­
ties. Negotiations are delicate because of the numbers of returnees and because there 
are many poor local families who also donot have landandwould like some. Some local 
people are still unable to get back land which was in their family before 1975 because 
others have it now. In some areas, such as Keo Moni, a new village has been established 
for returnees, but in other villages UNDP pushes the boundaries of the village territory 
to expand the land for returnee families' access. Muanpong Juntopas, Community 
Development Officer, UNDP /CARERE, Pursat, commented on the kind of negotia­
tions necessary to secure land: 
UNDP uses "baiting" practices for negotiation of land. For example, the 
floating rice land near Tonle Sap gets fresh water during its annual flooding 
and needs a particular rice. Many people now access land without the land 
title, especially returnees. When negotiations were held with the provinces, 
UNDP offered seed, tractors, fertilizers, etc. for 800 families, if the returnees 
gotdear land title. These negotiations were through the Agricultural Depart­
ment. In Bakan district as well, negotiations got deep-land rice for 150 
returnee families. The "baiting" was to ensure that benefits were given to all 
the villagers, not just returnees. In the first year of the program it was very 
successful, so that in the second year UNDP could push further for land for 
returnees, including helping them with ploughing and planting. Land nego­
tiation is a slow building-block process. The first year only 50 poor local 
families benefited and the village rice banks increased, which in tum in­
creases the strength of the village. In the second year, the programcan expand 
to more families. 
Inboth new villages and in established ones where returnees have settled, assistance 
has been community-based, through the provision of road construction,land clearance 
for housing plots, seed banks, animal banks, credit unions, rice banks, handicraft co­
operatives, community funds, co-operative cash crop and food production, training 
programs, and communityponds andwells. Inaddition, UNDP is training village head 
men to be community development workers. The kinds of development projects being 
implemented are designed to encourage locals and returnees to work together. If 
returnees can rent land from someone else, they can also be eligible for UNDP 
assistance. 
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Returnees and New Resettlement Villages 
Through the assistance of the provincial government, UNDP, and several NGOs, a 
number of new villages have been created for returnees. The basis for their creation is 
to provide assistance for self-sufficiency and sustainability. UNDP /CARERE has 
funded, both separately and in conjunction with NGOs, several land preparation 
projects through QIP money. Ploughing, seeds, fertilizer, wells, livestock and rice 
banks, ponds, tree nurseries, credit schemes, andeven access roads have been provided 
in an integrated approach to ensure sustainability in the newly-created villages. 
Peter R Swift, Field Director of Southeast Asia Development Project, noted that 
HECKS, a Swiss NGO, is building two villages in Kampong, Chhang Province, for 
approximately 150 families each, one for returnees and the other for demobilized 
soldiers. They are clearing land, providing housing, rice, tree seedlings, vegetable 
seeds, tools, and cooking utensils. CONCERN is implementing a similar project in 
Bakan District, Pursat Province, focusing on the poorest people in communities-those 
with physical disabilities (handicapped, blind, those suffering from mental illness), 
internally displaced, returnees, and widows with children. Ms. O'Mahoney, Executive 
Director of CONCERN, commented on how NGO intervention is essential to help 
returnees access land and make use of it: 
Siem Reap Province is where CONCERN is most involved with returnees. In 
Siem Reap CONCERN targeted these returnee families to assist them in 
settling on their own land. Provincial and local district authorities in Siem 
Reap softened their attitudes to returnees in September 1993 when 
FUNCINPEC became the government, with more tolerance shown to return­
ees and a willingness to negotiate land. 
It was not until April 1994 that 800 families, 90 percent of whom are 
returnees, were given housing land (30 by 40 metres) and one hectare of rice 
agricultural land per family. As in Pursat, there is nodear title to the landyet, 
although the onehectare amount is certified. Returnees' need for land was so 
great that people moved onto the housing plots before housing kits were 
available. This showed their commitment to resettle. 
Four main village sites of approximately 180 to 200 families per village 
were allocated, as well as one smaller village of about 45 families. Roughly 30 
percent of the f~ies are identified as female-headed households. 
When people moved onto the site housing kits were provided, but 
assistance inbuilding thehouses was given only to vulnerable families, those 
female-headed and handicapped. At the beginning of August 1994, the 
Department of Forestry gave 5,000 mixed tree seedlings to the returnee 
villages to plant. As yet, there are no fruit trees. 
Vulnerable families need little assistance in rice agriculture and are 
planting the three types of rice (paddy-transplanted rice, upland-scat­
tered growing, floating-also scatteredbutwith a different rice seed), as well 
as maintaining vegetable plots. Many returnees have pigs and chickens 
obtained through CONCERN credit schemes or through savings from daily 
labour. Credit was also made available to returnees to hire oxen or water 
buffaloes from local villagers to plough their land. Inone village, where there 
were no oxen and water buffalo for hire, the Ministry of Agriculture allowed 
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returnees to hire their tractors, also paid for on a credit scheme. Overall, the 
pay back is minimal, 100 kilograms of rice per family. CONCERN feels this 
amount reflects the scarcity of resources returnees have. 
Yet despite this assistance, community development in new returnee villages is 
especially problematic for a variety of reasons. One problem is that some returnees 
want to live close to town. Mr. Say Mang, Chief Officer for Phtas Prey Commune, 
explained: 
The government had a plan for a new village just beyond Sras Srang in Prey 
Nhy Commune where returnees could get house land. But the returnee 
families here didn't want to go because it was too isolated. Most wanted to 
stay around the market. But those who stay around the market here cannot 
have land to build their own house. Some of them have relatives to stay with, 
others spent their money to build a house on somebody else's land. 
Another problem evident in community development for new returnee villages is 
that returnees have lived in total dependency for over ten years and have had little 
chance to participate in decision making, especially concerning their own long-term 
development programs and activities. Inaddition, the average returnee adult has little, 
if any, agricultural skill andneeds extensive training assistance in clearing and levelling 
land, ploughing, or cultivating. Further, most returnees do not own any draft animals 
and families lack the basic tools to farm. The average tools needed for a self-reliant 
agricultural family include a cooking stove, plough, hoe, spade, rake, shovel, machete, 
ax, sickle, bucket, watering can, pumps, rice huller (manual or peddle), and use of 
community rice mills. Unless the animals and tools are provided, returnees find it 
difficult to access the land given them. 
Muanpong Juntopas, Community Development Officer, UNDP /CARERE, Pursat, 
noted certain difficulties after land had been secured for returnees: 
Because many families who got the land didn't do anything with it and some 
sold it for profit, the UNDP now makes the family a contract in which they 
must acknowledge to cultivate and actually cultivate in order to keep the 
land. UNDP nowprovides credit for draft animals, fertilizer, etc. to help them 
do this. InBakan, returnees are now having meetings with district authorities 
to negotiate land. District authorities say land title will be notbegiven to them 
until the land has been cultivated for five years. This is to prevent returnees 
from getting the land and then selling it for a profit. Also, this is based on the 
past experience of returnees having a lack of interest to farm the land. They 
just give up quickly and sell it ... This also happened in Keo Moni. As a new 
village, there was no pagoda, no established midwives, nocommunity health 
centres, no school within walking distance, no teacher (because no salary 
from the government). With all this, some returnees choose to remain in 
established villages near the town. The main issue for returnees seems to be 
access to services such as they were accustomed to in camp. 
Froma different perspective, Mr. Samrith Bo, Krakor District Authority, commented 
on why returnees did not stay in Popit village in Anlong Thnot Commune: 
Returnees did not stay because the land was not good for rice production. 
Many returnees didn't like the housing land the government provided 
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because it was notnear the road and there was no water. Also those with land 
didn't have cows or buffalo to do the ploughing. Now in the district another 
new village has been created for returnees. Also cows were provided and 
ploughing. UNDP, CONCERN, Red Cross all were involved. There is still no 
land for rice, only vegetables and other crops. Land for rice is available but it 
is too far to walk. During the rainy season [the returnees] stay on the rice land 
to work and live in make-do huts. 
Profile of Two New Returnee Communities 
1. Keo Moni Village in Bantey Dey Commune, Kandieng District, Pursat Province 
Keo Moni villagewas developed through the UNDP in 1993. The village was to consist 
of mixed categories, 94 returnee families and 13 established families. Each family 
received housing land 50 by 100 metres. The development project consisted of land 
clearance, the construction of a land access road through "food for ·work/' seed 
distribution, rice bank, agricultural input, an animal bank, digging wells and three 
public ponds (forwater in the dry season), and the building of a school. InAugust 1994, 
the school had only a temporary roof and tables and chairs, but no walls. CARERE will 
eventually build a permanent school. Keo Moni village has its own militia group of six 
to seven people and the government provides weapons and clothes. The militia was 
established for protection against bandits. By August 1994, Keo Moni village was only 
about 70 percent filled. According to Kosal Mona, Field Worker for WFP in Pursat: 
Returnees want the housing landbut they donotwant to move away from the 
market area in Pursat town. Eventually, there will be a truck in the village to 
transport people and vegetables to the market every day. This will make a 100 
percent capacity. Some returnees have already started gardens. Mostfamilies 
have just the one plot of land but there are some returnees with two parents 
in the family who work really hard and sell the vegetables and other things 
in the market, and work on the road construction and they have saved 
enough to buy another plot. Now they are clearing the land to plant rice. 
Several of the returnee families have planted upland rice in the fields beside the 
schoot and wetland rice is growing in the canals along the road. After the harvest, in 
addition to the "food for work" projects, people will do trade or go to the forest to cut 
bamboo to prepare for palmsugar collection. During the rainy season people fish in the 
local river, but during the dry season they must go to the TonIe Sap for fishing. Keo 
Moni villagers cannot sell their vegetables at the edge of the main road (highway #5) 
because it is private property. They are forced to go to nearby markets although, if 
transportation is available, people prefer to go the Pursat market because they get a 
better price (almost double) for their produce and they can socialize with other people 
and buy needed household items. 
In August 1994, there were only about ten to fifteen days left in the Keo Moni road 
construction, and the WFP field workerwas encouraging the returnees to focus on land 
clearing so they can plant vegetables and fruit trees. Palm trees, for example, take 25 
years before they are productive. Mr. Mona, Field Worker for WFP in Pursat, described 
the continuing development of Keo Moni village: 
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The land the government provided has too much bush. Therefore, "food for 
work" program has an emphasis on clearing the land. People get paid 350 
kilos of rice per one hectare cleared. Last time it was only 250 kilos per hectare 
and it was too low so we had to raise. A strong man can do only 100 square 
metres per day and women about 60. The development of Keo Moni village 
has cost more than 100 tons of rice. Many of the Sras Sarong returnees have 
done much of the work and received the payment in rice. Now I am trying to 
think of more programs for people, to keep them working. The long~term 
emphasis is on road maintenance because a good road means cars and more 
business. 
In Keo Mom village, many returnees expressed frustration that they cannot access 
the rice land in the areas immediately surrounding their village. The Chief of Keo Moni 
village, a returnee who has lived in the new settlement for over a year, commented on 
various areas that are still needed for self-sufficiency: 
The first problem is no land for planting rice. Last year we had no crops but 
had support from UNDP and CRS. Some seed from UNHCR was given and 
has been planted. We have only land for the garden, no land for rice. Only 
some produce can be sold in the market. At this point all the energy is going 
to build the roads so we have no time to do market business. After the end of 
the road program we don't know. People in general are happy to have this 
land. Most of the ideas to set up the project come from the WFP and the CRC, 
but the request comes from the people. UNDP and UNICEF have provided 
wells. Ponds are also dug by UNDP, then they are filled with rainwater for 
drinking. We have one Kru Khmer in the village and people go to him. But 
some cases need to go the hospital in Pursat via a motorbike with cart. Two 
ARC trained returnee midwives also live in the village and they assist 
women. They also are part of the ARC program in Pursat. 
The village is open for more growth, like newly~married couples who, if 
they work hard, can get more land. A small part of the road construction 
people can save up to 150 kilograms of rice (about 20 days work). They can 
exchange the rice for other food such as fish and meat. UNDP provides credit 
money for people to buy pigs and chickens and they will receive rice as 
payment. But last year the crops for rice were not good at all. The reimburse­
ment to UNDP was very low, only two tons of rice was available instead of 
the expected twelve tons. One hundred kilograms of paddy rice equals 60-65 
kilograms of milled rice. The extra 40 percent in husks and such goes to the 
mill owner as payment and then he sells it for fish food and pig food. What 
people need most here is a variety of seeds for vegetables and fruit. We also 
need clothes and materials for the schools such as books. At the beginning 
UNHCR gave vegetable seed but it is not enough, especially if the bush land 
is cleared and we plant more. People musthand plough their vegetable plots. 
Those with money or through a harvest exchange can rent the buffalo. One 
family prepared a house to make the chicken business because UNDP said 
they would supply the chickens, but they have not come yet. Also, UNDP 
money that they lend is at a high payback so people have no incentive to 
borrow because they don't make the profit. 
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2. Sre Ampil Village, Kien Svay District, Kandal Province 
Before repatriation, Sre Ampil was a small village consisting of some 110 families. 
During 1992,at the request of over 100 families in Site 2, UNDP began negotiations with 
the Kien Svay District Authority to find land for housing and for farming (Church 
World Service 1993). Sre Ampil village was selected because several of the returnees 
had old contacts and family connections in the area, although others subsequently 
resettled in Sre Ampil through friendship networks based in Site 2. Returnees were 
provided with food rations (from the UNHCR and World Food Program), given a small 
plot ofland (40 by 10 metres per family), and promised 100 hectares (250 acres) for rice 
farming. To date, returnees still have not received this agricultural land, although in 
July 1994 the MiniStry of Agriculture stated that it would be supplied. In a 1993 survey 
byCWS, 97 returnee families and 11alocal families were identified inSre Ampil village. 
Unlike local families in Ampil village, returnees still have no rights to their land and no 
dear title. Since the May 1993 survey, thirty-seven families (most of whom are 
returnees) have left Sre Ampil village. The reasons given for leaving were to find work 
in Phnom Penh and to live with relatives elsewhere. Returnees in Sre Ampil village 
stated that since the food aid ended at the end of December 1993, several families sold 
their plots for profit and left to make a business in Phnom Penh. 
Much of Sre Ampil village has been newly developed for returnee families through 
extensive reintegration assistance from the Church World Service (CWS), an American 
NGO. CWS staff were first introduced to returnees in Sre Ampil village atthebeginning 
of 1993. At this time CWS, in coordination with district authorities, was identifying 
poor villages in Kien Svay District for participation in community development 
projects (ibid.). In response to a request from both the returnees and the district 
authorities for resettlement assistance, in March 1993, CWS agreed to reintegration 
support geared towards self-reliance of the returnees and a larger program for future 
sustainable development of the entire village. Since May 1993, CWS has focused 
primarily on Sre Ampil village, although two smaller projects were designed for the 
nearby villages of Propael Kae (digging a well) and Kandal Leu (Vegetable Seed 
Project). 
The implementation of community development projects in Sre Ampil was ham­
pered by preparations for the May 1993 election. In addition to limitation on travel, 
numerous district and local officials (all of whom were CPP) were unwilling to make 
decisions before election results (ibid.). The uncertainty continued after the election, 
with government departments and officials unclear of their positions within a provi­
sional government. It is not clear, however, why the land for returnees was not 
provided since the necessary approval at the district level was obtained at the end of 
1993. When the 100 hectares of land are made available to returnees, CWS will assist in 
clearing and preparing it for cultivation. In addition, CWS will provide a cow bank 
scheme. Cattle are used by local villagers for labour such as pulling carts and plough- . 
ing, and are often loaned out to poorer families. 
To date, the bulk of CWS aid has provided direct support for returnees. Seeds 
(vegetables), fruit trees for harvest (banana and papaya), agricultural tools, and 
animals (pigs, chickens, ducks) were made availableon a credit basis through revolving 
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funds. Several family and community ponds were dug and seeded with catfish on a 
credit scheme that allows repayment after the first fish harvest in September 1994. CWS 
provides a pump which villagers rent to drain and refill the ponds every two weeks or 
so. Although all families have difficulty meeting the rental fees, CWS feels payment 
fosters accountability for responsibility to take care of pump repairs. A handicraft 
centre, including five weaving looms, was constructed to provide the newly-formed 
returneewomen's association with income generation and crafts training. The returnee 
women allowed poor local women to join their association and participate in weaving 
and craft production. 
In conjunction with CWS planning, the International Labour Organization, with 
UNHCR funding, began extensive road construction in Sre Ampil. Ten kilometres of 
existing road through Sre Ampil were repaired and extended to the returnee housing 
site. In addition, construction of a new internal road has also been started (ibid.). Road 
labour is provided by the returnees (male and female, all ages), who receive rice 
payment in exchange for work. 
The Norwegian Save the Children Fund, Redd Barna, participated in rehabilitating 
the local school at the Buddhist Wat. Further aid was provided byRedd Barna and CWS 
in the construction of a school office, three additional classrooms and two latrines, and 
in giving school furniture, teaching materials, and school supplies for the students 
(notebooks, pencils, and rulers) (ibid.). In a project implemented by the Ministry of 
Health and UNICEF, and funded through the UNHCR, four wells with hand pumps 
were dug at the returnee site. Additional technical assistance was provided from the 
Groupe de Reserche et d'Echanges Technologique (GRET) to encourage returnees to 
build for themselves two more sources of safe drinking water. Although CWS supplied 
gravel and sand, returnees have not shown interest in finishing these wells (providing 
a cover and a pump), thus postponing the addition of two more wells for the school and 
the pagoda. 
The Swiss Interchurch Aid group (HEKS) selected three Sre Ampil villagers (two 
returnees and one local) to attend a training course on sustainable agriculture. Upon 
return, eight families formed a "sustainable agriculture group" and received further 
funding to create a mushroom farm, a tree nursery, and a vegetable base that would 
provide seedlings to the other villagers (ibid.). Excess produce is to be taken to the 
PhnomPenhmarketswith funds going back to the group to enable the purchase ofcows 
and chickens. At present, twelve families are in the sustainable agriculture group, four 
of whom are the primary tenders of a huge fish farm. 
Duringmyvisit to Sre Ampill the CWSprogram staff encountered two other workers 
from a different NGO, collecting payment for a credit scheme. CWS had not been 
informed that another agency was involved in giving loans and staff expressed 
disappointment that this courtesy had not been given. The rule between NGOs is that 
if one NGO works in an area, the other NGO can assist only after consultation and 
discussion. Control of ongoing aid programs in a specific project area is clearly defined. 
Both CWS and the other agency provide similar credit systems-200,000 riel (US$40) 
per family since January 1994, with a one percent interest payment for a payback of 
20,000 riel (US$4) permonth. CWS concern is not only for the infringement ofwhat they 
perceive to be their "territory,"butthatreturneeswill"shoparound" for as much credit 
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as possible, getting deeper into debt. The CWS program co-ordinator speculated that 
the outside agency was contacted directly by the returnees themselves (most likely 
because of previous association in the Thai camps). He cited other instances where poor 
returnee families borrow credit from a second NGO to make payments to the first, 
compounding until either the family sells their plot to repay or chooses to get a bad 
reputationbynotrepaying at all. Non-repayment of credit to aNGO, however, does not 
carry the stigma of being in debt to other Khmer. 
According to the returnees, their biggest concern is food. A returnee village leader 
stated: 
In Site 2 it was very crowded but there was no worry about food. Here we 
have liberty to go everywhere and to live in a good atmosphere. But, there is 
a problem in the lack of food. We havenot yet got the rice land for cultivation. 
If we get this land there will be no problem. Here there is a lot of vegetables 
and a lot of fish which we have all the time and can trade for rice. Still, if this 
runs low we are in trouble. It takes a lot of time to get the fish. Sixty percent 
of all the families here live on the edge. 
Without land, most returnees get rice in exchange for their road labour. During the 
month of July 1994, 38 pounds of rice was provided as payment by the World Food 
Program (WFP). When this payment is postponed (for example when WFP food trucks 
are diverted to other areas to deal with emergencies, such as the recent flooding in 
Konpong Speu), returnees stop work on the road and go to the ponds and rivers for fish 
and to the forest for materials to sell at local markets. The first day after a food payment 
was not forthcoming, 100 returnees showed up for road work, the second day, less than 20. 
Only 40 percent of village families are considered to be in a secure position because 
they work with the government as soldiers, police, or in health care (as nurses). None 
of these families, however, are returnees. Among the returnees there are teachers, who 
do not have jobs because the government will not recognize their certification from the 
refugee camps. There are also several youth who received senior matriculation levels 
from the camps, but can find no suitable application for their education. Returnee 
parents expressed their worry that these children have no work to do. Instead of 
learning agricultural skills, the youth spend their days fishing, going for fuel, and 
finding food to feed the pond fish. 
The Women's Handicraft Centre is a combination of basket weaving (specifically for 
holding Loggin fruit), weaving cloth materials to make into kramas (scarves) and 
sampots (skirts), crochet and embroidery. To date, the women have experienced 
problems in marketing their goods and have not made any profit. Leaders of the 
women's association are in the process of visiting other craft centres (locally as well as 
in Phnom Penh) for ideas and marketing strategies. If they can secure credit for raw 
materials, the women plan to expand their production to weaving blankets and sewing 
mosquito netting. 
According to the CWS Program Co-ordinator, the fish ponds will provide returnees 
with an excellent profit. The returnees, however, are not as confident, as is evident in 
the words of one returnee man: 
Fish in the ponds are late in growing and the water has to be changed every 
two weeks. To do this we have to rent the pump which is very expensive. This 
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means that there is no profit from the pond. Also some of the fish die and a 
lot of money is spent on food. Also medicine for the fish is expensive. 
Local Area Development and New Returnee Villages 
The development of new villages often results in considerable advantages for the 
surrounding areas. If local labourers participated in QIP road construction, this could 
result in increased income for purchasing, saving, or to repay debt. In the construction 
ofan access road, the presence oflabourers is also good for local economies in the selling 
of baskets for soil carrying, selling fruits, sugar palm, bread, cakes, and other goods 
(CONCERN 1994, 48). Road construction to new villages also increases access through­
out the area, resulting in greater school or temple attendance, as well as opening up 
more areas for cultivation orgrazing. Along Sre Ampil road, for examp Ie, herds of cattle 
are walked up and down the road daily. Rural roads are generally passable only by 
walking, bicycle, or oxcart but, after reconstruction, motorbikes and motor vehicles can 
be used. This use impacts on long-term expectations concerning better health services. 
In the case of emergencies, for example, Sre Ampil villagers can now arrange for taxi 
transportation to a nearby Christian hospital. Increased access to roads also provides 
a greater opportunity for villagers to sell farm animals, fish, and vegetables to one 
another, causing sales of local produce to increase and prices generally to drop. 
Conversely, villagers get easier access to other food items, fuel, alcohol, cigarettes, 
clothing, and videos. 
Numerous families, including many returnees, also move along the newaccess roads 
to Keo Moni and Sre Ampil villages. Their presence, however, does not mean that they 
can participate in the development programs. During the process of developing Keo 
Moni in early 1994, for example, almost 30 returnee families built houses along the 
beginning of the access road that cuts through Sras Srang village. These returnees were 
not included in Keo Moni community development programs, although they did 
engage in Food for Work during road construction. One returnee man, now living in 
Trnot Tret village in Phtas Prey Commune, did not understand the basis upon which 
development assistance was given to some returnees and not others: 
I first lived in Sras Srang village in the Prey Nhy commune and the NGOs 
never helped the returnees with getting the land and building the house. I 
asked for help but they did not give me any. All the NGOs did was surveys 
and then never did anything. I am disappointed and angry. The NGOs only 
work to help the rich returnees and not the poor returnees. UNDP and WFP 
work for the government and do not help the poor people. The rich returnees 
are those who have the land and the house. We could not get help because we 
had nothing to pay back, not clothes or household utensils. 
The UNDP position is that there were no development plans for Sras Srang at the 
beginning of the Keo Moni project. Now, however, a community worker has been in 
place since Sras Sarong started growing in 1994, and plans are being projected to 
implement development in this village as well (Muanpong Juntopas, Community 
Development Officer, UNDP ICARERE,Pursat). By August1994,however, there were 
no QIPs and the budget for projects had not been approved. 
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Reintegration-Continuance and Impediments 
The Assumption of Reintegration 
BackinNovember 1993, WFP did a survey of those who were getting their last 
rations, some 7,000 returnee families throughout the country. Since May 
1994, the 400-day food has absolutelyended for returnees and as a group they 
are no longer targeted for assistance. Instead, areas are targeted and some of 
these may have returnees in concentration, but there is no special assistance 
provided for them, nothing different from other poor villages who get 
development aid. Returnees are not "vulnerable" because they are "return­
ees." Vulnerable is a different classification. After the 400 days, returnees 
become a "normal" Cambodian villager. (Kenro Osidari, WFP, Phnom Penh) 
ByAugust1994, returnees were no longer being targeted for reintegration assistance. 
The discontinuation was based on the assumption that returnees have integrated into 
social and economic networks, as Bernie O'Neill, Field Director for CONCERN in 
Pursat, explained: 
In Pursat, most returnees came to this province based on the assumption that 
family would be here or because they were originally from here. Most 
returnees that CONCERN has experience with in Bakan District have inte­
grated into their families. Integration occurs because everyone lives as a 
cohesive family unit. In the villages there are no visible signs of distinction. 
Returnees tend to build smaller houses on the same plot as the families they 
stay with or they live in the same house. 
In the villages observed during this study's survey, it was found that while returnees 
do tend to build smaller houses on the same plot as the families they stay with, 
distinctions are still quite obvious because of the construction materials returnees got 
for housing and the blue UNHCR plastic sheets. Garvan O'Keeffe, Field Programmer 
with CARE in Pursat, also commented on the "visibility" of returnee housing: 
In the villages up to ten percent have come back from the border. You can tell 
by their houses. Returnees got a housing kit which included certain types of 
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building timber, plastic roofs, and distinct water buckets. Even when they 
have moved into relatives' houses you can see the same kit. Over time this 
will decrease. 
In new returnee communities, developed through UNDP or NGO assistance, these 
distinctions are not evident. 
Based on the assumption of returnee integration, local governments, international 
agencies, and NGOs eliminated the classification of "returnee." Reintegration support, 
originally targeted for returnee families, expanded to include all Cambodians, espe­
cially those in most need, however that is to be defined or determined. Martin Fisher, 
Director of WFP in Pursat, noted: 
It's better to treat everyone the same. Therefore, the emphasis of WFP is not 
for repatriated people in certain villages but in "poor" villages ... The 
emphasis is now on village leaders who identify those individuals who are 
disabled from working. The emphasis is on allocating small jobs to all in need. 
In addition, there are supervisors who monitor the decision-making appara­
tus to make sure EVIs get the food support. 
UNDP/CARERE and NGOs now focus on generalized zonal assistance programs 
designed to improve the overall standard of living in an area via community develop­
ment. In practice, however, general community development provides an uncertain 
opportunity for returnees. Linda Hartke, Executive Director of CWS, for example, 
expressed concern that NGO support programs that follow a "cookie cutter" develop­
ment model may hinder returnee reintegration: 
The ideas for joint ventures and of sharing resources and working together 
come from other areas in the world. InCambodia, people tend not to put a lot 
of effort into these programs because of the negative connotation associated 
with "sharing." During the 1980's, a Communist hierarchical development 
scheme was enforced through collectivization of land. Today, people are 
motivated only if they, individually, are going to get something out of it. 
People will dig a pond only if it will be their pond, not to help another family. 
From the perspective of most NGOs, however, community development through 
sharing resources and working together encourages the integration of returnees with 
local people. OMahoney, Executive Director of CONCERN, commented: 
At present, CONCERN is trying to get away from the label returnee but to 
keep aware of the long-term reintegration, or the lack of it ... In Pursat, 
returnees were not identified as specific recipients of aid as programs were 
geared towards those most in need. Both local people and returnees were 
hired to clear scrub land for returnees' rice planting to avoid resentment or 
jealousy. CONCERN's emphasis in Pursat remains on participatory village 
appraisal, which obliges both returnees and locals to come together and 
discuss things. This strategy, along with the village-based credit system, 
forces people to work with one another and, ideally, to eventually develop a 
sense of trust. CONCERN, for example, stipulated that in order for returnees 
to access housing kits, they had to help build homes for the vulnerable 
(widows and disabled). Unless assistance for others is somehow coerced 
from people, it will not occur. The only aid specifically targeted to returnees 
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was to help them access the rice bank and cow bank credit schemes. These 
credit schemes were devised from a Bangladesh credit and savings program. 
One of the difficulties with community development, though, is that a sense of trust 
and willingness to help one another has still not developed between locals and 
returnees. Without the presence of NGOs, locals do not support returnees. NGOs, for 
example, must implement agricultural skills training sessions for returnees because 
locals do not share their knowledge, and villages are carefully monitored to ensure tha t 
locals do not appropriate what has been given to returnees: As O'Mahoney noted: 
Returnees remain insecure because their land holdings are still viewed as 
temporary. There is concern that if a good rice crop occurs this year, locals 
may attempt to push returnees from the productive land. To ensure this 
doesn't happen, CONCERN is maintaining a presence in the area for the next 
two years. 
Impediments to Reintegration 
One year has not been enough time for local people to overcome their initial feelings of 
suspicion and disinterest towards returnees. Much of the suspicion and distrust 
occurred because many returnees chose to settle in places they had never lived in 
before. Dr. Nguon Sakhon of the CRC commented: 
Integration problems occur if people don't return to their area of origin and 
then expect help from the locals. It ismuch better to return where the families 
are, especially the woman's family. A big problem is that many couples 
returned to the husband's family connections because this was the area 
located for them. If the husband can get work this is okay, but if the husband 
depends on his relatives it doesn't work. There has been a lot of secondary 
movement to the wife's family, especially after the 400 days ended. There is 
a lot of movement now, sometimes five or six moves per family and it is 
difficult for us to keep track of them. For the single mother withchildren, they 
only move once or twice because it is too difficult for them. 
Lam Vong, Field Worker for CCDP, felt that one of the biggest problems between 
returnees and locals is that locals have a sense of long-term residency and do not feel 
that returnees have a commitment to stay. The uncertainty caused by continuous 
returnee movement is reflected in comments by Garvan O'Keeffe, Field Programmer 
with CARE in Pursat: 
There has been a lot of secondary migration. Resettlement works out much 
better when returnees go back to villages where they have relatives. Most 
returnees in Bakan have gone to live with families, a brother or parent. They 
tend to build houses on the same property and some share access to land. In 
general, returnees are still a burden to their families. There is much over­
crowding and overloading of resources, but they are accepted. Returnees 
have not had a chance to claim areas and will slowly get absorbed over time. 
But now returnees have no food support and they are desperate for land so 
there has been continuous movement. Villages in Bakan tend to have a 
maximum of 100 to 120 families, so everyone tends to know another and the 
returnees as welL Locals track the coming and going of returnees. 
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The initial apprehension towards returnee newcomers was compounded by the fact 
that many of the returnees were openly suspected of supporting the different factions 
of the refugee camps. Rogge (1994, 40) clearly identified the impact that political party 
differences would have on the returnees: 
An extreme example of such conflicts in social and cultural reintegration is 
that currently being faced by the impending repatriation to Cambodia. All 
three political fronts in exile have imbued their population with radically 
different values: the Khmer Rouge continue to uphold their extreme princi­
ples of utopian agrarianCommunism, the Sihanoukists (FUNCINPEC) foster 
a traditional Khmer society dominated by a near-feudal royalty, and the 
Khmer People's National Liberation Front (KPNLF) proffer a Western-style 
laissez-faire society and democracy. Repatriation will send all three factions 
into a Cambodian society that has also evolved significantly during the past 
decade of Vietnamese control and which bears little or no resemblance to the 
Cambodia of the 1960s or to any of the societal visions held by the exiles. 
During the 1993 election, which coincided with the beginning of the repatriation 
process, returnees were an easily identified target. Several incidents of intimidation 
and abuse were reported, involving attempts by local political factions and police (who 
were predominately members of the Vietnamese-backed Cambodian Peoples Party, 
CPP) to influence returnee voting. Returnees were routinely questioned about their 
camp of origin to determine their political affiliations, i.e., whether they were Khmer 
Rouge, FUNCINPEC, or KPNLF. Even after the major political change following the 
May elections, political conflict did not end and the CPP contending party retained 
substantial political power in provincial, district, commune andvillage administration. 
In established villages, returnees tend to be excluded from village affairs. Bernie 
O'Neill, Director of CONCERN in Pursat, commented on the dearth of returnees in 
local leadership: 
Village leaders are appointed by commune heads who are appointed by 
district heads who are appointed byprovincial heads. Cambodia is rare in not 
having village leaders elected from within. This is where political divisions 
come in, also the question of competence and interest. Most requests for 
development come directly from people in the village to the NGO. After the 
request, theNGO (dependingonwhatpeoplewant) maydrop into thevillage 
for a lookabout, check to see if another NGO is involved, then if they can 
respond to the request, the NGO will talk to the village leader, then the 
commune leader, and the district authority. In all of the villages CONCERN 
works with, they have never come across a returnee in a position of leader­
ship, either among the men or women's groups. There are three possibilities 
for their invisibility in village affairs: returnees have not stayed so their lack 
of presence is not an issue; returnees feel so powerless they are hidden in the 
background and are afraid to speak; or returnees hav.e integrated success­
fully and don't identify themselves as such because they don't want to 
remind people. 
From a different perspective, Garvan O'Keeffe, Field Programmer with CARE in 
Pursat, noted that returnees tend not be to be in administration of village affairs because 
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administration has been previously established and because returnees have no land 
and therefore no voice of authority. 
By August 1994, the provincial and local levels of government were still CPP­
dominated and did not seem overly concerned with or sympathetic to returnees. Local 
peoplewere also said to reflect this attitude. Several returnees stated that, even after one 
year, extended kin still refuse to acknowledge family ties, primarily out of fear that 
association with returnees may affect their positions with local CPP political networks. 
The returnees say it will take time for their relatives to "know them," meaning that 
relatives will need to be assured that the returnees will not cause trouble with different 
political values. One returnee man stated: 
No one really talks free to returnees, for example asking them what their 
beliefs are. So many local people just guess and don't know the true person. 
Slow ly this is changing and it really is up to the returnee to show that heI she 
is not one political partyor another. Even still, local people donot believe and 
try to trick returnees into saying something bad. There is still the separation 
today that here is the CPP and there is the returnee. We can talk to one 
another, say hello, but not have really free conversation. Yet when people 
understand me now, then they like me. 
Another returnee man said: 
Ingeneral, it is hard for returnees to make friends. Even in families it has taken 
all of two years before other relatives relate with returnees and make friends 
with them. When returnees first came back many of their relatives didn't like 
to make it known that they have relatives who are returnees, in case it causes 
problems with their own jobs. Relatives were afraid they would come under 
suspicion for having contact with"enemies" from the bordercamps. All these 
past fears are very hard to erase. 
Due to limited resources, resettlement and reintegration have not been a priority 
with the CPP local governments, and officials do not seem to have the interest nor the 
capacity to identify or provide appropriate assistance to returnees. Again, this attitude 
was reflected by local villagers. It is possible that the reintegration process has been 
impeded by local jealousies and resentment about the good aid package that returnees 
got and the education they received in the camps. According to the first survey at Sre 
Ampil village in Kien Svay District, Kandal province, for example, returnees were 
much better off than the local people in terms of health, skills/training, money they 
received, and the 400-day rice ration (CWS 1994). In the first year following repatria­
tion, returnees in the newly-developed village of Sre Ampil faced distrust and jealousy 
from local villagers. A leader of the Women's Handicraft Association recalled: 
When people first arrived, local people hated them but now there are close 
relations. When they first arrived, locals thought returnees were Khmer 
Rouge and locals were afraid to go to the returnee village. Now locals know 
the kind of people here ... Some of the old people when they went to the Wat, 
no one would speak to them. They caused one woman problems until they 
found out she came from an area supervised by Son San ... Local people felt 
jealous for the development aid that the returnees were given. When returnees 
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first got the food for work program, they were called "thieves in the forest." 
At the beginning, when the women went to the forest for firewood, they were 
chased out. But this stopped when the food program stopped. 
This attitude can in part be explained by the extensive loss that local people 
throughout Cambodia have undergone. During the long years of international isola­
tion, local people have lived within a severely damaged infrastructure with little or no 
assistance. Most villages continue to suffer an acute scarcity of all resources including 
draft animals, tools, seeds, andhousehold appliances. The extensive poverty in villages 
could explain why returnees received such minimal levels of assistance from their 
neighbours and the lack of meaningful response from within the village community. 
Several returnees noted thatsince their 400-day food aid ended, local people appear less 
hostile. Now that returnees have no special attention, local people may be more 
receptive and supportive of returnee needs and involvement in zonal assistance 
strategies. Returnees could also play an important role in local development programs 
by sharing their communication skills to effectively request and access available 
assistance. Unlike returnees, most local village people do not have a high degree of 
receptiveness to available assistance from international organizations and interested 
NGOs, nor the effectiveness of the returnee's ability to articulate needs. Samrith Bo, 
Krakor District Authority, expressed confidence in the long-term reintegration of 
returnees: 
When the returnee came to settle there was trouble but they now have no 
conflict with the local villagers ... Many organizations, NGOs, come into the 
district to help returnees. This has been good for the district because they are 
now doing help for us. I expect that when the returnee children grow up they 
will marry with the local people. Now there is no longer a label for returnees 
as being different. Now that the aid has stopped there is less and less tension 
between people and less distinction. It was not jealousy, but just that for all 
those months returnees had rice. NGOs are now focusing on everyone-on 
women, on those who need some help, there is no distinction. 
In comparison, however, a returnee man, who works for a Pursat-based NGO, gave 
the following detailed account of the ongoing lack of reintegration among returnees: 
There are many problems with returnees. Where they live is often very 
dangerous for them. They have knowledge about things but are afraid to say 
anything. My feeling is that there are still differences between poor local 
people and returnees. The biggest thing is that poor people have more land, 
for housing and for rice. Most returnees have nothing and lack any sort of 
property--cow, buffalo and all the farming materials. Even though poor local 
people have problems, their houses have knives, they have ploughs and 
animals, and they have authority. Local people are the village police, but not 
the returnees. Returnees cannot sleep easy at night. They worry all night. 
Returnees feel local police do not give them protection. Also, local people 
have guns and no returnees have guns. They can't even get them because they 
are still under scrutiny and not quite trusted. Local people question why 
returnees want a gun. 
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Also returnees are still having to behave like they are the guest in the 
house. They cannot speak back even when people are impolite or rude. 
Returnees cannot say anything. Also, even though the returnee has a house, 
they cannot stay. They are scared, they have no protection, or other families 
around the returnee house are complaining or try to press on the returnee 
family. The returnee family feels under pressure all the time and the situation 
is bad, so they cannot stay and they move to another place. Returnees have 
little support. Returnees are made to feel like a guest in their relative's house, 
they are expected to leave. This creates a lot of tension. Also, if the spouse of 
a returnee (especially the husband) comes from another province, local 
people don't trust him/her. 
Also, when the returnee family has no food, other local families are not 
concerned. Local families are also hesitant to include returnees in the credit 
work schemes. I work in administration for the credit work scheme of my 
NGO and I know that the credit group in the villages is always with the local 
families. You have to have five families in the credit scheme and the five never 
include the returnee family. My feeling is that in the long term, as long as the 
returnee can work for the other families in the fields and if they do a side 
business, they will make it day by day. 
But, if sickness occurs, many things happen. If the sick returnee goes to the 
hospital, there is no family network to take care of them in the hospital. There 
is the problem of money, taxi money to pay for their transportation to the 
hospital, money for food to feed the patient, money for treatment, money for 
medicine. Returnees have not been able to develop the community networks 
for support, nor have the extended family connections to help the whole 
situation of being sick, for example making sure money is paid for the fuel for 
the generator to do the operation. Local people have all this. Local people help 
each other and know who are the good medical people and make sure their 
family gets good treatment. With returnee people there is no one to look out 
for them. If returnees don't go to the hospital what can they do? The Kru 
Khmer charge returnees more money because they don't know them and 
there are no friendship links to bring the charge down. Returnees are afraid 
to say anything in case the medical person gives them the wrong injection. 
Reintegration among Returnees in Newly-Established Villages 
For returnees in newly developed communities, the support and presence of other 
returnee families has been critical in developing a sense of reintegration. According to 
several of the returnee women in Sre Ampil village, for example, not many of the 
returnees have relatives nearby. The returnee women stated that this area was chosen 
through negotiations between the leader of the returnees and the government, and it 
was made clear to them that if they did not come here there was no place else to go. 
Many returnees inSre Ampil have relatives inSvey Rieng, PhnomPenh, and Kampong 
Cham, but felt they were not given a choice in locating there. Most returnees, however, 
developed close friendships with one another in the camps, and they say it is these 
friendship networks which formed the resettlement unit and now keep Sre Ampil 
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people together. Friendship linkages have replaced the family-based "kroms" (tradi­
tionally comprised of groups of eight to twelve nuclear households who share matri­
lineal kinship). The non kin Kroms remain the basis upon which social life and shared 
economic activity revolves, and returnee women say that they expect their children to 
marry one another. Eight families in Sre Ampil village "sustainable development 
group," for example, are considered to be a "Krom," with four other families affiliated, 
but relegated to fish pond maintenance. Core members of the returnee women's co­
operative are also part of two Krom groupings, and those on the outside have difficulty 
participating. Returnees in newly-developed communities are also more positive 
about their long-term reintegration with local neighbours. The returnee leader of Keo 
Moni village, Kandieng District in Pursat, noted: 
We are also building a pagoda with assistance from the Buddhist Develop­
ment Association in Pursat, but the number of monks is not yet decided. On 
Tnay Sil days people go to the pagodas near by, about seven kilometers on 
bicycle or motorbike. Relationships between retumees and locals are quite 
good. They respect each other. My deputy is a local person. All of us come 
together to celebrate New Year's. People from other villages come here to 
visit and also to pick up vegetables and chickens for the market. Also people 
come from villages as far away as fifteen kilometers to work in the "food for 
work" program. Most returnees here have relatives in Pursat, but not nearby. 
In the village, friendship relations take the place of the relatives. 
In Sre Ampil village as well, relations with local villagers have slowly improved, 
especially after the new roads were constructed. For returnees, the road provides easier 
access to local markets and nearby pagodas. Local people have built housing and 
businesses (such as duck farms) on either side of the road, right up to the returnee 
settlement. The road is increaSingly used by locals in the surrounding villages to bring 
their cattle to new grazing fields, and to access flooded areas for future harvests. The 
cessation of the food aid has also coincided with improved community relations 
between Sre Ampil returnees and locals. During the New Year's celebrations of 1994, 
for example, Sre Ampil village was opened to locals from several areas. Following 
religious celebrations in the morning at the Wat nearest Sre Ampil, a New Year's party 
was held all day, all night and into the next day. As a result, friendships were made. 
In other Cambodian villages, however, there are still few signs of reintegration 
between locals and returnees, as Anne O'Mahoney, Executive Director of CONCERN, 
noted: 
Locals do not share their militia teams, needed to defend land holdings from 
Kluner Rouge incursions and general banditry. Returnees thus have no 
protection. In addition, returnee sites are on their own, apart from locals. 
While returnees go into local villages, visits by locals are not returned. 
Returnee children do not have access to local schools. Local schools cannot 
cope with the large number of returnee children and although there are 
numerous teachers within the returnee population, they cannot get on the 
government payroll. Returnees go to the local pagodas but, to date, monks 
have not gone to the returnee villages. 
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Returnees as Internally Displaced 
According to Anne O'Mahoney, Field Director of CONCERN, up to 90 percent of the 
large number of internally displaced people over the last two years have been return­
ees. She cited several reasons to account for the high proportion of returnee IDPs: 
1. Returnees were given access to land situated on the outskirts of local 
villages. This was calculated so that the returnee presence would act as a 
human shield between local people and the Khmer Rouge or bandits. When 
attacks occur, returnees are first hit and local people forewarned. Refugees 
become displaced and lose what they have, but local people absent them­
selves and their animals for a few days until the Khmer Rouge or bandit 
presence is gone. 
2. There is a question concerning the degree of commitment on the part of 
returnees to rural life. Returnees are not used to the difficulties of village life 
and the lack of services (medical, education, support) that were available to 
them in the refugee camps. 
3. When displacement occurs, the first people to go back are usually the non­
returnees who have a greater familiarity with the area and have long-term 
support networks. In most cases, returnees do not have access to these 
important networks. They cannot be provided, only developed. 
Dr. Nguon Sakhon of the CRC noted that, as the reintegration focus of CRC 
disappeared, funds were channelled into emergency relief and programs for the 
internally displaced. Increasing occurrence of droughts and floods and internal secu­
rity have replaced attention on returnees. In Pursat, although there are no IDP sites, 
such as in Battambang and in Bantheay Meanchey, internal displacement occurs 
regularly. By August 1994, there was extensive mixing of internally displaced persons 
with returnees. From the local village perspective, Linda Hartke, Executive Director of 
CWS, noted that among village people the categorization of "returnee" is not a clear 
concept. The label "returnee" is often confused with IDPs, or anyone who has been 
forced from their land for whatever reason and has come back. In Khmer, there is no 
word for returnee. "Chun Pien Kluan" indicates someone who has left the country, 
which in English would be translated to "refugee," and "Chun Pien Sut" means 
someone who has left the area, which in English is translated as "internally displaced." 
As the numbers ofIDPs continue to increase throughout Cambodia, thelabel"returnee" 
is used less frequently. 
Issues and Problems in Rural Economic Reintegration 
Rogge (1994, 34) notes that economic reintegration and rehabilitation are key issues in 
any repatriation, and some degree of assistance is usually needed to facilitate the 
process: 
For repatriating refugees, this process of economic adjustment and reintegra­
tion is contingent upon a number of variables: length of time in exile, level of 
self-sufficiency or dependency while in exile, skills or knowledge acquired 
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while in exile, income-generating opportunities or means of production 
available in home areas, individual or zonal reintegration assistanE:e pro­
vided, degree of voluntariness in returning, and individual commitment 
and!or tenacity to re-establishment. 
Given the extremely high degree of dependency in Cambodian refugee camps 
(indicating that returnees will experience difficulty readjusting to support themselves), 
combined with severely restricted access to agricultural production or income-gener­
ating opportunities, low skills, and a devastated economy, the economic reintegration 
of returnees is problematic. Very few returnees have achieved any degree of self­
sufficiency. Those whodo are either employed by NGOs or in their ownbusiness. Even 
those small numbers of returnees provided with access to garden land, tools, and seed 
can only engage in small-scale vegetable production, not the self-sufficiency of rice 
cultivation. According to Mr. Say Mang, Chief Officer ofPhtas Prey Commune, Pursat 
Province: 
[0 Jnly 50 percent of the people in this commune have access to the nearby rice 
land. None of these are returnees. Those with no rice land are usually 
employed with the government as soldiers or they run businesses in town. 
Also, many are workers for labour jobs or work as porters on the train. 
Returnees have also been able to get some of these jobs after their support 
ended. Some returnees have found jobs with the NGOs because of their 
language skills, and some have their own business selling vegetables or 
[running] repair shops. 
A number of returnees who do not have land are working in small businesses like 
radio repair, video repair, motorcycle repair, and transportation. Like local people, 
returnees are often engaged in several activities, such as day labour, processing palm 
sugar, or firewood selling to help bring in money to buy rice. The majority of returnees 
want steady employment, but its scarcity means that they remain dependent on Food 
for Work schemes. In addition to the WFP food security, returnees are learning several 
local coping mechanisms to live withpoverty, such as catching fish orgoing to the forest 
for raw sandalwood, which sells well in the markets (even though it increases exposure 
to malaria). A new employment innovation in Pursat is catching local grasshoppers. 
Cambodian grasshoppers are uncommonly large and are considered a delicacy in 
Thailand. One is worth 450 riel from the middleman, so that catching only a few a day 
will generate one US dollar, enough to buy rice for a family. 
Apart from the small numbers of returnees who have well-paid positions with 
NGOs, most educated returnees cannot access teaching or health care jobs similar to 
those they held or were trained for in the camps. Among CPP provincial, district, and 
commune administrators, there has been a marked antipathy towards employing 
highly-skilled returnees, especially those who received training in the refugee camps. 
There is a general bureaucratic intransigence on the part of all levels of governments to 
accredi t the qualifica tions of returnees and, as a result, professional returnees (teachers, 
nurses, administrators) cannot find work in Pursat. 
One returnee man in his late thirties spoke of his formal medical training in 
Cambodia before 1975 and his medical certification in Site 2. For four years he was the 
TB co-ordinator in the border camps for a NGO. UNBRO then recruited him to co­
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ordinate their more extensive TB program for two years. He repatriated to Pursat in 
1992, where he has since worked with CARE International as the Community Division 
Program Officer. Still, his qualifications as a health care professional are not recognized 
by the Ministry of Health. Another professional returnee, a woman, used to be Chief of 
Obstetrics in Site 2 with ARC. At present, she heads the midwifery and maternal health 
care program for CARE in Pursat, and is Chairperson of the Cambodian Midwives 
Organization, a unique position because 90 percent of all members are government 
workers. Yet, even though she is their elected leader, the government will not recognize 
her qualifications and allow her to practice as a midwife. Brian Heidel, Executive 
Director of ARC, commented on the difficulties professional returnees have in access­
ing employment: 
The differences between returnees and locals are subtle. There is no outright 
discrimination except in returnee access to government employee positions, 
administrative, health care, teaching, etc. Except at the high Ministerial level, 
where certain individuals from Site B have found positions inthe FUNClNPEC 
government in Phnom Penh, returnees are not welcome in district and 
provincial level administration, in government hospitals and clinics, in 
public administration, in schools. 
One reason why returnees are not welcome is that numerous government 
workers at the district and provincial levels have received inadequate or 
unstandardized training for the positions they now occupy. While this was 
a necessary strategy in rebuilding the shattered infrastructure as quickly as 
possible, those in current positions do not want to lose their jobs or have their 
deficiencies made visible by working with returnees who are better qualified 
for running and implementing innovative health care or educational policies. 
Localparty staff and political leaders are threatened by the returnees who are 
coming in with new knowledge. This discrimination against returnees re­
sults in a great waste of human resources and skills, a waste of eight years of 
knowledge and technical experience in the camps. 
In a 1992 Discussion Paper by the Ministry of Health, Planning and Statistics Office, 
called "Cambodia: A Standard District Health System," incumbent District Health 
Officers responsible for curative and preventative health care at the district hospital 
and throughout the province, are identified as lacking the management skills and 
expertise to meet the people's needs. The Paper also identified the lack of standards in 
training and recommended that a standard test be given to all health care workers. On 
April 19, 1993 in a Concept Paper on "Development of Integrated Training Centres for 
Health Personnel at Provincial Level," the World Health Organization (WHO) clearly 
stated that the need to utilize the skills and resources of returnees and have their 
qualifications recognized was a priority. To date, however, nothing has been imple­
mented and WHO's position is that it is up to the Ministry of Health (a member of 
FUNCINPEC) to instigate the process. Leaders of the CPP coalition party (the previous 
Vietnamese-backed government), however, continue to advocate on behalf of district 
and local bureaucrats who remain in place despite the change in the top echelon of 
political power, and a recognition of their shortcomings. Both professional returnees 
and the NGOs who are working in health care find this situation frustrating. Profes­
sional returnee men who are unable to find employment have had to rely heavily on 
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their wives, friends, and family for support since repatriation. Many of these men are 
forced to engage in labour-intensive road construction for food payment, or stay at 
home assuming many of the domestic duties while their wives attempt to make cash 
through small-scale marketing. Their continuing financial woes are stressful, as is the 
considerable disappointment and embarrassment many of the returnee men feel in not 
acquiring work that reflects their training and education. 
At present, professional returnees can only find employment in UN or NGO 
agencies. A returnee man working for a NGO commented: 
Except for the top leaders of the country, and most of them returned from 
Western countries, returnees cannot work for the government. The CPP 
government is in control in all the provinces. They, the CPP, feel that the 
returnees are enemies and they have no confidence in them. Returnees want 
to work with them and apply for many kinds of jobs with them, but never get 
a job. Returnees only have authority when they work withNGOs. If returnees 
don't have the capacity or the skill, they don't get a job. When UNTAC came, 
many returnees went with them and NGOs worked hard to recruit their own 
workers. After UNTAC left many returnees were unemployed and NGOs 
had no place for them. They tend to wander around to try to get a job. Like 
me, Pursat is notmy homeland. I applied for a job in PhnomPenh, and Pursat 
was available, so me and my family came here. I came before repatriation to 
get a job. This was very dangerous. Many accidents occurred going through 
the forest with mines and soldiers. We had no personnel card and we were 
illegal in the country. But if I waited in the camp I might not have gotten a job. 
So it was better I came early. I hadworked withUNICEF, UNBRO, and CARE 
on the border so I could get something because I already worked with the 
people. 
To some extent, the disproportionate number of UNand NGO Khmer staff from the 
border has resulted in the creation of an elitist system. Carol Strickland, Program Co­
ordinator at CARE in Pursat noted, for example, that 50 percent of CARE project staff 
were returnees. Anne O'Mahoney, Executive Director of CONCERN, stated that the 
vast majority of the over 400 CONCERN staff are returnees, because they have the 
necessary skills and because many are familiar to CONCERN, which has worked with 
Khmer in the refugee camps since 1979. Brian Heidel, Executive Director of ARC, also 
notes that most ARC Khmer staff are returnees, including program staff and a Khmer 
administrator. Some NGOs in Phnom Penh, however, are deliberately not employing 
returnees, even when they are better qualified, to avoid creating resentment among 
local people. Linda Hartke, Executive Director of CWS, noted that the selection of 
returnees for staff positions was also diminishing: 
In general, returnees are not favoured in job hiring and tend not to be more 
skilled than local people. Two years ago, 1992, their English language skills 
gave them an edge for employment in UNTAC and the election procedures, 
but this is no longer the case as locals quickly caught up, and now are as 
frequently employed as translators. NGOs such as CW5, which have a big 
emphasis on agricultural training and programs, have few returnees on staff 
because they tend to lack minimal skills training in agriculture. The CW5 is 
more interested in community development skills among those whom they 
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hire, and returnees tend not to have training in this area as the camps were 
more "service-" rather than community-oriented. 
Vulnerable Returnees 
Throughout Cambodia, there are few employment opportunities, especially in rural 
areas. The returnee problem in finding work is a reflection ofthe country's poverty, not 
the returnee status. One returnee woman now living in Tonsay Kol village, Anlong 
Thnot Commune, Krakor District in Pursat, commented on her circumstances: 
When we lived in the camps it was easier. In the camps we were supported 
by many organizations, but here there is no support. When in the camps, our 
living conditions were good. Here there is no money for medical services or 
medicine when someone gets sick No NGOs have come to help us since we 
came to Pursat. Six of us women [all returnees] sell food at roadside, to the 
people on the bus, the children help with the housework Two of the women 
are widows. One has to support her two children all by herself. She has no 
relatives here. Next year there will be no change in our lives. The life for the 
children is very hard and they will have to work so hard. But we are glad to 
be back in Cambodia, glad to have returned home. We like to stay in this area 
and want to make this village our home. The local people here make us feel 
welcome. We would be happy ifwe get the good land. The men in the family 
can clear the land for vegetable growing. I would like another ration card 
because this would guarantee my family would get rice. 
Female heads of households and other vulnerable groups such as the physically 
handicapped, ill, or the psychologically traumatized, have the greatest difficulty in 
accessing employment and are totally dependent upon WFP food aid. Their lives are 
precarious, especially since the loss of the 400-day food aid and the extensive NGO 
support system. Returnee women do not receive special consideration from NGOs. 
CWS, for example, moved away from the criteria of returnee reintegration to focus on 
the poorest andmostdisadvantaged people within a community development context, 
many of whom are in female-headed households. The CWS approach is moving more 
to a credit system and repayment for commodities such as rice and fertilizer, and 
assistance is geared towards the community rather than individuals. In an attempt to 
help one returnee womanwho is expecting her seventh child in September, butwhose 
husband recently abandoned her for a younger woman in Phnom Penh, CWS could 
only encourage the woman to continue her participation in the Sre Ampil handicraft 
associa tion and make sure the woman's daughter participates in the road labour for rice 
payments. Often, returnee women are not in a position to help one another. Although 
Sre Ampil is considered the "Phun," or village, there is little sense of "community" to 
include all returnee or local families. As one woman explained: 
Some of the single mothers joined the handicraft weaving but this was a 
problem because they had no rice to eat and they don't know how to do the 
weaving. Also, there isnoone to look after their children so they can go weave 
... No one in the village helps them and CWS gives only general aid. These 
women try very hard to manage, especially when the children get sick It is 
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difficult for non-krom members to help these women because everybody 
here struggles and there is little to spare, no time or extra money. 
NGO zonal-targeted assistance, geared towards community development and in­
come-generation schemes, requires that returnee women would have to be part of a 
group of at least five women to qualify for assistance. Unless returnee women have 
resettled with close kin or have developed friendship networks, they are not likely to 
find other women willing to share in development projects. 
During the survey inPursat Ville villages, several returnee women who are heads of 
household stated that they had no extended family or friendship networks, that they 
were isolated, abandoned by everyone, dependent upon themselves, and solely re­
sponsible for their children. Under these circumstances, the women and their children 
are easily subject to labour exploitation, and emotional and physical abuse. In their 
striving for some sense of economic self-sufficiency (outside of a traditional system in 
which a woman's position is inseparable from that of her husband's), female heads of 
households, attempt to survive through day labour (domestic or working in the rice 
fields for others), through informal sector activities such as marketing crafts, firewood, 
or vegetables, running food stalls, or through engagement in illicit activities such as 
brewing alcohol or prostitution. 
In the new settlements, some female heads of households have received plots of 
garden land but, without help (tools, draft animals, labour), they have difficulty 
preparing the ground for vegetable or fruit cultivation. Returnee women also tend to 
have little knowledge or skills involving non-rice agricultural cultivation, such as fruit 
trees and vegetables. Women are not likely to retain their land if they cannot work it, 
or if their production is low. The WFP recognizes that many women are vulnerable, 
especially with their lack of relevant skills, and field agents attempt to devise work 
schemes in which single-parent women can participate (baby-sitting other children, 
cooking for the road labourers) in order to receive food payment. Yet, even when 
women do participate in the WFP road construction, they get paid less rice, because 
they get less done per day and because their job to carry the dirt is not worth as much 
as the digging, done primarilybymen. InSre Ampil village, returnee womenidentified 
the poorest families as being those headed by women, and those with numerous 
children (more than three). One returnee woman, a widow with two children, felt she 
was much better off with no husband because she would not increase her family size 
and thus reduce her opportunities for employment and savings. 
Thorn (1991) identified differences in attitude between returnees and local women 
that may have impact on long-term reintegration. Thorn (1991) noted that, in the 
refugee camps, the collective memory of women was that of pre-1975, i.e., "to be a good 
wife and mother" and to work in traditional female occupations such as sewing and 
weaving. There has been a "reluctance among the camp women to learn practical skills" 
or to gain experience in running small businesses (Thorn 1991,56). Further, in the 
camps, NGOs emphasized problem solving and service delivery, giving little prepara­
tion to women to face the realities of living independently inCambodia. In comparison, 
the Women's Association of Cambodia (WAC) encouraged local women to advance as 
much as possible and identified several qualities that were considered essential to the 
contemporary role of a Cambodian woman: to be able to work hard and achieve good 
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results; to be literate and educated both technically and culturally; to practice co­
operation and solidarity with each other; and to raise children and provide for their 
welfare. The emphasis for local women was on self-help and sharing through programs 
such as revolving credit schemes (ibid., 55). 
The Khmer Women's Association, active in the Khmer border camps to provide skills 
tr aining, adult literacy, child care support, and numerous social andhealth services, has 
not reorganized in Cambodia to implement support service or skills training among 
returnees. In Pursat, previous leaders of the Khmer Women's Association tend to be 
working for NGOs as midwives or translators. The skills and resources that returnee 
women acquired in the camps are not accepted or utilized by local and provincial 
authorities, including the Women's Association of Cambodia. 
Typology of Returnees 
Based on the information in this report, five types of returnees can be distinguished. 
1. Returnee Elites 
Included in this group are all those who work for NGOs and receive very high wages 
compared to all other Cambodians. Translators or field workers make an average wage 
ofUS$120 a month, and even the lowestpaidNGOworkers such as cooks or drivers still 
make about US$80 a month. Many of the good returnee staff at NGOs came back earlier 
from the camps in January or February 1992 to access the first available jobs. They left 
their families behind in the camps. Returnee elites are also comprised of those who 
worked for UNTAC as translators. UNTAC paid double and triple the rate (US$300­
400 a month), and many qualified returnees who were employed are stil1living off the 
funds and have been able to buy a house and good land, or start a business. People in 
this category often have VCRs in their homes and a motorcycle. 
Also included in this group are those returnees who receive financial assistance from 
overseas relatives. In Sre Ampil village, there are two large-scale enterprises (mush­
room farming and chicken raising), operated by returnees, both started through 
overseas financial support. The chicken farmer has over 500 chickens and is said to be 
getting rich. 
2. Returnees with Land 
Returnees who have been given a good plot of housing land have the opportunity to 
grow fruits and vegetables and to participate in marketing, and can grow small-scale 
rice crops. The following agricultural crops can be locally grown in home gardens: 
oranges, custard apple, jack fruit, papaya, cocoa, banana, sugar palm, citronella, red 
pepper, pulasan, onion, cucumber, pumpkin, string bean, mung bean, sesame, smell­
ing grass, carambola, mint, aegle marmelos, eggplant, ginger, edible arum, sugarcane, 
gourds, pineapple, as well as edible aquatic plants. 
Returnees with land who participated in UNDP ICARERE or NGO community 
development assistance, such as receiving wells, seeds, training, credit, or land clearing 
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in the newcommunities, exhibit greater potential for self-sufficiency than those with no 
external assistance. The difference between returnees' gardens in Keo Moni and Sras 
Srang villages for example, is often a reflection of which village gets community 
development aid. According to the Chief of Keo Moni village: 
People who came here to this village have a much better life than other 
returnees because we have houses and land for gardens. The differences in 
houses and gardens inKeo Moni depend onhowhard the people work. Some 
families with two parents are lazy and never do work on their house or make 
a garden. 
After one year, clear disparities of wealth are visible among returnee homes in new 
settlements. In Sre Ampil village, for example, some family dwellings have noticeably 
deteriorated, with gaping holes in the thatch siding, while other dwellings have new 
wooden walls, verandahs, a bicycle, or numerous animals underneath the house (pigs, 
chickens, ducks) indicating wealth. One returnee woman explained: 
Throughout the year some families are getting richer and some poorer. Those 
who havemoney canmakemoremoneyand thosewith thehusband and wife 
together can try harder and get more profit. The one who has a job or a 
motorbike can get money. Others can't do this. Those with only one parent in 
the family have the hardest time. 
In general, returnee homes still lack small animals (ducks, chickens, piglets), draft 
animals (cows, buffaloes), farm materials (plough, cultivator, oxcart, ploughshare), as 
well as construction materials (wire, timber, zinc sheets), all of which are seen in local 
homes. Returnees with land can still participate in "food for work" schemes and 
supplement their incomes through fishing, firewood, and general selling in the market. 
3. Employed and Semi-Employed Returnees 
Returnees in this group are working in their own businesses, such as repair shops, or 
are the inter-phone operators who serve the NGOs' expatriate staff and the Cambodi­
ans who have family overseas. They make enough money for self-sufficiency, but it is 
not reliable. Many of the returnees who now operate a small business came back from 
the camps with money saved from a small business or trade in the camps or from 
payment working for NGOs. Generally, these returnees live in Pursat town, or in 
nearby villages, and have a bicycle or motorcycle. Several handicapped returnees are 
in a business developed through assistance from the UNHCR. 
4. Landless and Unemployed Returnees 
These returnees have no family in the villages, no jobs, are staying only temporarily in 
a village, and have difficulty in reintegrating. They tend to move frequently in their 
search for land, job opportunities, or family members. There are few material resources 
in their homes such as furniture (tables, cabinets, or chairs) or kitchen supplies. Many 
move to Phnom Penh to find work or become soldiers. These returnees are often 
envious of locals who have housing land, draft animals, and agricultural livelihoods. 
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Also included in this group are those returnees who have access to land by virtue of 
living with their families or having built a house on their plot, and who engage in a 
combination of labour jobs such as "food for work," working for others in their fields, 
or gathering firewood. Now that returnees can no longer be guaranteed basic food 
needs, however, their presence often becomes a burden to relatives or others with 
whom they have found accommodation. 
5. Extremely Vulnerable Returnees 
This group would include the disabled, the ill, women without husbands who receive 
no NGO assistance and have no land or relatives to help them, or families with 
numerous children. They tend to live on the boundaries of villages in poorhousingwith 
few material possessions. The dilapidated house with holes in the thatch and missing 
walls is a good indicator of their poverty. Their homes are empty ofwater jugs, kitchen 
utensils (pots, frying pans), furniture, and bedroom items (blankets, mosquito nets). If 
they are not receiving WFP rice, these families must supplement their diet with 
foraging in nearby forests for wild yams or wild cereal crops. Several of the women 
stated that they and their children are servants for other people in the village. Poor 
health was frequently mentioned, as well as the lack of money for health care resulting 
in the death of family members. Those who can afford to move from the villages often 
gravitate to Phnom Penh. 
Garvan O'Keeffe, Field Programmer of CARE, characterized this group of returnees 
thus: 
There is a "left over" population of returnees: those who didn't get jobs, have 
no family to get absorbed into, and who have no land. These left-over people 
are still in the final stage of repatriation. 
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Survey Results 
Sample and Procedure 
The results presented in this section are drawn from a survey conducted in Pursa t town 
over a period of four days in August 1994. The sample selection process began by 
identifying 11 sub-district communes where large numbers of returnees were known 
to have settled. From this, three villages were chosen on the basis of access and 
interviewer safety. In total, 96 individuals were included in the study. 
District heads, as well as commune and village chiefs were first consulted about the 
study and later notified of the day surveyors would be in the village. Interviews were 
given inKhmer and all information was recorded in that language. To minimize errors, 
interviewers worked from a structured questionnaire written in Khmer (to ensure 
accuracy the instrument had been previously translated from English to Khmer and 
then back translated). Information on the completed forms were then transcribed into 
English. 
A team of 10 interviewers were hired from a groupwho had previous data collection 
experience with other NGO agencies. Interviewer training took place in one day, 
during which time the questionnaire was carefully reviewed and questions about its 
implementation were answered. Dr. R. Dion was responsible for constructing the 
database, analysis and the presentation of results in this section. 
Fieldwork Consideration 
Some of the field problems revolved around difficulties in finding respondents. In Prey 
Nhi, and especially in Roleap, several returnee houses were abandoned. Neighbours 
did not knowwhy the families left and did not know where they had gone. The common 
response was "they just moved one day and didn't say." In Roleap, many of the 
returnee houses were located on a narrow strip of land between the river and the road, 
while local houses were on the other side of the road. In Phteas Prey there were no 
empty returnee houses although many were closed. Neighbours stated that many 
people had gone to work in the rice fields for the day, while others had gone to sell 
vegetables in the market and would not return till the late afternoon. This made 
interviewing difficult since interviewer safety required that they return home before 
dark. During many of the interviews, returnees were unable to say what they felt 
because local villagers would stand nearby and listen to what was being said. Several 
of the survey team stated that during interviews the returnee women would begin 
crying about how they have no food. 
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Overall, the survey implementation was limited by a number of difficulties. Harsh 
research conditions which included imposed curfews, restricted travel, lawlessness, 
villager suspicion and the constant threat of Khmer Rouge attacks made large scale data 
gathering impossible. Thus, the results presented in this report are intended only as an 
indicator of the circumstances facing those repatriated back to Cambodia from the Thai 
Refugee Camps. 
Demographic Profile 
Background characteristics of the 96 repatriated Cambodians are presented first. Data 
(Table I, below) show that two-thirds (66%) of those surveyed are female. In terms of 
age, results reveal that the majority (50%) are 31 to 40 years old, with 31 percent above 
40 years and 15 percent under 30 years of age. Most of the respondents reside in Prey 
Nhi (32%), although substantial percentages can also be found in Phteas Prey (30%), 
and Roleap (26%). Those surveyed living in other places represent 12 percent of the 
sample. 
Data onhousehold composition shows that 81 percent of returnees interviewed have 
4 or more people living together and only 16 percent report 3 or less individuals in one 
dwelling. Most of those surveyed (74%) state that they are the head of the household, 
with a large percentage of this sample being female. This, coupled with the finding that 
79 percent are also married or re-married, raises interesting questions about the extent 
of family role changes since repatriation. Although almost all respondents have 
children, slightly more than half (55%) report having 4 or more children, while 40 
percent indicate that they have 3 or fewer children. Only 5.2 percent of those surveyed 
report having no children. To investigate family role changes after repatriation, 
household chores were crossed by sex of respondent. 
0/0 
Results 	 71 
Table 1: Demographic Profile of Respondents 
Profiles % 	 Profiles 
Sex 	 No. ofHousehold Members 
Male 34.4 1-3 15.6 
Female 65.6 4-6 45.8 
Total 100.0 7-9 32.3 
n 96 10 or more 3.1 
Age Not stated 3.1 
00-20 years 1.0 Total 100.0 
21-30 years 13.5 n 96 
31-40 years 50.0 Status in Households 
41-50 years 22.9 Head-of-household 74.0 
51 or older 8.3 Other 25.0 
Not stated 4.2 Not stated 1.0 
Total 100.0 Total 100.0 
n 0 n 96 
Communeffown 	 Marital Status 
Roleap 26.0 Single (never married) 0.0 
PreyNhi 32.3 Married 76.0 
Phteas Prey 30.2 Widowed 13.5 
Other 11.5 Divorced 4.2 
Total 100.0 	 Remarried 3.1 
n 96 	 Separated 2.1 
Not stated 1.0 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Number of Children 
1-3 39.6 
4-6 49.0 
7 or more 6.2 
No children 5.2 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
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Table 2: Types of Chores by Sex of Respondent 
Types of Chores Male Female 
% Responses % Responses 
Cooking 45.5 95.2 
Cleaning 48.5 95.2 
Childcare 51.5 84.1 
Washing clothes 45.5 90.5 
Shopping 36.4 85.7 
Carrying water 66.7 68.3 
Gardening 60.6 36.5 
Finding extra food 36.4 20.6 
Collecting firewood 54.5 46.0 
Caring for persons 
outside home 12.1 3.2 
Other unspecified 3.0 0 
None 6.1 1.6 
Not stated 9.1 3.2 
100.0 	 100.0 
33 63 
Responses indicate that females continue to cook (95%), dean (95%), take care of the 
children (84%), washdothes (91%) and shop (86%). Chores most often cited by men are 
carrying water (67%), gardening (61%) and collecting firewood (55%). Interestingly, 
men indicated caring for persons outside the home more often than women (12% males, 
3% females). 
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Figure 1: Year of Departure 
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Year Left For Thailand 
Data for Figure 1 show that departures began in 1978 and continued yearly to 1993, 
with the exception of 1987,1988, 1991. The bulk of movement occurred between 1979 
and 1981 when 75 percent of those surveyed left for Thailand. These numbers are 
reflective of the exodus that occurred in the larger population in the wake of the 
Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the disintegration of Khmer Rouge control. 
Table 3: Travel Companions in Flight from and Return to Cambodia 
Companions to Thailand To Thailand To Cambodia 
and back to Cambodia % Responses % Responses 
Parents 25.0 21.9 
Children 35.4 81.2 
Spouse 33.3 72.9 
Relatives 16.7 14.6 
Solo 18.8 13.5 
Friends 19.8 8.3 
Siblings 32.3 21.9 
Others 2.1 5.2 
Other returnees 1.0 
None 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
n 96 96 
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Ta ble 3 shows resul ts for the types of people who accompanied respondents on their 
journey to Thailand and back to Cambodia. Children and other family members (e.g. 
parents, spouse, siblings) constituted the majority of those travelling with respondents 
when leaving and returning to Cambodia. It is interesting to note the relatively' large 
deviation in percentages for the trip to and from Thailand. For instance, 35 percent of 
respondents left with children, while 81 percent returned with children. Thirty-three 
per cent left with spouses and 72 percent returned with married partners. Solo 
travellers comprised 19 percent on the journey to Thailand, while slightly less (14%) 
returned alone. Although it is difficult to attribute an exact interpretation to these 
fluctuations, it does suggest family reunification, or the creating of new families in the 
Thai camps. This second explanation is further supported by the increased percentage 
of those returning with spouses and the slight decreased percentage of those travelling 
alone. 
Table 4: Reasons Rated as Important or Very Important 
for Leaving Cambodia 
Reasons for Leaving Cambodia %Responses 
Seeking food 70.8 
Escape from Khmer Rouge 26.0 
Opportunity for a new life 50.0 
Fear of Vietnamese 32.3 
Nothing left in Cambodia 43.8 
Accompanied others who left 46.9 
Looking for family 24.0 
Other 14.6 
Not stated 1.0 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Despite years of subjugationand forced labour by the Khmer Rouge, only a minority 
of respondents refer to the fact that they left to escape Khmer Rouge controL While 
seemingly paradoxical, this is understandable since the invasion of Vietnamese forces 
would have diminished the existing threat of further Khmer Rouge enslavement. 
However, it did not eliminate other dangers such as life under Vietnamese communism 
or starvation caused by a failure to plant and harvest rice as people searched for family 
members and remained unsettled. As the data reveal, respondents frequently report 
leaving to search for food (71%). A significant percentage of responses suggest that 
respondents were motivated to leave for personal reasons, indicating the need to start 
a "new life" (50%) or to accompany others (47%) and the feeling that there was "nothing 
left in Cambodia" (44%). Many were also concerned about their liberators, stating that 
they left because they feared the Vietnamese (32%). 
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Table 5: Province of Origin, before 1975 and Province Returned To 
Province Province Province 
of Origin before 1975 Returned to 
% % % 
Battambang 10.4 16.7 10.4 
Kornpong Chann 3.1 
Kornpong Chhnang 4.2 1.0 
Kornpong Speu 3.1 1.0 1.0 
Kornpong Thorn 1.0 1.0 
Kandal 8.3 5.2 4.2 
PhnornPenh 2.1 6.2 3.1 
PreyVeng 2.1 1.0 
Pursat 50.0 45.8 74.0 
Svay Rieng 1.0 1.0 
Takeo 6.3 4.2 
Kampot 2.1 1.0 
Banteay Meanchey 1.0 2.1 
Other 4.2 4.2 
Not stated 1.0 12.5 4.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
n 96 96 96 
Table 5 shows respondents' province of origin, before 1975 and the province they 
returned to after the Thailand camps. Most of those sampled lived inPursat before 1975, 
(50%), or Battambang (10%). The majority of respondents returned to the same two 
areas, Pursat province (74%) and Battambang province (10%). The remaining 16 
percent returned to the other provinces such as Kompong Speu (1%), Kandal (4.2%), 
Kampot (1.0%), Banteay Meanchey (2.1%). 
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Life in Thai Camps 
To obtain information about respondents' lives in the Thai refugee camps, questions 
were asked about the specific camp where they stayed longest, the time spent there, 
type of training received and their desire to remain in the camps. 
Table 6: Thai Refugee Camp Respondent Stayed in Longest 
Camp Stayed in Longest % 
KhaoIDang 5.2 
SokSann 2.1 
HuayChan 13.5 
Green Hill 1.0 
Site 2 61.5 
Site 8 1.0 
Say Bie 1.0 
Chun Borey 1.0 
Tampy 1.0 
RithSen 1.0 
NomgChang 1.0 
DangRek 2.1 
Site B 5.2 
Not stated 3.1 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Data in Table 6 show the Thai refugee camps where respondents spent most of their 
time. Of the locations named, the majority (75%) stayed in two places; Site 2 (62%) and 
Huay Chan (13%). Approximately 5 percent were located in Khao I Dang, 2 percent at 
Sok Sann, 1 percent at Green Hill and 1 percent at Site 8. The remainder (13%) were 
dispersed in other sites along the Thai boarder, such as Say Bie, Chun Borey, Rith Sen, 
Nomg Chang, Dang Rek and Site B. 
Table 7: Years Respondent Lived in Thai Refugee Camp 
Years in Thai Camp % 
11 years or less 24.0 
12 years IDA 
13 years 47.9 
14 years 16.7 
15 years 1.0 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
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Three-quarters of the respondents in the sample (75%) spent between 12 to 14 years 
in Thai refugee camps. Considerably fewer (24%) lived in Thai camps for less than 11 
years and only 1 percent of the sample did so for more than fourteen years. 
Table 8: Types of Training Received in Thai Camps 
Types of Training % Responses 
Mechanics 5.2 
Healthcare 14.6 
Educational 18.8 
Typing 7.3 
Agricultural 4.2 
Tailor / sewing 2.1 
Administration/management 1.0 
Hairdresser 1.0 
Handicraft 2.1 
Construction 1.0 
Other 10.4 
No training 49.0 
Not stated type of training 2.1 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Table 8 illustrates the types of training respondents received while in the Thai camps. 
The most striking finding is that 49 percent of the sample did not obtain any training. 
Nineteen per cent trained as educators, 15 percent as healthcare workers, 10 percent in 
other occupations and 5 percent as mechanics. The high percentage of individuals 
receiving no training is consistent with the fact that manyCambodian refugees were in 
camps where no training was provided. 
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Repatriation 
Repatriation from Thai camps back to Cambodia involved several steps. One of the first 
UNHCR initiatives was to distribute information by flyers and videos about the 
repatriation process. This section investigates the most important sources of informa­
tion. As well, it reports the dates, destinations and reasons respondents provided for 
repatriating. 
Table 9: Source of Most Information on Repatriation 
Source of Most 
Repatriation Infonnation % 
Relatives 1.0 
UNHCR 95.8 
NGO's 3.1 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
By far, the source of most repatriation information was the United Nations High 
Commission On Refugees (96%). Relatives and Non-Government Organizations pro­
vided information to only 4.1 percent of respondents. 
Table 10: Year Returned to Cambodia 
Year % 
1990 1.0 
1991 3.1 
1992 45.8 
1993 36.5 
Not stated 13.5 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
As the figures in Table 10 indicate, some movement back to Cambodia occurred in 
1990 and 1991 (4.1%), but the largestinflux of returnees occurred between 1992and1993 
(82%). Since the food/aid package began on return, 46 percent of Cambodians who 
repatriated in 1992 would have finished their UNHCR package before 1994. It is likely 
that the 4.1 percent of respondents who returned prior to 1992 were more entrepre­
neurial and saw opportunities for future employment with NGOs. This is the case with 
the single individual who returned prior to 1991 and is currently working for an NGO. 
--
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Table 11: Reason for Selected Destination 
Reasons % Responses 
Homeland/birthplace 26.0 
Live with/near family /relatives 45.8 
Hope to get land/house 10.4 
Hope to get job 4.2 
Brought by friend 3.1 
Close to market/trade centre 3.1 
Involuntary/ referred by agency 8.3 
Other 5.2 
Not stated 3.1 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
The reasons for repatriation are predominantly, although not exclusively, positive. 
By far the most popular reason given by those sampled was to reunite with family 
(46%), or to return to their homeland (26%). Some returned for economic opportunity 
(jobs 4%, closer to market/trade centre 3%), while others report being involuntarily 
referred by an agency (8%). 
Table 12: Person(s) Stayed with on Return to Cambodia 
Family 
Friends 
Alone 
with % 
79.2 
11.5 
9.4 
Other 6.2 
Total 
n 
100.0 
96 
Table 12 illustrates that the majority of those sampled report having stayed with 
family upon their return to Cambodia (79%). Far fewer stayed with friends (12%), alone 
(9%) or in other arrangements (6%). 
Table 13: Length of Stay at First Location after Repatriation 
% 
Less than 1 year 43.8 
1 to less than 2 years 28.1 
2 or more years 24.0 
Not stated 4.2 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
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A large percentage of returnees (72%) stayed at their first resettlement location for 
less than two years, while 24 percent settled for longer. The high number of those 
moving within a two year period suggests resettlement difficulties such as lack of land 
or employment, non-acceptance by locals, and unsuccessful attempts to reintegrate 
with family. These will be explored at greater length in later sections. 
Table 14: Number of Times Moved after Repatriation 
Times Moved % 
None 29.2 
One 49.0 
Two 14.6 
Three 4.2 
Four 1.0 
Not stated 2.1 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Table 14 displays the number of times respondents moved after returning to 
Cambodia. It is interesting to note that approximately 69 percent of those sampled 
indicate moving once or more. Only 29 percent of the respondents remain in the place 
where they first returned to in Cambodia. Such high internal migration suggests that 
many returnees feel unwelcome by villagers or have difficulty accessing land or 
employment. In an attempt to determine the reason for the high secondary movement 
after their return, respondents were asked to indicate their reasons for moving. Table 
15 reports the outcome of this question. 
Table 15: Reasons for Moving after Return to Cambodia 
Reasons for Moving After Return % Responses 
No land available 56.3 
Financial difficulties 55.2 
No employment 51.0 
No housing 59.4 
Security reasons 20.8 
To be near family 20.8 
Other 6.3 
None of the above 11.5 
Did not move 29.2 
Not stated 2.1 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
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Respondent's reasons for moving after they returned to Cambodia revolve mainly 
around basic needs such as land, income, employment and housing. On these issues, 
respondents seem about evenly split between problems in acquiring land (56%), 
financial difficulties (55%), employment problems (51%) and a lack of housing (59%). 
Despite the constant threat of Khmer Rouge guerrilla raids, fewer responses (21%) 
suggest that security was the reason for a move after returning. 
Table 16: Reasons for Wanting to Remain in Thai Refugee Camps 
Reasons % Responses 
Hope for better life for kids 36.5 
Good support in the camps 43.8 
Fear of returning to Cambodia 17.7 
Security 28.1 
Jobs available in camps 1.0 
Training available in camps 2.1 
Better living conditions (food/jobs) 7.3 
Had no land 3.1 
Miscellaneous other 1.0 
No relatives left in Cambodia 2.1 
No land/house in Cambodia 7.3 
No job/earnings in Cambodia 4.2 
No security/peace due to war 6.3 
Poor living conditions for self/children 6.3 
Miscellaneous no desire to retum 4.2 
Nothing to depend on 2.1 
Did not want to stay in Thai Camp 54.2 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
When asked why they had wanted to remain in the Thai refugee camps, the reply 
most often given is that the camps provided "good support" (44%). Those surveyed 
also mention that life in Thai camps offered hope for their children (37%). At the same 
time, a sizable percentage of responses suggest personal safety was a factor in wanting 
to remain in the camps, (18% didn't feel safe returning to Cambodia, while 28 percent 
believe that the Thai camps offer security). A number of mentions also related to a 
general despair with life in Cambodia such as the absence ofland, homes, relatives, jobs, 
and poor living conditions. 
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Life in Cambodia 
To gain a sense of how well returnees are adjusting to life in Cambodia, respondents 
were asked to rate their standard of living, to indicate whether they had debts to repay, 
as well as to state their employment status, occupation, income and the hardships (e.g. 
unemployment) experienced. 
Table 17: Standard of Living and Indebtedness 
Standard of Living 0/0 Debts 
Above average 
Average 
Below average 
Bad 
1.0 
39.6 
51.0 
5.2 
Yes 
No 
Not stated 
27.1 
66.7 
6.2 
Very bad 
Not stated 
2.1 
1.0 
Total 100.0 Total 100.0 
n 96 n 96 
Figures in Table 17 indicate that 58 percent of the respondents feel that their present 
standard of living is below average, bad or very bad, while 40 percent state that it is 
average. Only one person assesses his/her living standard as above average. 
Although the standard of living is generally perceived to be below average, bad or 
very bad, the reasons for this do not hinge entirely on having debts since the majority 
(67%) report owing nothing. In an attempt to further investigate the basis of dissatis­
faction with living standards, several tables were constructed showing a typology of 
respondents, employment status, occupation and income level (Tables 18-21). 
Table 18: Respondent Types by Rating of Living Standards 
Land Semi-
Rating Elites Access Employed Vulnerable Others 
Average or Above 78.0 46.7 39.2 29.4 35.3 
Below average 22.0 46.7 55.0 59.0 53.0 
Bad or very bad 6.7 3.0 11.8 11.7 
Not stated 3.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
n 9 15 33 17 22 
To gain an understanding of those who may be most and least satisfied with their 
current living conditions, a typology of respondents was created. Elites comprise all 
those whose income exceeds 100,000 riels per month. The land access category is made 
up of respondents who, through their immediate family, can utilize land for gardens 
or rice production. It should bepointed out that immediate family inciud esgrandparents. 
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Thus, many returnee families who access land do so through family connections. 
Although it is possible to be an elite and a land owner, there was only one person in this 
sample with both of these designations. In contrast, there was more overlap between 
semi-employed members andvulnerable respondents (widowed, divorced ordisabled 
individuals). Nevertheless, results in Table 19 show a clear linear trend across groups. 
As one might expect, most elites (78%) rate their living standard as being average or 
above average. While the same is true for those with access to land, there are slightly 
fewer of them (47%). Only 39 percent of those semi-employed and 29 percent of 
vulnerables rate their living conditions as average or above. Somewhat unexpected is 
the fact that 22 percent of elites rate their current condition as below average, despite 
having the highest monthly income. 
Table 19: Employment Status 
Status % 
Employed full-time 38.5 
Part-timeI Semi-employed 32.3 
Homemaker 25.0 
Unemployed 4.2 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Of those surveyed, 39 percent report being employed full time and 32 percent state 
that they work on a part-time basis. Those identifying themselves as homemakers 
constitute 25 percent of the sample, while only 4 percent consider themselves to be 
unemployed. These results are interesting in light of the high unemployment through­
out Cambodia. A cross tabulation of employment status by occupation (not shown) 
indicates that those considering themselves employed full and part-time are predomi­
nantly farmers and sellers in the market. Both of these activities can be considered self­
employment occupations. In terms of respondent types, all elites and those with access 
to land report being employed full or part-time, while semi-employed andvulnerables 
indicate greater percentages in the part-time, homemaker or unemployed categories 
(table not shown). ' 
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Table 20: Occupation before 1975, in Thai Camps & Currently 
Before 1975 In Thai Camps At Present 
Occupation % % % 
Farmer (rice/vegetable) 42.7 1.0 14.6 
Healthcare worker lOA 4.2 
Wood cutter/collecting 2.1 4.2 
Small selling in market 12.5 24.0 11.5 
Handicraft vendor 1.0 
Construction 2.1 4.2 
Child care (only) 
Homemaker (only) 3.1 25.0 
Tailor 1.0 1.0 
Childcare & homemaker 2.1 1.0 
Mechanic 1.0 
Farming & wood collect. 2.1 
Teacher 1.0 11.5 2.1 
Labourer 1.0 5.2 
Small repairs (radio) 2.1 
Military 2.1 5.2 
Student 17.7 4.2 
Sanitation worker 3.1 
Translator 1.0 
Hairdresser 1.0 
Taxi operator 3.1 
Work with KWA 
Elderly-no occupation 1.0 
Child-no occupation 6.2 1.0 
No occupation 7.3 8.3 4.2 
Other 5.2 2.1 4.2 
Not stated 4.2 6.2 14.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
n 96 96 96 
Data in Table 20compare occupations prior to 1975,while in Thai refugee camps and 
since repatriation back to Cambodia. The most dramatic shifts in occupational roles are 
seen in farming. Forty-three per cent of those interviewed engaged in farming before 
1975 and only 15% report being currently occupied by that activity. 
Occupations with the smallest changes from before 1975 and at present are selling in 
the market and teaching. Occupations most popular in the Thai camps were marketing, 
teaching and healthcare. Note that some provided skilled labour in the camps, such as 
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translators and hairdressers. Many of these occupational activities could not be 
continued after repatriation. Moreover, those who were students or military personnel 
before 1975 have been forced to find other work or no employment at alL 
It is also important to note that a large percentage of respondents, who did not have 
an occupation before 1975, now report being homemakers. This is likely due to the 
number of young mothers who, over the thirteen year period of life in the Thai camps, 
started families of their own. 
Table 21: Monthly Household Income (in Riels) 
Monthly Income % Adequacy of Income % 
30,000-1ess 
30,001-100,000 
100,001-500,000 
500,001-750,000 
No income 
47.9 
19.8 
7.3 
3.1 
6.2 
Yes 
No 
Not stated 
7.3 
88.5 
4.2 
Not stated 15.6 
Total 100.0 Total 100.0 
n 96 n 96 
The most striking feature in Table 21 is that the majority of respondents (48%) earn 
30,000 riels or less in a month (about $12.00, U.S. a month, or $144.00 per year). The next 
highest earners (20%) report making between $12.00 and $40.00 (U.s.) a month. Only 
a small percentage of respondents earn between $40.01 and $200.00 (U.S.) per month, 
or more. Not surprisingly, most (89%) believe that their current income is inadequate, 
while only 7 percent feel their income is reasonable. Although not shown in tabular 
form, results were also crossed by the respondent types. Elites report the highest 
income, making over 100,000 riel per month. A few of those with access to land and 
semi-employed state that they earn between 30,001 and 100,000 riel per month, but 
most are making less. All vulnerables report a monthly income of 30,000 riel or less with 
12 percent of those stating that they have no income at all. 
Table 22: Respondent Types by Adequacy of Income 
Land Semi* 

Income Adequacy Elites Access Employed Vulnerable Others 

Yes 33.3 15.2 
No 66.7 100.0 84.8 88.2 94.1 
Not stated 11.8 5.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
n 9 15 33 17 26 
Table 22 shows respondent types broken outbyadequacy of income. Consistent with 
the overall distribution of responses (Table 21), all respondent types feel that their 
income is inadequate. However, it is surprising to find that the majority of elites (67%) 
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believe their current earnings are insufficient, especially since they live in relative 
luxury compared to the rest of the Cambodian population. This remains puzzling as 
further investigation reveals thatelites suffer no more disadvantages in terms of health, 
caring for sick, disabled orelderly individuals than those whohave access to land, semi­
employed persons or vulnerables. 
Table 23: Reasons for Income Inadequacy 
Reasons % Responses 
Expenses exceed income 30.2 
Impossible to support family 12.5 
Children sick frequently 7.3 
Income not steady 3.1 
No land for cultivation 1.0 
No job/income 13.5 
Needed to buy food lOA 
Needed to buy clothes 2.1 
Needed to pay for housing 1.0 
Too little 19.8 
Need to support many children 3.1 
Miscellaneous other 14.6 
Not stated 12.5 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
The mostpredominan t response given byrespondents for their income inadequacies 
is that "expenses exceed income" (30%). Many others simply state that their income is 
"too little" (20%) or that they have "no job/income" (14%). Beyond strictly pecuniary 
replies, prevalent responses are "impossible to support their family" (13%) or "buy 
food" (10%). Others indicate that their children's frequent illness, the need to buy 
dothes and the lack of land are further reasons for their income troubles. 
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Table 24: Reasons for Being Unemployed 
Reasons % 
Qualifications not recognized 
Lack of appropriate skills 
Do not want to work 
Financial! transport difficulties 
Lack of language skills 
No demand for skills 
Illness 
Discrimination 
Disability 
Other reasons 
Not stated 
Total 
n 
28.1 
31.3 
13.5 
38.5 
30.2 
14.6 
2.1 
4.2 
8.3 
9.4 
30.2 
100.0 
96 
There is Iittle consensus about the reasons for being unemployed. A large percentage 
of the responses revolve around the issue of skills, either a lack of ("language" 30%, 
"appropriate skill" 31%), orno demand for (15%) the abilities they possess. Roughly 10 
percent feel that illness or disability is the reason for their unemployment. Many others 
(28%) believe that their qualifications are not being recognized, or that job market 
discrimination prevents them from gainful employment (4%). 
Manyof those interviewed (39%) indicate that financial! transport difficulties disad­
vantage them in that start-up money for small businesses is unavailable, or transport­
ing their goods to the market is a problem. For those who live far from the markets, the 
cost of a taxi or bicycle is prohibitive. Interestingly, 14 percent of respondents state that 
they do not want to work. Given that a large segment of the sample is engaged in 
homemaking, notwanting to workmay refer more to an unwillingness to workoutside 
of the home given domestic responsibilities such as child rearing, or an inability due to 
physical disability. 
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Table 25: Problems Experienced after Returning to Cambodia 
Problems % Responses 
Money 99.0 
Housing 92.7 
Finding employment 69.8 
Health 50.0 
Access to schools 36.5 
Finding medical services 58.3 
Difficulty finding family 15.6 
Other difficulties 14.6 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Most of the problems respondents experienced after returning to Cambodia revolve 
around a lack of infrastructure needed to provide basic necessities. For example, many 
responses focus on money (99%), housing (93%), employment (70%) and health or 
medical care hardships (50% and 58% respectively). Access to schools and difficulties 
finding families, while important, appear to be less pressing. 
Table 26: Comparison of Life in Cambodia versus Life in Thai Camps 
Cambodia versus Thai Camp % 
Better 35.4 
Same 16.7 
Worse 45.8 
No comment 1.0 
Not stated 1.0 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Results in Table 26 indicate respondent's overall sense of dissatisfaction with life in 
Cambodia. When asked to compare their current circumstances with their previous 
living arrangements, 46 percent said that life in Cambodia is worse than life in the Thai 
refugee camps. Roughly 17percent believe that life in Cambodia is comparable to their 
previous situation. Thirty-five per cent of the respondents state that they consider life 
in Cambodia to be better than their Thai camp-life. 
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Assistance after Repatriation 
Assistance was provided to returnees from the UNHCR in the form of several aid 
packages described in section one. Respondents were asked to give their opinion on the 
assistance they received on return, their current situation and future aid preferences. 
Table 27: Aid Received on Return, Currently, and Aid Desired 
On Retum Received Now Desired 
Types of Aid % Responses % Responses % Responses 
Departure information 90.6 
Travel arrangement 77.1 
Post-arrival information 69.8 
Food/rice 95.8 14.6 90.6 
Tools 83.3 64.6 
Housing 41.7 7.3 87.5 
Advice 51.0 
Employment 33.3 
Education/training 41.7 5.2 76.0 
Money/cash 80.2 12.5 92.7 
Clothes 52.1 
Equipment 42.7 
Healthcare 3.1 75.0 
Land 89.6 
Safety/Security 75.0 
Plant seed 10.4 
Job skills 65.6 
Agricultural tools 78.1 
Other 1.0 2.1 20.8 
No aid received now 57.3 
Not stated 9.4 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
n 96 96 96 
While all received some form of aid on returning, the types varied greatly across 
respondents. Departure information (91%), food/rice (96%), tools (S3%) and money 
(SO%) are some of the most frequent responses. Mentioned less often are housing (42%), 
advice (51%), employment (33%), education (42%) and equipment (43%). 
Slightly more than half (57%) of the sample currently receive no aid. A few receive 
food / rice (15%), money (13%) or plant seed (10%). The types ofassistance desired were 
also quite varied, but six categories predominate. The two most popular types are 
money (93%) and food/rice (91%). The next most important items desired by respond­
ents are land (90%), housing (91%) and agricultural tools (7S%). 
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Table 28: Most Important form and Adequacy of Aid Received 
Most Important 
Aid Received % Adequacy % 
Pre-departure 
information 2.1 Yes 6.3 
Rice/food 50.0 No 63.5 
Tools 3.1 Not stated 30.2 
Housing 2.1 
Advice 2.1 
Employment 5.2 
Money 13.5 
Clothes 1.0 
Not stated 20.8 
Total 100.0 Total 100.0 
n 96 n 96 
Table 28 shows the types of aid considered most importantby respondents. Most of 
those interviewed (50%) feel rice/food to be the most vital, while only 14 percent per 
cent report that money is important. The remaining types of aid such as tools, housing, 
advice, equipment and employment are of significance to fewer individuals sampled. 
The finding that assistance with housing, tools and equipment are not more popular 
items is understandable in light of the inability to access land promised in the UNHCR 
packages. As a result, most respondents (64%) state that current assistance is inad­
equate. 
Table 29: Financial or Other Aid Received from Family 
or Relatives Overseas 
Family Overseas 
Aid Received % 
Yes 17.7 
No 82.3 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
In addition to assistance provided by agencies such as the UNHCR, families living 
in Canada, France or the United States could also lend financial help to their relatives 
in Cambodia. However, this source of support seems limited. As indicated in Table 28, 
very few returnees sampled receive overseas aid from family or relatives (18%). Of 
those who obtained external family support, only 7 percent received financial assist­
ance. Over a six month period, these individuals report receiving an average of $74.00 
U.S. 
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Social Reintegration 
In order to determine the degree of difficulty returnees face in social reintegration, 
those surveyed were questioned on their perceptions and attitudes about acceptance. 
For example, respondents were asked about the presence of family, relatives or friends 
in the area, whether villagers received them warmly or expressed resentment towards 
them and whether UNHCR aid helped in reintegration. 
Table 30: Relatives or Family from Thai Camps Live Nearby 
Relatives or Family Nearby % 
Yes 67.7 
No 32.3 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Slightly over two-thirds of the sample (68%) indicate that they have family or 
relatives living close to them, while roughly 32 percent state that they do not have any 
relatives living near them. 
Table 31: Types of Relatives in the Area Prior to Arrival 
Types of Relatives % Responses 
Father 4.2 
Mother 12.5 
Brother(s) 11.5 
Sister(s) 13.5 
Mother-in-law 3.1 
Father-in-law 2.1 
Aunt(s) 7.3 
Uncle(s) 5.2 
Cousin(s) 11.5 
Grandparent(s) 3.1 
Other family 33.3 
No answer 12.5 
No family nearby 32.3 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Table 31 shows the types of relations respondents had in the area before their arrival. 
The majority of respondents (32%) report that no relatives were present before their 
arrival. Of those who did have relations living in the area prior to arriving, immediate 
family such as mother, siblings and other family are most often cited. 
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Table 32: Number of Family Members Living near Respondent 
Number of Family Members Nearby % 
None 32.3 
One 13.5 
Two 11.5 
Three 11.5 
Four or more 17.7 
Not stated 13.5 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Approximately 54 percent of those sampled state that they have one or more family 
members living near them. Eighteen per cent indicate that they have four or more 
family members living close to them. However, 32 percent report no relatives nearby. 
For these individuals, existing family support networks are unavailable as a means for 
social integration into the community. Instead, these respondents are saddled with the 
more difficult task of creating networks which include overcoming villager suspicions 
and hostilities. 
Table 33: Friends nearby Prior to Arrival and Continued Friendship 
after Repatriation 
Friends Nearby % Continued Friendship % 
Yes 32.3 Yes 58.3 
No 67.7 No 24.0 
Not stated Not stated 17.7 
Total 100.0 Total 100.0 
n 96 n 96 
Figures in Table 33 show that far more respondents report having no friends prior to 
their arrival (68%), than those who did (32%). Of those who did have friends before 
arriving, themajority (58%)have maintained that companionship. However, a substan­
tial percentage (24%) have not continued their friendships on return. Unfortunately, 
the reason for not maintaining the pre-existing friendships is unknown. Perhaps the 
demands of daily living, the desire to start over or the high migration are contributing 
factors. 
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Table 34: Perception of Locals' Attitudes towards Returnees 
Attitude % 
Favourable 65.6 
Not favourable 15.6 
No opinion 16.7 
Not stated 2.1 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Most of those surveyed believe that attitudes towards returnees are favourable 
(66%), but approximately 16 percent feel that villagers do not like returnees. However, 
a high percentage (17%) of respondents report "no opinion" on this issue. Although it 
is difficult to interpret this response, it could indica te a cultural or politically motivated 
reluctance to divulge their true feelings on the matter. 
Table 35: Percentage Who Perceived a Warm Reception on Return and 
Percent Age Who Experienced Resentment Regarding UNHCR Support 
Warm Reception % Resentment % 
Yes 64.6 Yes 26.0 
No 17.7 No 72.9 
No idealopinion 15.6 
Not stated 2.1 Not stated 1.0 
Total 100.0 Total 100.0 
n 96 n 96 
Almost two-thirds (65%) of those sampled believe that returnees were given a warm 
reception. Eighteen per cent thought that returnees were not warmly received and 
about 16 percent had no opinion on this matter. Moreover, over one-quarter (26%) of 
the returnees interviewed report encountering outward resentment for UNHCR sup­
port, but the majority (73%) have nothadsuch experiences. To gain a better understand­
ing of the way in which aid packages helped or hindered resettlement, respondents 
were questioned on the role assistance played in their effort to reintegrate into family 
and community. Table 36 displays these results. 
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Table 36: Whether Aid Helped in Resettlement and to Move Closer 
to Family 
Helped Resettlement % Closer to Family % 
Yes 70.8 Yes 80.2 
No 27.1 No 19.8 
Not stated 2.1 
Total 100.0 Total 100.0 
n 96 n 96 
The majority of those surveyed (71%) state that aid has helped them in the resettle­
ment process. Furthermore, 80 percent of respondents feel that the assistance received 
has enabled them to move closer to their family and friends. Only 27 percent and 20 
percent in each category maintain that the assistance has not helped. 
Table 37: Frequency of Being Accused of Abandoning Cambodia, 
Unwillingness to Share Land and Villager Resentment over Jobs 
Returnees Villagers Villagers 
Accused of Unwilling to Resentment 
Abandoning Share Land with Returnees over 
Cambodia Returness Jobs 
0/0 % % 
Frequently 9.4 28.1 13.5 
Sometimes 37.5 13.5 33.3 
Never 50.0 56.2 51.0 
Not stated 3.1 2.1 2.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
n 96 96 96 
Results indicate differences between respondents experiencing some form of dis­
crimination (accusations, local unwillingness to share, resentment) and those not 
encountering any of these hostilities. For instance, 50 percent of those surveyed claim 
to have "never" been accused of abandoning Cambodia. Fifty-six per cent state they 
have not encountered an unwillingness to share land and 51 percent indicate that they 
have not experienced local resentment over opportunities for employment. 
However, almost an equal percentage (47%) of respondents indicate that they are 
sometimes or frequently accused of abandoning Cambodia. Moreover, a substantial 
percentage of those surveyed (42%) state that they sometimes or frequently encounter 
unwillingness to share land and47 percent report that they experience resentment over 
jobs sometimes or frequently. Given the lack of infrastructure, the scarcity of mine-free 
land, the extreme poverty and the constant threat to personal safety, it is not surprising 
that integration of returnees into the existing village life is difficult. 
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Table 38: Memberships in Any Support Groups 
Membership Groups % Responses 
Administrative unit 34.4 
Rice co-operative 9.4 
Security guard group 9.4 
Men's group 4.2 
Women's group 4.2 
Youth group 4.2 
Buddhist group 19.8 
Elder group 7.3 
NGO development group 12.5 
Human rights group 10.4 
Political group 7.3 
Other 1.0 
None 33.3 
Not stated 4.2 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
The most popular organizations cited by respondents are those affiliated with some 
sort of village administrative unit (34%), a Buddhist group (20%) or an NGO develop­
ment group (13%). Membership in other associations such as rice, security, gender, 
youth, elderly, political or human rights are all about 10 percent or less. It should also 
be mentioned that a large segment of those sampled state that they are not currently 
members of any group (33%). Although it is difficult to determine, this high degree of 
non-membership may result in isolation and alienation amongst returnees. 
Table 39: Items Shared with Non-Family Members 
Items Shared % Responses 
Food 27.1 
Land 7.3 
Labour 13.5 
Tools 14.6 
Information 16.7 
Medicine 11.5 
Goods 14.6 
Other 5.2 
Never share 58.3 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
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Despite the fact that information is the easiest commodity to give, it is not the most 
frequently shared, as only 17percent of respondents report sharing this item with non­
family members. Food is the most often shared item (27%), followed by tools (15%), 
goods (15%), and labour (14%). Land and medicine, perhaps the two most scarce 
commodities, are shared the least outside the family. The lack of available resources, 
combined with personal and family needs, is demonstrated by the fact that 58 percent 
of respondents state that they never share items with non-family members. 
Table 40: Reasons for Feeling Accepted and for Feeling Unwelcome 
Accepted % Responses Unwelcome % Responses 
Being recognized Locals resentful or 
as a villager 10.4 jealous of aid 15.6 
Being greeted by locals 7.3 Poor communication 
with locals 4.2 
Being with relatives 11.5 Unfriendly / rude 
neighbourhood 9.4 
Given land/house/aid 5.2 No land/house 9.4 
Good relations / communications 
with locals 16.7 No employment 4.2 
Returnees feel accepted 7.3 Lack of government support 1.0 
When locals share 
with returnees 2.1 Locals incite conflict 1.0 
Very happy 5.2 Feeling unsafe / insecure 6.2 
By not making conflict 1.0 Accused of abandoning 
Cambodia 2.1 
Being back in homeland 2.1 Lack of money 2.1 
When visited by locals 3.1 Locals don't share 4.2 
If returnees share with locals 3.1 Locals are unhappy 
with returnees 2.1 
Locals don't want returnees 
Other 8.3 in activities 2.1 
Don't know 2.1 Other 7.3 
Not stated 19.8 Don't know 2.1 
Not stated 39.6 
Total 100.0 Total 100.0 
n 96 n 96 
When asked what makes returnees feel welcome, respondents report that being 
recognized as a villager (10%), being with relatives (12%), and having good relation­
ships and communications with locals (17%) are most important. In contrast, the 
reasons respondents gave for feeling unwelcome are somewhat more varied, with only 
one response being commonly held. Sixteen per cent of those interviewed indicate that 
__ ----------------
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resentment or jealousy over returnees getting aid has created feelings of being unwel­
come. 
Table 41: Feelings of Whether Returnees Are Accepted 
Acceptance % 
Most of the time 40.6 
Sometimes 40.6 
Never 14.6 
Not stated 4.2 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Despite being confronted by accusations of abandoning Cambodia, unwillingness to 
share land and resentment, 81 percent of the respondents believe that returnees are 
accepted" sometimes" or "most of the time." Only 15 percent of those surveyed felt that 
returnees were "never" accepted. 
.... . 
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Returnees' Health after Repatriation 
Cambodians who fled to the Thai refugee camps carried with them the mental and 
physical scars of their adversities under the Khmer Rouge. Although most refugee 
camps offered a haven from the Khmer Rouge, mental and physical abuses were not 
easily healed. This section investigates the mental and physical health status of 
returnees interviewed, their assessment of access to medical health services and their 
feelings about the future. 
Table 42: Responsibility for People with Special Needs 
Special Needs % 
Sick people 18.8 
Elderly 24.0 
Orphaned Children 12.5 
Physically handicapped 12.5 
Mentally disturbed 1.0 
No one with special needs 54.2 
Not stated 2.1 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Of those surveyed, the most frequent responsibility is caring for an elderly person 
(24%), followed by someone who is ill (19%), orphaned children (13%) and the 
handicapped (13%). However, slightly more than half the sample (54%) indicate that 
they are not responsible for anyone with special needs. 
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Table 43: Respondent's Rating of Own Health and Children's Health 
Respondent's Health Child's Health 
Rating % % 
Excellent 1.0 
Above average 12.5 15.6 
Average 59.4 70.8 
Poor 27.1 8.3 
No children 5.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
n 96 96 
Compared to Others 
the Same Age 
Better 14.6 
Similar 34.4 
Worse 49.0 
Not stated 2.1 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
It is interesting to note that only 1 percent ofrespondents rate their health as excellent 
and no one selected this response for their children. The majority of respondents (72%) 
report their health to be average or above average, while 86 percent feel that their 
children's health is average or above average. A considerable percentage (27%) state 
that their health is poor. 
When asked to rate their health relative to others the same age, however, most 
respondents (49%) feel that their health is "worse". About 34 percent believe their 
health is similar to others and only 15 percent believe their health to bebetter than others
. 
of the same age. 
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Table 44: Times in Last Six Months that Healthcare Was Needed 
Times Respondent Time Respondent's 
Needed Healthcare Child Needed 
Healthcare 
in Last 6 Months in Last 6 Months 
% % 
None 65.6 61.5 
One 11.5 4.2 
Two 7.3 11.5 
Three 4.2 4.2 
Four 6.2 
Five 2.1 
Six or more 6.2 3.1 
Have no children 5.2 
Not stated 3.1 4.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 
n 96 96 
Figures inTable44 show thatmost of the respondents and their children (66% adults, 
62% children) did not require healthcare in the last 6 months. Twelve per cent of adults 
report needing medical attention once in the last 6 months, while an equal percentage 
of children required care twice in the same time span. More importantly, 23 percent of 
children required healthcare three or more times compared to only 16percent of adults. 
Thehigher percentage of children requiring attention more thanonce in 6 monthperiod 
reflects their heightened susceptibility to diseases under the current circumstances. 
Their need for healthcare is likely a result of the poor sanitation, lack of uncontaminated 
water and inadequate diet. 
Table 45: Healthcare Person Seen Most' 
Healthcare Person % 
Family 36.5 
KrouKhmer 10.4 
Buddhist monk 6.2 
Community health centre 29.2 
Visiting doctor I nurse 5.2 
Not stated 12.5 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Most of the respondents indicate that their healthcare needs are attended to by a 
family member (37%) or a conununity health centre (29%). Approximately 17 percent 
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seek a "traditional healer" such as a Krou Khmer or Monk, while only 5 percent see a 
medical professional. 
Table 46: Whether Health Problems Interfere with Daily Activities 
Health Problem Interference % 
Very much 26.0 
Somewhat 50.0 
Not at all 22.9 
Not stated 1.0 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Slightly more than three-quarters of those surveyed (76%) indicate that health 
problems interfere with their daily activities "somewhat" or "very much". Twenty­
three per cent report experiencing no health impediments in their daily activities. These 
results suggest a disturbing situation when considered in light of the 66 percent who 
reported not accessing healthcare in the last 6 months (Table 44). It may be that many 
are depriving themselves of needed medial attention, perhaps because of cost or 
scarcity. Without proper attention, family life and economic well-being undoubtedly 
suffers. 
Table 47: Ailments Diagnosed by a Doctor During Lifetime 
Ailments % Responses 
Malaria 18.8 
Heart disease 10.4 
Anaemia 6.2 
High blood pressure 4.2 
Tuberculosis 4.2 
Diabetes 1.0 
None of the above 59.4 
Not stated 3.1 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
Malaria is the single most common ailment respondents report being diagnosed by 
a doctor. Fifty-nine per cent of the respondents state having never been diagnosed by 
a doctor for any of the ailments specified, although this does not necessarily mean they 
do not have ailments such as malaria. 
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Table 48: Health Problems Experienced in the Last Year 
Health Problems Often Sometimes Rarely Never Total 
% % 0/0 % n 
Depression 63.5 19.8 2.1 14.6 96 
Frequent headaches 24.0 53.1 5.2 17.7 96 
General weakness 25.0 32.3 17.7 25.0 96 
Dizziness 15.6 45.8 13.5 25.0 96 
Head pain 19.8 52.1 5.2 22.9 96 
Stomach aches 12.5 14.6 10.4 62.5 96 
Poor appetite 30.2 31.2 13.5 25.0 96 
Poor sleeping 17.7 38.5 17.7 26.0 96 
Cold hands or feet 2.1 22.9 16.7 58.3 96 
Poor concentrating 26.0 30.2 14.6 29.2 96 
Forgetfulness 14.6 38.5 14.6 32.3 96 
Weak heart 14.6 24.0 7.3 54.2 96 
Other 3.1 4.2 7.3 85.4 96 
Although the frequency of all health problems is relatively high, there are some that 
indicate serious health risk. One which is very high and potentially very serious is 
depression. Sixty-four per cent of those interviewed admit suffering "often" from 
depression. Frequent headaches (24%), poor appetite (30%) and cold hands or feet 
(26%) are also common problems that respondents mention occurring" often". In light 
of earlier results (Tables 44 and 46), this indicates that those surveyed are not receiving 
medical treatment even though they require it. To see who suffers from these ailments, 
Table 49 was constructed. It displays respondent's gender and the associated health 
problems. 
Table 49: Health Problems Experienced in the Last Year by Sex 
Depression Frequent Headaches Poor Appetite 
Frequency Male Female Male Female Male Female 
0/0 % % % % % 
Frequently 51.5 69.8 36.4 17.5 24.2 33.3 
Sometimes 12.1 23.8 36.4 61.9 30.3 31.7 
Rarely 3.0 1.6 9.1 3.2 15.2 12.7 
Never 33.3 4.8 18.2 17.5 30.3 22.2 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
n 96 96 96 96 96 96 
Data in Table 49 show that both male and female depression rates are extremely high, 
but especially so for females. Sixty-four percent of men and 94 percent of women 
indicating "sometimes" or "frequently" experiencing depression. In terms of head­
aches, men report having headaches more "frequently" (36%) than women (18%). 
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However, when the categories "frequently" and "sometimes" are taken together, 79 
percent of women and 73 percent of men report having this health problem. Women 
also indicate that they experience poor appetite more often than men, but when the 
other categories are considered there appears to be little difference (e.g. "sometimes" 
is 30 percent for males, 32 percent for females). Overall, the data suggest that female 
respondents are at greater mental health risk than their male counterparts. 
Table 50: Adequacy of Healthcare Services 
Adequate Inadequate No Access Not Stated Total 
Health Services % % % % n 
Medical clinic 37.5 31.2 27.1 4.2 96 
Hospital 25.0 26.0 30.2 18.8 96 
Conununity health centre 21.9 24.0 28.1 26.0 96 
Visiting doctor /nurse 12.5 20.8 42.7 24.0 96 
KrouKhmer 21.9 16.7 42.7 18.8 96 
Monk 20.8 17.7 41.7 19.8 96 
Overall, very few of those sampled feel that the healthcare services specified are 
adequate. The most acceptable appears to be the clinic, but this choice is only indicated 
by38 percent of respondents. On average, 58 percent of respondents believe that all the 
services are either inadequate or lacking entirely. Furthermore, those surveyed main­
tain that traditional healers such as Krou Khmer (59%) and Monks (59%) are not 
accessible. This may be due, in part, to financial constraints. 
Table 51: Feelings about Own Future and Children's Future 
Respondent Feelings Respondent Feelings 
about Their Future about Child's Future 
% % 
Hopeful 16.7 18.8 
Uncertain 59.4 53.1 
Fearful 22.9 13.5 
Not stated 1.0 14.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 
n 96 96 
Only a small percentage of respondents feel hopeful about their future and their 
children's future (17% and 19% respectively). The majority of those responding are 
"uncertain" or "fearful" about the future for themselves and their children (82% and 
67% respectively). The reasons for these uncertain feelings are provided in Tables 51 
and 52. 
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Table 52: Negative and Positive Reasons for Respondent's Future 
Reasons % Responses 
Negative Reasons 
Nothing to depend on 4.2 
Alone, no one to depend on 7.3 
Lack everything 1.0 
Lack land for cultivation/house 11.5 
Lack money 21.9 
Lack job 12.5 
No money to start a business 5.2 
In poor health/disabled 17.7 
No money for medicine 1.0 
Too many children to support 1.0 
Poor living conditions 4.2 
No government support 1.0 
Worried about future employment 3.1 
Other negative mentions 10.4 
Positive Reasons 
In good health 1.0 
Possible to support family 4.2 
Peace from war 2.1 
Hope to get support in the future 2.1 
Better life under new government 3.1 
Other positive mentions 8.3 
Cannot predict future 4.2 
Not stated 6.2 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
A glance at Table 52 shows that negative reasons offered by respondents about their 
future out-number positive ones. In terms of negative answers, the most common 
revolve around basic living conditions such as lack of money (22%), job (13%), land 
(12%), and poor health/disability (18%). The finding that so many do not foresee a 
positive future indicates that reintegration at this point has not been as successful as 
anticipated. 
Those offering positive replies concerning their future outlook are fewer and their 
responses are more equally distributed. The most frequently mentioned positive 
opinion is the possibility of family support (4.2%). Others such as good health, peace 
from war and better government are also mentioned, but less than four percent of the 
time. 
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Table 53: Negative and Positive Reasons for Their Child's Future 
Reasons % Responses 
Negative Reasons 
Carmot send children to school 12.5 
Carmot support children in future 18.8 
No money for medicine when child is sick 1.0 
Carmot support children at present 11.5 
No money 10.4 
Hopeless future 4.2 
Too many children to support 1.0 
Other negative mentions 9.4 
Positive Reasons 
Can send children to school 9.4 
Expect better future for children 7.3 
Children will be well educated 4.2 
Will be peace / no war 2.1 
Will be government support 2.1 
Will have good jobs 1.0 
Other positive mentions 2.1 
Other neutral mentions 2.1 
Children still too young 4.2 
Have no children 5.2 
Don't know 6.2 
Not stated 8.3 
Total 100.0 
n 96 
As with respondents' feelings about their own future, those surveyed feel equally 
negative about their children's future. The most often cited responses once again 
include basic needs such their children's schooling (13%), supporting their children 
now (12%) and in the future (19%), and not having enough money (10%). 
Positive answers regarding their children'S future include being able to send their 
children to school (9%) and their children being well educated (4%), expecting a better 
future (7%) and a Cambodia free of war (2%). Although perceptions about their 
children's future are not strongly associated with commune or number of children in 
school, they are related to income level. Those in the highest income levels (more than 
100,000 riel per month) also have the most positive views, while those in the lowest 
income categories report the most negative outlook (table not shown). Despite the 
positive responses given by respondents about their children's future, the frequency of 
negative replies still out-number more optimistic views. 
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Many NGOs remain critical of the speed with which the UNHCR resettled returnees. 
In hindsight, it is clear that little consideration was given to an adequate assessment of 
needs, priorities, resource availability and impacts on both returnees and areas of 
resettlement. UNHCR did not adequately assess the social, cultural and psychological 
reintegration difficulties of returnees, nor the social tensions and conflicts associated 
with their return. Previous examples of repatriated African refugees (Allen and 
Moronic 1994) led to an assumption that Cambodian refugees would be welcomed 
back, especially when they returned among kinsfolk. This presumption proved inaccu­
rate given the subsequent instances of hostile receptions (causing secondary migra­
tion), the lack of assistance from neighbors and kin, and the simmering tensions 
concerning land and resources between returnees and locals. The land allocation, for 
example, should have been a part of UNHCR planning, and not left to the returnees and 
the NGOs to deal with. 
Reintegration depended critically on returnees' developing their own informal 
networks and independent strategies to live within endemic rural poverty. Local and 
provincial governments gave little support concerning returnee resettlement and 
reintegration. The assumption was that returnees would rejoin family members who 
would provide assistance. Survey resul ts showed that only two-thirds of returnees had 
family or relatives living close to them and about one-third did not rejoin family (Table 
30). Local people, however, continue to face innumerable economic constraints, even 
for those with access to agricultural rice land. Rice agriculture remains risky due to 
conditions of flood or drought and insecure profits, and the small plot size provides less 
than a nuclear family's basic needs for self-sufficiency. The added burden of returnees 
meant that other sources of income (small market businesses, gathering forest prod­
ucts, crafts) became a critical component for economic survival and continued familial 
support, especially after the 400 day food aid ended. The harsh economic realities of 
reintegration often necessitated returnees engaging in secondary migration in search 
of less depressed rural areas or more advantaged family. In fact, survey results show 
that 69 percent of respondents moved one or more times since their return to Cambodia 
(Table 14). For many returnees, success in resettlement is based not so much on their 
own ability, but on the living conditions of their kin. Returnees remained disadvan­
taged if they received little kin support or if they had been unable to relocate families. 
In November 1993, the WFP classified 38.7 percent of total returnees as vulnerable, 
i.e., households headed by women, the elderly or handicapped, and 84 percent fell into 
the categories 'marginal,' 'needy,' or 'at risk.' At the time of the returnees highest 
vulnerability, the endingofthe 400day food support (which started in December 1993 ), 
UNHCR had scaled down their involvement. Itbecame obvious shortly after December 
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1993, that the food support package had provided basic subsistence and the basis upon 
which returnees negotiated a place to stay, not the means through which they could 
develop other options for reintegration. Option C had merely postponed the necessity 
for land. Contrary to UNHCRexpectations that returnees would be "re-established" by 
the absolute end of the 400 day food rations in May 1994, most returnees remain in 
precarious circumstances. 
By August 1994, the numbers of returnees 'at risk' had increased dramatically, 
reflecting the scarce opportunities for economic activities. For many returnees, the 
return to home villages or to areas where relatives and friends live has not been 
successful, resulting in a perilous landless existence that necessitates frequent moves 
or squatting at the edges of villages. 
Without access to land, returnees have difficulty becoming self sufficient and tend 
to subsist on unpredictable low-waged seasonal labour and the Food For Work 
development programmes. Survey results show that 52 percent of the respondents 
were either semi-employed or vulnerable, while only 16 percent had access to land and 
10 percent had incomes above 100,000 Riels per month (Table 18). The overall assess­
ment from this report is that the lack of land is a critical impediment for successful rural 
reintegration. 
According to NGO information, the majority of returnees have not reintegrated into 
existing communities, nor have they developed support networks beyond friendships 
with other returnee families. In many villages, especially in the Western provinces, 
water is scare, food supply limited and schools, sanitation and health care marginal, all 
of which are exacerbated by armed conflict, increasing banditry, and forced conscrip­
tion into the Cambodian army. Despite these drawbacks, 81 percent of the survey 
respondents still felt returnees were accepted"sometimes" or "most of the time" (Table 
41). 
Anderson's (1992) report, listed numerous areas of work that returnees wanted to go 
into when they returned: medical services, teachers, artisans, blacksmiths, barbers, 
fishermen, rubber plantationworkers, miners, and factory workers. It is clear, however, 
that local economies have not rehabilitated enough to accommodate returnee job­
seekers. Professional returnees face ongoing discrimination in accessing employment, 
particularly with local and regional government offices such as health, social services 
and education. Survey findings show that 47 percent of respondents reported experi­
encing resentment "sometimes" or "frequently" in employment opportunities (Table 
37). Returnee educational qualifications andvocational certificates gained in exile have 
not yet been recognized by the Cambodian government, and despite years of working 
experience, their skills are not welcomed, reflecting underlying political implications 
ofwho has the greater right to access jobs and who hires. As a consequence, survey data 
show that manyofthe respondents employed as heal thcare workers and teachers in the 
Thai camps have not continued in these professions after repatriation (Table 20). 
Interviews with returnees gave an overwhelming impression of continuing poverty 
and economic adversity. Chronic unemployment means most returnees are surviving 
on a day-to-day basis depending on what they can forage in the forest or what labour 
they can find. Starvation seems to be checked only by the Food ForWork opportunities 
available through WFP and day-by-day survival strategies. Numerous families appear 
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to be lacking basic needs. Many stated that their children are unable to attend school 
because of the barrier of school fees. Even those returnees living in new settlements 
have minimal production from vegetable agriculture and if they can, try to develop a 
diversified range of income sources. For most returnees, developing non-agricultural 
economic opportunities are limited and they must compete for employment with local 
and internally displaced populations. Bleak economic conditions colour individual 
perceptions of the future. When survey respondents were questioned about their 
children's future, an overwhelming number of responses were negative. 
Since the end of the food support, land negotiations for returnees have intensified. 
Through the assistance ofNGOs, WFP, and the Cambodian Red Cross, some groups of 
returnees have negotiated with local, district and provincial authorities for housing 
plotswith eventual access to agricultural land. The outcomes of negotiations vary from 
district to district, depending on the extent of commitment from the specific NGOs, 
government personnel, the amount of internally displaced and local vulnerable popu­
lations, the number of mines and the overall security situation in the area. In Bantheay 
Meanchey, Kompong Thom and Battambang provinces, for example, thousands of 
returnees have become long term internally displaced (IDPs), dependant on World 
Food Program (WFP) rations in temporary sites. In contrast to local people who 
continue to access their farming land, returnees tend to want to stay in the IDP sites to 
avoid any further risk of land mines or Khmer Rouge intimidation. To a large extent, 
land allocation negotiation depends as much on the number of families already located 
in the commune (sub-district) or local village as on the numbers who will need to be 
moved to the area from IDP sites. With the increasing numbers of internally displaced 
and rural poor (most often caused by crop failure due to drought or flood), however, 
returnees are being perceived less and less as a unique group with special needs. 
In Pursat province, housing land has been made available to approximately 10 
percent of returnees, although clear title and ownership remains uncertain. In the 
survey, 16 percent of survey respondents had access to land (Table 18). 
In some areas of land allocation, extensive assistance was provided for community 
development and returnees have tended to remain oriented towards the provision of 
additional resources and external help to solve ongoing problems. 
Several NGOs who have been active in implementing resettlement and reintegration 
schemes are critical of the returnee attitude, especially in their unwillingness to "take 
responsibility for themselves" by employing creative problem solving, and in their 
tendency to "shop around" for assistance. Future NGO, as well as government 
attention is to focus on broad categories of vulnerability or areas in need, rather than 
specific identities such as returnee. The criteria for vulnerable families refers to female 
headed household with no male children over 16, households with a handicapped or 
disabled person, and households in which there are numerous children under 16 years 
old, especially those without land or support from relatives. Although a slightly 
different definition was used here, the results of this survey show that roughly 18 
percent of the sample fall into the category of vulnerable (Table 18). 
It is stillimpossible to assess the success or socio-economic ramifications of the new 
settlements from the short-term perspective of this study. Rebuilding an economic and 
social infrastructure through which self-sufficiency farming can be established, com-
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munities formed, local markets accessed and integration into local or regional politics 
will take several years. Although returnees may well have the capacity to reintegrate, 
the length of time needed to establish themselves will make an agricultural survival 
difficult. Differences in levels of self-sufficiency achieved within the new settlements 
can already be observed. Survey results showdifferences in levels ofincome, health and 
life satisfaction. The type and extent of livestock, gardens, outbuildings, and general 
housing upkeep are clear indications of those returnees who are achieving and those 
who do not. The noticeable differences reflect household composition (such as a two 
parent or extended family) as well as the personal ability and tenacity of individuals. 
Much of the behaviour or attitudes on the part of returnees can be explained by the 
excessive dependency Cambodians experienced in the refugee camps. InbothUNHCR 
and border camps, the decision, care and maintenance of Cambodian were regulated 
on a day-to-day basis by political leaders, government officials and aid agencies. No 
attempt was made to encourage Cambodians to become self-supporting or even to 
introduce minimal measures of self-reliance, since Thai refugee policy opposed such 
strategies. As Rogge (1994, 35) notes: 
Repatriating such refugees, and having them become economically viable in 
theirhome areas, is, therefore, a problem of more thansimply providing them 
with land and/or other means of production. Getting people to break out of 
a welfare syndrome acquired during many years in refugee settlements and 
to make decisions for themselves is a major task confronting any repatriation 
exercise; in some cases itmaybe impossible. It is clear that the longer the time 
in exile in a state of acute dependency, the greater will be the difficulty in 
achieving economic reintegration on return. 
Rogge (1994) suggests that the time lag (which may be of several seasons' duration) 
between the production of any meaningful output and!or profit from the land may be 
too long for some returnees to withstand, causing a disillusionment that may drive 
returnees to urban areas out a sheer desperation to survive (ibid., 36). Returnees may 
also lack essential experience or skills with agricultural practices as well as the tenacity 
and endurance to withstand drought and other natural calamities. Rogge (1994) notes 
that if these skills are not learned from childhood, they may be difficult to instill into 
young adults, especially if much of their adolescence and early adulthood has been 
spent in refugee camps (ibid., 38). Again, this may cause many to opt out of rural areas. 
The majority of Cambodian returnees who resettled in rural areas lack essential 
agricultural skills. Inaddition, returnees face constant threats to their security resulting 
from widespread corruption, nepotism and increasing instances of violence and 
lawlessness. The combination of poor skills and continual security threats make it hard 
for returnees to cope with the demands of agriculture or rural living conditions. 
Considering the numbers of returnees who have disappeared since the end of the 400 
day food aid, it is reasonable to assume that many have migrated to Phnom Penh, 
despite the fact that they also lack the skills required to achieve steady employment 
there. Alternatively, those who migrate from area to area seeking family or a conducive 
community, may also eventually reach the urban areas out of desperation. In urban 
areas, returnees would most likely join the ranks of the disadvantaged and vulnerable 
in permanent social and economic dislocation. The levels of poverty found in Phnom 
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Penh are more visible thanrural poverty as squatters are found in every abandoned and 
debilitated building, and alongside the numerous garbage dumps and quarries through­
out the city. Desperately poor and destitute people with no shelter at all, cook, eat, and 
sleep on city streets. As they sit begging in the streets, pulling cyclos or labouring in 
construction jobs, Cambodia's urban poor look malnourished and weary, lines etched 
deeply in their faces. Carol Strickle, CARE Co-ordinator in Pursat, commented on 
distinctive features of the Cambodian people: 
Everyone talks about the loss of family, of their children killed, their parents 
who were killed, and so on. Its still very much a part of their life in the present. 
Everyone seems to have a lot of physical complaints and there is a general lack 
of trust for anyone. 
Within the last six months many of the high hopes people had have faded. 
Great but false expectations were thought to come with the elections, but of 
course this has not happened. There is general disillusionment throughout 
the country, extensive corruption, political instability, recent military fight­
ing. People say it is just like before 1975. The Khmer Rouge advances on 
Battambang caused a mass exodus of NGOs, increased IDPs and a rise in 
banditry all over. Everyone is worried for themselves, for their country. 
Given the continuing degradation in Cambodia, the 'fading hopes' of returnees is 
widely shared and it is perhaps this sense of despondence and lack of future promise 
that makes returnees most indistinguishable from other Cambodians. 
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